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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This work has been conceived regarding the effects that law provoke in society and also 
on the observance of what society expects from law in answering some questions. It is interesting 
because we firstly depart from a conception of law which connects itself with many other fields 
of knowledge, such as sociology, biology and so on so forth. There are so many questions arising 
from problems society faces in front of civilization advancement natural process and in each one 
the analysis becomes twofold: what law provides as an answer and what society expect from law 
as an answer. 
The science of law has a lot of undeniable social traits, regardless whether contractarian 
theory sympathizer or not. At same time, as morality is a social compass, we also understand law 
as a science attached to moral background, especially in respect to human agency. Therefore, 
moral reasoning is a cornerstone of this work and we believe that there are several layers on 
human knowledge before reason as a human guide toward true knowledge and good decisions. 
During this process, warns Hugo Mercier, first comes inference, then intuitions, then intuitions 
about representations, then intuition about reasons and at last, reason1. The rationality here 
developed then goes through this very humane process of using reason to justify ideas and 
opinions.  
 
1 HUGO MERCIER AND DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF REASON 05-06 (2017). 
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Only through communicative action we may ascend to new levels of civilization social 
enhancement and law expand as moral instrument, while authorizing the democratic debate on 
values and providing accurate answers to real social problems2. The diversity of our opinions 
arises not from the fact that some of us are more reasonable then others, but solely that we have 
different ways of directing our thoughts, and do not take into account the same things. It is not 
enough to have good soul; you must be able to use it righteously. The greatest minds are capable 
of the greatest vices as well as the greatest virtues3.  
Reason can be worked to explain or justify decisions already taken and belief already 
held. This is a retrospective use of reason. On the other hand, sometimes reason is used as 
arguments in favor of new decisions or new beliefs. This is a prospective use of reason. Yet, 
when reason is used prospectively, it may be to answer a question which the answer is unknow 
or to convince others of an opinion one already has. The former is inquisitive reasoning, while 
the latter is argumentative reasoning, or communicative reasoning. In the production of reasons 
to convince others, the same reasons have both retrospective and prospective relevance4. 
Furthermore, this work trails on prospective reason at argumentative kind, since the arguments 
are made in favor of new decisions and beliefs and the aim of this argumentative exercise is to 
convince readers of author’s opinion about the matter, based in both retrospective and 
prospective element. 
 
2 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, DIREITO E DEMOCRACIA: ENTRE FACTICIDADE E VALIDADE 190-194 (Rio de Janeiro: 
Tempo Brasileiro, 2nd ed. 2012)  
3 René Descartes, Discurso do Método, in OBRAS ESCOLHIDAS 39, 41 (SÃO PAULO: DIFEL, 2ND EDITION, 1973). 
4 HUGO MERCIER AND DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF REASON 128-130 (2017). 
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On connecting the dots, we use both theoretical and pragmatic rationales. There are a lot 
of theories from doctrines just as much as theories from judicial precedents upon real cases. The 
main objective of this dissertation is to establish a deductive moral reasoning on situations of 
armed conflicts regulated by international law where targeting civilians becomes one of the most 
disturbing concerns of our morality of law and the use of it. Thus, the deduction method 
retrieved here comes from observation on what international courts are experimenting day by 
day in real cases where some observational and experimental truths are realized with axiomatic 
weight5.  
As a researcher, our posture is to inflict a critical spirit on some prevailing understanding 
on morality of law to discursively promote an alternative with intellectual honesty and humility 
towards what we hope to be a good use of reasoning. For that, Welber Barral explains that 
constructing a theory requires an analytical statement from technical knowledge to metascientific 
knowledge. The former is informative and useful to our routine, while the latter innovates 
concepts towards new ideas, very applied in dissertations6. Therefore, this work agglutinates 
some personal convictions on management of morality in human rights law and its relationship 
with other areas also covered by law. One thing that is very sensitive in hermeneutics lessons is 
the weight caused by the interpreter history and background in the application and insights of the 
law7.  
 
5 CARLOS MARÍA CÁRCOVA, LAS TEORÍAS JURÍDICAS POST POSITIVISTAS 33-34 (2ND EDITION, BUENOS AIRES: 
ABELEDO PERROT, 2009). 
6 WELBER OLIVEIRA BARRAL, METODOLOGIA DA PESQUISA JURÍDICA 29-34 (3RD EDITION, BELO HORIZONTE: 
DEL REY, 2007). 
7 1 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, VERDADE E MÉTODO 70-74 (PETRÓPOLIS: VOZES, 1997). 
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Therefore, it is undeniable my personal origin in a South American country where the 
discussions over the law is quite more theoretical than pragmatic. The way law is taught in 
Brazilian universities is very different from U.S. model of learning. First, Brazil has a civil law 
genealogy and a great influence of Catholic Church institution in state and social politics. As 
heritage, we work very hard in hermeneutics science to give our civil law traditions and legal 
rigidity (dura lex sed lex) some mobility towards the best account of justice possible. Second, 
moral values and dignity are, besides empiric hypocrisy revelations every day in our society, 
very important elements in law development and understanding in Brazil. Personally, I am 
agnostic, but I took a lot of moral lessons from my military catholic father and my geneticist 
protestant mother. Although being in military school my whole youth and taking theology 
classes in parallel with law classes, my social status of agnostic remained while I have been 
nurturing philosophies of goodness and altruism virtues with deep roots in Christianity, even 
towards animals to whom I am an enthusiastic defender of subjects of rights in the same way I 
am a vegetarian in order to save animal lives.    
All these background influences in the way I think and, certainly, in the way I write. 
Diversity of background and thinking is something that American universities are used to 
embrace which is one of the characteristics that made me look for something abroad. The 
American inputs help my personal and professional growth, the same way I expect my inputs and 
this work will be part of Penn State library materials which may touch any curious soul 
interested in something different from the usual American standard.    
With that being said, the construction of the thesis departs from an overall vision of 
international law and the new design in international society from the second half of last century 
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onwards. The promulgation of human rights core values, a whole international system centered 
in human dignity instead of state interests, and the method employed to govern all these elements 
toward a brand-new threshold of international law and international community, all of these new 
traits are exposed in this work. Some characteristics will make intimate connection with the 
purpose of this dissertation, which is legal and morally evaluation on targeting civilians in armed 
conflicts situations where emergency is a reality. 
Besides of the proliferation of new international actor and the decentralization and 
universalization of international society, the legal codification process and appearance of 
international courts, mainly human rights courts, have shown a great shift on international values 
and legal framework. A very interesting phenomenon we are able to point out is the leading role 
played by judicial decision-making process in defining international law legal contours. 
Associated with the vertical hierarchy structure of international legal system and the several 
primary sources of law to manage, Vienna Convention and ICJ Statute tries to bring harmony 
and integrity to international legal order when setting interpretation and application of law 
guidelines.  
Notwithstanding, international courts guided by the good intentions of promoting 
humanity core values and implementing into the law the dynamic and ductile elements of legal 
provisions semantic densification, creates an alternative body of legal source that, in practice, 
becomes primary source of international law. In addition, we have the opportunity to explain all 
avenue human rights law crossed, from origin values to moral reasoning configuration, which 
generates a very strong conception of law, both statutory and morally. The same proliferation of 
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values and plurality has given to human rights some moral quandaries which international courts 
have been settling case by case. 
By the same token, the law of war gains the moral component of humanity and Geneva 
Conventions are drafted to humanize the horrors of war and a good amount of international 
legislation also regulates civilians’ immunity and care, recommending the nominal replacement 
of law of war to international humanitarian law. Some international obligations upon civilians 
are bound in international law demanding heed to principles of distinction, necessity, 
proportionality and, most of all, humanity. Nevertheless, civilians continue to experiment the 
hellishness of hostilities all over the globe and international courts launch a new comprehension 
regarding mutual application of international humanitarian law and human rights law, setting 
eventual collision between each specific provision to be solved by lex specialis criteria of the 
former upon the latter. 
In the beginning of this century then, a new form of combat emerges astonishing all 
international community because of its characteristics, or the lack of it. New terrorism does not 
comply to any humanitarian or human rights law, and it is added by acts of shocking cowardice, 
evilness and cruelty, disregarding any value or distinction among their victims. International law, 
in response, progressively shapes its jurisprudence to try to overcome the evil, step by step, and 
restore peace and community welfare. During such process, some precedents mutates form 
incident to incident and some concerning considerations appears to guide this dissertation. 
Mainly focused in the relationship interplayed by international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, we establishe some foregrounds from where we unfold our thought over the 
matter. So, in an attempt to organize chronologically the ideas, we foresee three waves of 
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international law comprehension. The first would be the official merge between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law that, until that moment, were considered two opposite 
branches of law. Despite of being set international humanitarian law as lex specialis over human 
rights law, the compatibility between them was formally recognized. Secondly, human dignity 
morality was pushed to the center of the interwoven relationship, interfering in acts judgement 
performed during armed conflict situations. Finally the third wave, we have the human dignity 
morality and some important human rights law provisions and considerations withdrawn from 
the relationship, what happens initially in Europe, where the effects of the fight against global 
terror are being closely sensed. 
Regarding this third stage, we develop a critical analysis which disagrees with the 
rationale employed albeit agreeing with the overall conclusion. Basically, we scientifically and 
argumentatively uphold a theory that promotes the same outcome and final understanding, 
however, under different justifications. Believing that we are able to convince our arguments, the 
idea is to develop a creative theory of action which changes the morality overview on targeting 
civilians as side effect in armed conflicts situations. Taking account of all relevant international 
humanitarian law provisions, human rights morality and the combination of both with the recent 
understanding on their mutual interplay where not even the claim of formal derogation on human 
rights has to be fulfilled, we boldly present an alternative solution which complies with legal 
morality and rationality toward the action of targeting civilians. 
We chose to keep the scope of the analysis narrow, although the rationale we develop can 
be applied in different situations where factual analogies might be made. Nevertheless, the 
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situation under the lens is the action of targeting civilians during armed conflicts whose factual 
scenario matches with consensual notion of supreme emergency or state of exception. 
The materials used to elaborate this dissertation come from different parts of the world. I 
work with Brazilian theorists, especially international law scholars, Argentinian and European 
theories and law cases, a bunch of German scholars with their hermeneutics and sociology 
theories, a lot of American scholars and theorists as well, and Inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence and international documents, and United Nations documents and International 
Court of Justice cases likewise.  
Let’s do it! 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
SENSE OF COMMUNITY 
 
2.1. Introduction; 2.2. The Paradigm Shift of the International Law 
and International Community; 2.3. Rules in International Law; 
2.4. The Generalization of Values in International Law; 2.5. 
International Complex Legal Systems. 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The origin of international law is closely related to the birth of the European States as 
political, national and sovereign unities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The 
international law grew into modernity boundaries as an aftermath of the new European system of 
Nation-States and it has reflected the natural development of the common human necessities of 
all cultures. Then the old idea of a State surpasses the European frontiers and the European 
system itself allows the appearance and coexistence of others States under the same international 
rules, if “civilized” – basically the Christian States. Subsequently, a system arises based in 
concepts of territorial sovereignty and equality of prerogatives among them8. However, the 
international law did not regulate the issues that involved the vital interests of the States which 
were overlapped by the private interests of the dominant States. It means that, legally, all 
 
8 A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE – BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION 91-93 (2004). 
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members of the international community were on an equal footing but in practice, a group of 
Great Powers have led the international scenario9.  
Thus the old international law possessed two salient features about international rules and 
principles: (i) they were the product of Western civilization based on a laissez-faire, laissez 
passer philosophy that all States were equal and free to pursue their own interests, irrespective of 
any economic or social imbalance; and (ii) they were mainly framed by the Great Powers, reason 
why they serve their own interests. After the First World War had many decisive impacts 
because of its magnitude involved all major members of the international community. It became 
tough for States to keep aloof from what was happening around the world. So in 1917 a new 
ideology and political philosophy arose with the following fresh principles: (i) self-determination 
of peoples advocated by the USSR; (ii) the substantive equality of States instead of the old legal 
equality; (iii) socialist internationalism, for the first time proclaimed by a member State of the 
world community as a policy to disrupt the capitalism and it was rapidly implemented in Mexico 
and Germany, by the Constitutions of 1917 and 1919 respectively; and (iv) the partial rebuff of 
international law because it was hitherto contaminated with capitalist tendencies, so only the 
provisions that match with the socialist interests would be endorsed10. 
In 1919, the victors of the First World War decided to set up an international institution 
designed to prevent the recurrence of worldwide armed conflict, the League of Nations. The 
reigning atmosphere proclaimed that the human race would grow together into a single great 
community which system of international guarantees would prevent future wars and foster 
 
9 GUILLERMO R. MONCAYO ET AL, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 35-39 (BUENOS AIRES: ZAVALIA, 1990) 
10 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-36 (2ND EDITION, 2005)  
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democracy and small nations self-determination rights11. So that was an attempt to lay the 
foundations for an enduring peace by replacing the old diplomacy and crafting its boundaries 
around the notion of power balance through a system of collective security in which all nations 
would be part. Nevertheless, the sovereign equality was shared only between member States. 
Thus, the League of Nations was a universal organization with statutory and organic basis which 
primary mission was to preserve peace and security as well as to promote international 
cooperation. In parallel, there were the Permanent Court of International Justice – PCIJ, created 
in 1921, and arbitral tribunals.  
As known, the League of Nations did not prosper. There were a lot of differences 
between member States, lack of cooperation, its use as a political instrument by Britain and 
France and also some institutional deficiencies. Even in the period between the two world wars, 
States gradually endeavored to retrieve their traditional unfettered right to use military force in 
international relations. The League of Nations, in this aspect, served to slow down the process 
and diminish the instances of recourse to force. However, the inefficiency of the League 
contributed to make international arbitration a full bloom that suddenly was also preventing the 
eruption of new wars. But arbitration was inherently unable to restrain state power in politics. 
Besides these failures, some grounds were set into international arena: the society of states 
gradually became more universal; the principle of international legitimacy on self-determination 
was set in motion; and legal constraints have appeared to mold state’s freedom to engage war, 
especially those based on humanitarian principles12.   
 
11 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 72-73 (2003). 
12 DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 58-59 (2007). 
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This work departs from contemporary international law concepts since modernization 
theory, as once stated by Hans Joas, embeds the idea that modernity is peaceful13. Not 
abandoning Hobbesian view of a state that emerges from human evolution to consciously adopt 
the necessity of a higher power capable to defend society, nevertheless. In centralizing the power 
into state’s hands, the individuals celebrate an agreement where they forfeit their anarchic liberty 
in order to prevent chaos. The state then rises as leviathan, opulent biblical monster that 
commands the environment and protects its subjects at same time. Notwithstanding, John Locke 
has mitigated this state-centric vision as he considers that man’s original freedom is not forfeited 
and, on this regard, serves as limitation to state powers, although sovereignty remains the 
absolute and undeniable state power. Nevertheless, the sole existence of a prominent figure such 
as leviathan, whose subjects collectively submit to his will, allows positively unrestrained 
competition in economic markets or in the political arena which highlights individuality during 
the pursuit of personal goals and turns possible a system centered in individual interests14. Also, 
cooperation to escape war is easier between democracies; it is easier if states are subject to some 
degree of international authority.    
However, modern international law has gradually moved away from state-sovereignty-
centered outlook in order to strengthen transnational forces. So, the legal international system or 
order has been enriched with normative elements which emphasizes international social 
interaction where a plurality of relatively independent bodies share to each other political, 
economic and cultural bonds. In their mutual interactions, these bodies ought to comply with 
norms which are deemed to be binding on the basis of legal consciousness rooted in religious, 
 
13 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 45 (2003) 
14 HANS JOAS, THE CREATIVITY OF ACTION 09-10 (2005) 
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cultural and other common shared values. International law therefore has become an elastic term 
set on a cosmopolitan formulation of international society which aggregates individuals and non-
state groups besides sovereign states15. The basis of the emerging new international law has 
abandoned the absolute independence of states to enforce the idea of the international 
community which carries multiple international subjects that maintain interests and common 
rights with and before states, forming an organic whole16. An international order which is to have 
any authority other than pure self-interest is also going to need the moral resources. 
War has its teachable moment with great meaning for the collective. War works as 
teacher because it tears collective ideas away from the feelings in which they are harbored and 
then breaks down barriers to learning process17. Last century has been marked by two world wars 
who shaped deeply the new features of modern international law. After the war horrors, the 
international community has come to an inexorable conclusion: the international law, the 
international community itself and especially the law needed to change. It became evident the 
existing tension between the opposite poles of law and force. Although we still have those 
escolars who advocate the realistic need of a leviathan to regulate international relations and 
bring peace to international community18, there is a growing movement of idealists who convey 
that international norms and rules must fulfill the righteous criteria of justice which has cardinal 
roots in natural law19.  
 
15 DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 36-53 (2007). 
16 STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (2014). 
17 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 182 (2003) 
18 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 112 (4TH EDITION, 2006). 
19 DEMÉRITO MAGNOLI, O MUNDO CONTEMPORÂNEO: RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 1945-2000 27 (SÃO PAULO: 
MODERNA, 1997). 
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On this regard, the international legal system foundation has shifted your core from state-
centric to individual-centered, mostly toward human rights. International law has been so 
dramatically enhanced that new rules and principles have been stated and performed upon; a new 
international framework has been established with a view to place an ever-increasing number of 
legal restraints on state sovereignty. Peace has become again the major objective of the world 
community at large. In an instable and unsecure world, humanity’s law has been constituted by 
the normative combination of the law of war, international human rights and international 
criminal justice which has reset the international relationships discourse20. In this vein, 
International Court of Justice ruling the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America asserted 
that the human effort to promote peace is the very cornerstone of international community which 
is so eager for peace and progress that its “non-observance could lead to disastrous consequences 
causing untold misery to humanity”21. 
 
2.2. The Paradigm Shift of the International Law and International Community 
 
Before the Second World War the demands of individuals that were not recognized as 
international subjects were initially accepted in two ways: related to the uprising policy of 
banning the institution of slavery and in groups of individuals when the complaints about 
religious, ethnic and linguistic issues were lodged with international bodies. These normative 
innovations were indicative of the new tendency to pay greater heed to the interests of human 
 
20 RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 04 (2011). 
21 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), 1986 I.C.J. §§143-146 (June 27). 
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beings who until then had had no say whatsoever in the international community22. The 
establishment of mutual beneficial relations between states has become a primary goal in the new 
international law regime. Afterall, it is the establishment of a legal relationship between states 
that fully creates the preconditions required to enable every human being to live in accordance 
with the imperatives of reason and peace, even domestically23.  
However, new standards and human values were required following the end of the 
Second World War. It was unshakable the belief that government themselves were not capable of 
safeguarding human rights which, from that day forward, should demand international 
guarantees24. Consequently, some States lost their prerogative of self-interpretation of the 
international law and it was collectively reconfigured to encourage only cooperative measures. 
Therefore, international community makeover changes radically. The paradigm shift from classic 
international law to contemporary is chiefly divided in five waves designed to prevent future 
generations to experience the horrors of wars and to establish new directives to reach a common 
good between nations and peoples25.  
First, the rising of a fiercely codification process of international legal order and the 
appearance of new institutions, regional systematization and organization of multiples branches 
of international law (Law of the Sea, Law of International Organizations, International 
Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law and so on and so forth). Therefore, there 
 
22 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-39 (2ND EDITION, 2005) 
23 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 35 (2003) 
24 LUIS MARÍA DESIMONI, LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y LA GUERRA CONTRA EL TERROR 35 (BUENOS AIRES: 
EDITORIAL ÁBACO DE RODOLFO DEPALMA, 2009). 
25 ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, DIREITO DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 527-528 (BELO 
HORIZONTE: DEL REY, 5TH EDITION, 2012). 
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has been a continuing expansion and development of areas which were not used to international 
scrutiny, such as transit, outer space, civil aviation, intellectual property, the Antarctic and 
terrorism. Throughout this expansion in the content of international law, a far deeper process of 
world politics legislation also has taken place26. 
Second, the legal order receives an institutional form genuinely universal. The liberal-
democratic theory was increasing and gradually granting legal entitlements to individuals on the 
international arena throughout the human rights doctrine. Individuals have been enabled to call 
states into account before international bodies whenever they feel their rights are being 
disregarded or overlooked. It has not only resulted in the drafting of several protective 
international treaties (mainly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, the 
American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights of 1981) but also creating regionals Courts of Human Rights (besides the International 
Court of Justice, it was instituted the European Court of Human Rights, in Strasbourg/France, the 
American Court of Human Rights, in San Jose/Costa Rica, and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, in Arusha/Tanzania)27. 
From this point on, we may unfold the third wave which gives to international law a great 
deal of legal content and jurisdictional solution to settle international disputes. As envisioned by 
Article 95 of United Nations Charter, there has been a gradual creation of judicial bodies with 
international jurisdictions to solve controversies between parties and to directly safeguard human 
 
26 DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 61-62 (2007) 
27 VALÉRIO DE OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, CURSO DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 880-938 (SÃO PAULO: RT, 
5TH EDITION, 2011). 
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rights from all citizens of the world28. When the Permanent Court of International Justice Statute 
was elaborated in 1920, the dimension of international law was notably inter-state based which 
led the judicial functionalism of that period to focus only on states disputes, option that no longer 
stands since now an individual person is entitled of capacity to act (legitimation ad causam) and 
to be (locus standi in judicio) before international courts29. Hence, international courts have 
acquired great importance on appeasing international conflict through their jurisprudence which 
have earned a major role on international law dynamics as we shall see forwardly.   
Forth, a communitarian law that comes from the openness and universality of 
international arena which makes it henceforth decentralized and horizontal on its subjects. The 
openness grants the appearance to new international actors, which differs from international 
subjects since the former, albeit playing a significant role in international arena, does not have 
full agency in international law life, as the latter, such as transnational corporations, for example. 
All international subjects are international actors, but reciprocity is untrue. Decentralization 
grants a unique system of operability in international law but without monopoly of a central 
power. Based on self-tutelage it also consolidates juridical equality among its members, like 
previewed in Articles 1 and 2 of United Nations Charter, international community enshrines the 
principle of non-discrimination and reciprocity among all subjects30.   
 
28 Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, El Valor Del Derecho y La Jurisprudencia Internacionales de Derechos Humanos en 
el Derecho y la Justicia Internos – El Ejemplo de Costa Rica, in LIBER AMICORUM, HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUNDIO, 
VOL. I 169, 175 (SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA: CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1998). 
29 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the due Process of Law, 
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado 
Trindade, §30 (October 1, 1999). 
30 SIDNEY GUERRA, CURSO DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 48-49 (SÃO PAULO: SARAIVA, 7TH EDITION, 
2013). 
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Then, states remain international law primary actor, although new players come into 
action bearing the same stature of states in international dialogue. New countries have been 
recognized after the erosion of colonial empires tradition; there was acceptance of new subjects 
like international organizations, private and public, national liberation movements and 
individuals per se or in groups, transfiguring international society into a universal and opened 
community. The selection criteria of international law subjects as civilized nations was shattered 
and United Nations, in 1945, promptly allowed the adherence of fifty-one new states-parties31. 
These actual subjects actively participate in foreign relations, also demonstrating the new 
decentralized nature of international law. The decentralized power similarly leads to a position of 
horizontal equality of its subjects, without overlapping each other, compelling the states to 
support a policy of non-discrimination and reciprocity32.  
Finally, the growing significance of global civil society, legalization and interventionism 
bring into international scenario of cosmopolitan principles whose origins is to be found in the 
ideas of a great community of mankind and natural law. Cosmopolitanism enjoins moral 
obligations and rights as possessed equally by all individuals regardless their bond – or no bond 
at all – to any specific political community. There are cosmopolitan signs spread in international 
treaties and customary rules of international law, especially those relating to human rights and 
the environment, which have coined valuable expressions like ‘equal and inalienable rights’ and 
‘common heritage of mankind’ respectively33. It is now acknowledged that there are some rights 
inherited by human personality which makes it inviolable by any positive norm and international 
 
31 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (6TH EDITION,2008) 
32 A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE – BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION 157 (2004). 
33 DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 64-65 (2007) 
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law shall be the guardian of it, regulating the relationship among cultures to turn it more 
sophisticated and improved as a universal community34. Thus, cosmopolitanism doctrines have 
stressed the importance of the community defined by common history, tradition and culture, 
planting the seeds of people’s right of self-determination. Under the influence of collectivist 
doctrines, individual rights came to be viewed as relative to a community, and essentially 
belonging to its members35. 
After two world wars, cosmopolitan law becomes the great hope for international 
community. It offers legitimate governance worldwide and is based in an “ethical-and-human-
rights-law discourse” built on Kant morality groundwork. This new discourse makes opposition 
to the traditional state-centric interests. International law turns into the appropriate channel to 
achieve peace, international security and to promote democracy and human rights all over the 
planet. Cosmopolitan landscape effectively captures the spirit that animates the proliferation of 
law to turn it essentially a timeless moral truth on pursuit of justice realizations36. 
Simultaneously, the self-interest governance and social tribalism, which gained strength in Nazi 
policies through social Darwinist ideas philosophically encouraged by Nietzsche, are overcome. 
Compassion is no longer weakness, but moral solidarity; human dignity morality is no longer 
loathsome, rather the new core of international law and community. Respect and sympathy 
become the heart of our system37. 
 
34 VICENTE RÁO, O DIREITO E A VIDA DOS DIREITOS 56-57 (SÃO PAULO: RT, 5TH EDITION, 1999). 
35 Maya Hertig Randall, The History of International Human Rights Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 03, 10 (2013). 
36 RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 167 (2011). 
37 JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY 327-337 (2nd ed., 2012) 
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As an outcome of international wide legislation and the appearance Vienna Convention 
on treaties in 1969, international law codification henceforth follows general rules. Sources of 
law has been divided in primary and secondary, being treaties, international customs and general 
principles of law primaries sources and jurisprudence and doctrine secondaries. In addition, it 
has been settled that instruments neither stemmed from treaty nor customs might acquire 
imperative status whether bearing human value, as jus cogens which is appreciated by some as 
formal acceptance of natural law precepts in international arena, since it marks the groundwork 
for the community as it occupies the higher level in international juridical logic and objective 
framework38. The concept of imperative norms pulled out from jus cogens requires 
straightforward formulation and does not stay immune of the idea of limitation since it is axial to 
law’s understanding that everything that is legally enforced is, at same time, susceptible to 
certain limits. However, jus cogens is currently considered as statutory law over the combined 
application of articles 53 and 64 of Vienna Convention where jus cogens has received the 
recognition in international law either as treaty or custom39.  
From this moment on, international law establishes its fundamental principles regarding 
moral and political agendas, both mitigating states sovereignty. Whilst sovereignty remains a 
core principle of international law, it now faces limitations set by consensus in international 
community, which are: prohibition of aggression and unilateral use of force; self-determination 
 
38 HILDEBRANDO ACCIOLY ET AL, MANUAL DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 137-138 (SÃO PAULO: 
SARAIVA, 20TH EDITION, 2012). 
39 Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, El Valor Del Derecho y La Jurisprudencia Internacionales de Derechos Humanos en 
el Derecho y la Justicia Internos – El Ejemplo de Costa Rica, in LIBER AMICORUM, HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUNDIO, 
VOL. I 169, 177-179 (SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA: CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1998). 
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of peoples; and the full respect to human rights40. Thus, the state that overlooks humanity value 
incurs in grave and systematic violations of human rights which make the state accountable 
before international community. No sovereignty permits the commitment of such violations 
toward mankind, not even against one sole individual41. Hence, it seems evident today that the 
essential point in international law is the full protection of human rights42. 
The major problem of our era is not to find reasonable argument to sustain human rights 
but to effectively endorse and protect them. As portrayed by David Rieff, by the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, we had come to accept the new conventional wisdom that there are no 
humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems43. With that being said, our problem is not of 
philosophical nature, but juridical and political. Behind the smokescreen of human rights, 
international law had hereafter the concern to grapple the safest way to ensure human rights and 
compel their continuously violations not mattering the right nature or foundation. Besides, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 has already set the cornerstone of human rights 
foundation which irrefutable value has been reached by international consensus – consensus 
omnium gentium or humani generis44.  
 
 
40 HILDEBRANDO ACCIOLY ET AL, MANUAL DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 953-954 (SÃO PAULO: 
SARAIVA, 20TH EDITION, 2012). 
41 Juridical Conditions and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. 
(ser. A) No. 18, §100 (September 17, 2003). 
42 SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 176 (2010). 
43 David Rieff, Humanitarianism in Crisis, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE VOL. 81 N. 6, 111 (2002). 
44 NORBERTO BOBBIO, A ERA DOS DIREITOS 25-27 (RIO DE JANEIRO: ELSEVIER, 2004). 
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2.3. Rules in International Law 
 
The international law codification process means the predominance of statutory law in 
international society. Thus, two major kind of law is produced, those related to organization and 
addressed to international organs and their proceedings; and those related to social behavior and 
values, where we have a fact and its consequence hypothetically foreseen all mingled by law to 
achieve the aim of promoting justice. International norms are characterized therefore by an 
enunciative propositional structure of certain organization or conducts that ought to be followed 
objectively and mandatorily, since they are formally and materially accepted by international 
community’s members (praeceptum juris), building the international legal system or order45.  
The sources of law can be either formal or material. The former is the positive norms 
built up by society through a formal law-making process while the latter is the phenomenic 
events of the world, studied by philosophy, sociology and so many other fields of social 
knowledge. In positive legal system, just as the contemporary international legal order, the 
primary sources of law are statutes, customs and general principles of law (Article 38 of 
International Court of Justice Statute). There are though some scholars that heavily criticize 
positive international legal order for being contradictory since it does not have an international 
legislative branch, international courts with mandatory jurisdiction and sanctions centrally 
organized which provokes a lot of disbelief to law practitioners. Under this outlook, international 
 
45 SIDNEY GUERRA, CURSO DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 63-64 (SÃO PAULO: SARAIVA, 7TH EDITION, 
2013). 
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rules would be only social structures made by primary obligations that would not afford it to be 
called as law46.   
Notwithstanding, we acknowledge international law as a valid general branch of law. 
Although possessing a diminutive juridical structure, the positive norms of international law do 
not lack of effectiveness and coercibility, which is enough to be called as law. The domestic 
structure of law and how it is conceived does not erode the validity of a different framework on 
international arena for not reproducing it ipsis litteris. International law is defined by a complex 
system of juridical norms, built by consensus or custom, and principles which sets rights and 
duties in international society to all its actors and then coordinates coherently international 
relationships among them. As the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg put it, 
“individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience 
imposed by the individual State”47. So, there is a web of justice which affords security and 
effectiveness with certainty to all activities from all international figures, based on cooperation 
and fulfilment of multiples collective and individual interests48.   
In this new horizon of international law, the active agency and dynamism of international 
organizations have been a great deal to reshape international law legal order to give it a 
multilateral progress, regional integration and international cooperation. There have been a lot of 
contribution on regulating new areas of human activity and the institutional setup of a gradual 
 
46 HEBERT L. A. HART, O CONCEITO DE DIREITO 230 (LISBOA: FUNDAÇÃO CALOUSTE GULBENKIAN, 5TH 
EDITION, 2007). 
47 Cited as [I.M.T., 1 (1946), p. 223] by JOANISVAL BRITO GONÇALVES, TRIBUNAL DE NUREMBERG 1945-1946 
27 (RIO DE JANEIRO: RENOVAR, 2004). 
48 HILDEBRANDO ACCIOLY ET AL, MANUAL DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 950-951 (SÃO PAULO: 
SARAIVA, 20TH EDITION, 2012). 
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valorization on international statutory law regarding humanity concerns, issues that states were 
never primarily interested to regulate satisfactorily. This role of international organizations 
furthermore has enriched the process of contemporary international law universalization49.   
By this token, international legal system, as conceived in Article 38 of International 
Court of Justice Statute, is programed into a vertical body of law, recognizing inside of the entire 
system a hierarchy among legal sources. Thus, jus cogens norms are recognized as 
“hierarchically higher than any other rule of international law, be it general or particular, 
customary or conventional, with the exception, of course, of other jus cogens norms”. So, it can 
be said that jus cogens, as a source of international law within a vertical legal system, basically 
overrides any other rule which does not have the same status. Consequently, in the “event of a 
conflict between a jus cogens rule and any other rule of international law, the former prevails”50.  
In accordance to Articles 53 and 64 of Vienna Convention of 1969, jus cogens are 
peremptory norms set in the highest position of our vertical international legal system. On this 
regard, human rights law is significantly appreciated as jus cogens norms. International Court of 
Justice has held that self-determination right51, war crimes and crimes against humanity52 are jus 
cogens; same did European Court towards freedoms, life and human integrity rights53 and Inter-
 
49 ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, DIREITO DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 534-537 (BELO 
HORIZONTE: DEL REY, 5TH EDITION, 2012). 
50 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., joint dissenting opinion filed by Mr Rozakis and 
Mr Caflisch joined by Mr Wildhaber, Mr Costa, Mr Cabral Barreto and Mrs Vajić (2001). 
51 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 
I.C.J. §136 (July 9). 
52 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 
§56 (February 14). 
53 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., §73 (2008); and Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom 
[GC], no. 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). 
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American Court54 and Commission55 towards all human rights. Hence, it is widely accepted that 
human rights protection is a general principle of law categorized as jus cogens splattering all 
over international and domestics legal jurisdictions and taking first level position in hierarchy 
scale of international norms56. 
In this hierarchy, international courts decisions occupy a down rate position, at the 
bottom of the verticality since it is considered as auxiliary source of law. Nevertheless, by 
techniques of interpretation and application of the law, we can assure that international 
jurisprudence is endowed of plenitude and full operability as legal source, which has granted to 
Article 38 a lot of critics and challenges. International community thereof interprets and applies 
Article 38 in broader terms. Even though, as auxiliary source, courts’ decisions cannot be based 
only on previous courts’ decisions, rather the rationale ought to embed treaties, customs and/or 
 
54 Case of the Members of the Village of Chichupac and neighboring communities of the Municipality of Rabinal v. 
Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No.328, §124 
(November 30, 2016); Caso Velásquez Paiz y Otros v. Guatemala, Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones 
y Costas, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 307, §173 (Noviembre 15, 2015); Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. 
Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, 
§264 (August 28, 2014); Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 289, §141 (November 20, 2014); Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, Members 
and Activists of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 279, §197 (May 29, 2014); Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion 
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) No. 18, §101 (September 17, 2003); Case of the Ituango Massacres v. 
Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 148, §47 (July 1, 
2006); Case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, reparations and costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, 
§100 (March 11, 2005); Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 83, §10 (March 14, 
2001); and Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. 
(ser. C) No. 22, §178 (September 15, 2005) among so many others. 
55 Coard et al v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 
6 rev, §39 (1999); and Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report Nº 121/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §331 (2018) among others 
56 German J. Bidart Campos, Jerarquía y Prelación de Normas em un Sistema Internacional de Derechos Humanos, 
in LIBER AMICORUM, HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUNDIO, VOL. I 447, 449-451 (SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA: CORTE 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1998). 
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general principles of law57. Far from being treated as a auxiliary source of international law, the 
decisions and opinions of the Court are treated as authoritative pronouncements upon the current 
state of international law. Even advisory opinions have a role of great importance58.  
For instance, if ICJ makes a judicial statement about some concrete case and turns it into 
international custom, this judicial opinion becomes binding in term of elevating that decision to 
primary source of law instead of auxiliary. Therefore, in theory this decision is not mandatory 
besides the parties involved, according to Article 59 of ICJS, but in practice it becomes primary 
law, binding and erga omnes59, what can be seen in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey case, 
where measures set by the European Court became binding through interpretation process under 
Article 31 of Vienna Convention that points to human rights system of protection in compliance 
to principle of effectiveness60. Thereafter, international jurisprudences are more than merely a 
secondary provenance for international law. ICJ has also stressed that judicial decisions are not 
incapacitated to law-making process, neither it is improper to function under this threshold, since 
it gives law provisions their accurate content. The court “states the existing law and does not 
legislate. This is so even if, in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify 
its scope and sometimes note its general trend”61.  
 
 
57 Manuel Becerra Ramírez, Las Decisiones Judiciales como Fuente del Derecho Internacional de Los Derechos 
Humanos, in LIBER AMICORUM, HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUNDIO, VOL. I 431, 432-433 (SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA: CORTE 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1998). 
58 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERMATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 203 (2004). 
59 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, MANUAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 33 (MÉXICO: FONDO DE CULTURA 
ECONÓMICA, 1994). 
60 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§122-123 (2005).  
61 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. §18 (July 8). 
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2.4. The Generalization of Values in International Law 
 
Universalist values are produced by wars. However, they do not owe their triumph to 
military force and victories, but to the fact that they are capable of generalization. Although 
paradoxical, war succumbs universalist values but, overturning the basket, war curbs values and 
stimulate their impetus to flourish. Therefore, a generalization of values must embrace everyone, 
never legitimizing their use in some instances and disavowing in others, since hypocrisy is not 
the road to moral education62. Like history denounces, the universalization process on human 
rights, what shall be grasped in more details at next chapter, new values were injected into 
international political system63. These common values are definitive elements of international 
law and interpretations of treaties performed by States, international courts and competent organs 
shall constitute a relevant consideration in solution of cases or definition of any terms meaning 
or notions64.  
Modern humanistic values can be traced back to the visionaries of the Enlightenment 
who sought a more just relationship between the state and its citizens. Notably after American 
Bill of Rights and independence process and French Revolution, human rights language was, in 
their beginning, a municipal matter, an internal affair between the government and its citizens. 
International regulation regarding human values through international codification on human 
rights would have been perceived as interference in the domains of the state. It remained, with 
 
62 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 185 (2003) 
63 Manuel Becerra Ramírez, Las Decisiones Judiciales como Fuente del Derecho Internacional de Los Derechos 
Humanos, in LIBER AMICORUM, HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUNDIO, VOL. I 431, 434 (SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA: CORTE 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1998). 
64 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., §85 (2008). 
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the exception of minority protection following the First World War, a subject of national law 
until after the Second World War. With the conclusion of the Second World War human rights 
became part of international law, starting with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 194865. 
After the end of twentieth century, history has pointed us towards an investigation into 
the conditions of peace with a sober analysis of specifically modern tendencies to war. For that, 
there is a need to justify the normative premises underlying the modern theory and its 
regenerative effect of violence. Thereafter, we have launched a clear consciousness that 
democracy is the yardstick of social progress – although the twentieth-first century has shown an 
astonishing recession on democracy regimes66 – and the social and legal reinforcement of crucial 
values and their foundation and development through civilization process67. It is the research on 
the role of war in social changes that promotes impacts and configurations in international law 
which allows modernization processes, moreover through international courts jurisprudence who 
pragmatically sets the genesis of new values and the tension between them and existing 
institutions68. 
The Nuremberg trials set in motion an important wave that has channeled the further 
judgments in every international Court and promoted a big wave of values generalization. Basic 
premises were established, and a new order and human values arose. The interpretation and 
 
65 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, in ISRAELI LAW REVIEW. VOL. 40, NO.2, 310, 313 (2007). 
66 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AS ORIGENS DA ORDEM POLÍTICA: DOS TEMPOS PRÉ-HUMANOS ATÉ A REVOLUÇÃO 
FRANCESA 19 (RIO DE JANEIRO: ROCCO, 2013) 
67 ANA PAULA DE BARCELLOS, A EFICÁCIA JURÍDICA DOS PRINCÍPIOS CONSTITUCIONAIS: O PRINCÍPIO DA 
DIGNIDADE DA PESSOA HUMANA 236 (RIO DE JANEIRO: RENOVAR, 2002) 
68 HANS JOAS, THE SACREDNESS OF THE PERSON: A NEW GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 86 (2013). 
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application of the human rights therefore became the main task of the international courts and 
these issues were no longer centralized in States’ hands. Moreover, every new subject of 
international law gained the faculty to participate and debate about these rights. These conditions 
emerged from the new framework of the world community, now universal and open to everyone. 
All these confluent events hugely contributed to the improvement of international law which, day 
by day, became an instrument of reality changer full of details. Henceforth every international 
actor has inherited the duty to promote the legal progress criticizing the rules and meditating on 
their guidelines for their gradual reconfiguration through the appointments of proper and 
opportune reforms69. That is the path towards law stability without being static, and dynamic 
without being frenetic. That is the reason why Norberto Bobbio calls the twentieth century as the 
Age of Rights. In this century, particularly, an entire new structure of law has erected, and as he 
has predicted, the improvement of law would make us experience its greatest challenge in the 
following century when all the functionality of that structure hardly built would be tried70. 
Despite the revolutionary development of human rights in the United Nations era, no 
attempts have been made to bring to justice such gross perpetrators of crimes against humanity 
or genocide as Pol Pot, Idi Amin or Saddam Hussein, perhaps because the atrocities in 
Cambodia, Uganda and Iraq (against the Kurds) did not occur in the context of international 
wars. Internal strife and even civil wars are still largely outside the parameters of war crimes and 
the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva conventions71. As asserted by Johnathan Glover, the 
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numbers of people murdered by Stalin’s tyranny far surpass those killed in the Nazi camps. The 
numbers of Mao’s victims are yet greater. Pol Pot killed a far higher proportion of the population 
than Hitler did and yet, even after thinking about Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot, to turn towards Hitler 
still seems to be to look into the deepest darkness of all72. 
Even though, it is post Holocaust that a collective process enacts a community 
declaration drafted by a diverse group of authors and successful case of “value generalization”, 
containing plural moral elements of individual and social nature. The world was unaware of the 
full extent of the Holocaust during the war, but efforts toward a human rights declaration were 
made before the war was over. Again, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a composite 
synthesis, the result of a dynamic process in which many minds, interests, backgrounds, legal 
systems and ideological persuasions played their respective determining role – the result of a 
successful and authentic process of value generalization. What was agreed was merely a 
declaration that was entirely or largely legally nonbinding, at first. Later on, it became binding 
by successive treaties, such as the two Covenants of 1966, and regarded binding too as 
customary law73. All human rights law framework, then, respected the cultural specificities 
between Western and Eastern cultures and civilizations, taking note of both differences of origins 
and values. Hence, international community builds daily its terms towards universally shared 
cultural assumptions of a universal validity based on generalization of values74. 
 
72 JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY 317 (2nd ed., 2012) 
73 HANS JOAS, THE SACREDNESS OF THE PERSON: A NEW GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 182-188 (2013). 
74 Xiaorong Li, “Asian Values” and the Universality of Human Rights, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
397, 407 (2001). 
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After horrors and unnecessary suffering provoked by men and overlooked by law and 
nations, a generalization of values becomes a need to dislodge human cruelty and to promote 
mankind communitarian peace. So testimony like Fergal Keane’s becomes obsolete: “it is this 
immensity of evil that prompts me to speak of the ‘soul of man’… I felt there was enough 
decency and love around to nourish the gift of hope. There will be many who say that I was 
foolish, naïve to ever have had such faith in man. Maybe they are right. In any event after 
Rwanda I lost that optimism”75. Objective not accomplished, yet, but at least we have a plurality 
of international actors and a legal system that afford some good fighting. Respect for human 
dignity is one of the great barriers against atrocity and cruelty which winning requires social 
cooperation and impulses.  
Cooperation is the reason why we still exist and, at same time, one of our greatest 
challenge in building an international community based on universal and generalized values. As 
all animals, we have individualistic impulses, however what makes we excel in animal kingdom 
is the ability to compose strong social impulses. Therefore, the survival and advancement of 
international community relies greatly in our social values, not disregarding individuals 
nevertheless76.  
  
2.5. International Complex Legal System 
 
 
75 FERGAL KEANE, SEASON OF BLOOD: A RWANDAN JOURNEY 185 (1996). 
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Contemporary international law framework is complex because it possesses a plurality of 
legal sources set in vertical hierarchy. In such kind of legal systems, it is normal when we face 
conflicts between legal sources which, at first glance, might seem contradictory to each other 
but, as a system, there is a method to pacify the supposed conflict, otherwise it would not be able 
to be called as a system. No serious system tolerates incompatible norms, reason why a 
mechanism of incompatibility elimination must be drawn. First and foremost, we need to 
apprehend that a vertical hierarchy system is endowed of three cooperating characteristics: (i) 
unity, meaning that the norm that is at the higher edge until the other at the bottom, both of them 
and all other in between, shall be connected and aligned, like an imaginary umbilical cord; (ii) 
coherence, meaning that all these norms from the top to the bottom must be harmonious in their 
purpose to guide action upon the with uniformity, so from multiplicity of norms we shall see 
orderly coexistence to the whole body of law just as much as between each other, working 
reciprocally without collision, molding a systematic and consistent bloc of law; and (iii) 
wholeness, meaning that all norms combined should cover all areas of human agency and 
interests in such way that there is no gap77. 
To a better comprehension, the villain of unity would be the lack of hierarchy, concerning 
a horizontal system of norms where each norm trumps the other, creating legal confusion; of 
coherence would be contradiction, technically called as antinomie, a norm prohibiting something 
another allows and vice versa; and of wholeness would be legal gaps, situations which law does 
not provide an answer, leaving the subject disregarded and certain situation uncovered. Although 
these crucial triad, we still lack of a perfect deductive system. An interesting fact on international 
 
77 NORBERTO BOBBIO, TEORIA DO ORDENAMENTO JURÍDICO 71-80 (10TH EDITION, BRASÍLIA: EDITORA UNB, 
1999). 
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legal system is that we have among valid norms some that are formal and written and others that 
are customary and, mostly, unwritten. This is very interesting because it requires from us a 
certain sense of “spirit of the system”, which leads to dynamic mechanisms of interpretations and 
the exercise of teleology to reach the ratio essendi (“raison d’être”) of the law78.  
Foregoing, to apply international law entirely, the interpretation and application 
deductive process of rationality is imminent and essential. This is the only avenue to full 
comprehension of a complex legal system, especially when we need to extract from it the inner 
morality and rationality, something beyond literality. It is this global vision that allows us to link 
past, present and future in law, guiding all interpretation and application of law as a system, not 
as isolated bodies of law. A sense of entirety must be extracted from the legal system, showing 
order from unity, coherence and wholeness features79. Furthermore, international law framework 
is a complex one, because it is made of multiples sources, positivists and customary. Among 
primary and secondary sources on law, we got international decisions which are considered a 
secondary source of law as inserted in article 38 of ICJ Statute. They are auxiliary means on 
international rule of law-making process. For that reason, article 59 makes it crystal clear that 
international court decisions apply only to the parties involved in such way that precedents shall 
not create legal rules. Despite this, Guillermo Moncayo and Thomas Buergenthal grasp a 
relevant warning when entails that international court decisions are a direct consequence of 
international law applicability, which means that it is court decisions that give international law 
its content and reach. Therefore, international court decisions should not be deemed as an alien 
 
78 NORBERTO BOBBIO, TEORIA DO ORDENAMENTO JURÍDICO 76 (10TH EDITION, BRASÍLIA: EDITORA UNB, 
1999).  
79 1 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, VERDADE E MÉTODO 444-487 (PETRÓPOLIS: VOZES, 1997). 
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source of law irrespective of treaties. Rather, it represents law interpretation in order to make it 
applicable to our day by day cases and their inner vicissitudes. This is the key to allow the 
progressive development of international law80.   
Likewise, Nils Melzer considers caselaw and doctrine as tools to permit treaties, custom 
and general principles of law to be applied in practice. Largely treaties, which possess statutory 
nature, contain indeterminacy in their expressions and concepts that needs interpretation that 
falls primarily to international courts and tribunals81. Therefore, three features have been relevant 
to harmonize and expand international legal system and its idea of rule of law, the prominence of 
general principles of law, the modern unity of law toward justice accomplishment and 
international jurisdiction as a mean to fulfil and pursue justice alongside domestic jurisdiction82. 
In essence, the primacy of justice becomes a foundational priority that bears a great deal of moral 
sense which outweighs political interests. Justice become not one value among other, but the 
highest of all social virtues, the one that must to be met during law’s interpretation and 
application on individual rights83.  
To determine the meaning of the terms and phrases used in the human rights bodies of 
law, Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention guide the rules of interpretation. Therefore, 
international courts are required to ascertain the “ordinary meaning to be given to the words in 
 
80 GUILLERMO R. MONCAYO ET AL, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 153-154 (BUENOS AIRES: ZAVALIA, 
1990); AND THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, MANUAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 33 (MÉXICO: FONDO DE 
CULTURA ECONÓMICA, 1994). 
81 NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 25 (2016). 
82 Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, A Contribuição dos Tribunais Internacionais à Evolução do Direito 
Internacional Contemporâneo, in O DIREITO INTERNACIONAL E O PRIMADO DA JUSTIÇA 03, 12-14 (RIO DE 
JANEIRO: RENOVAR, 2014). 
83 MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 02 (2ND EDITION, 1998). 
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their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the provision from which they are 
drawn”, taking also into consideration significant “supplementary means of interpretation, either 
to confirm a meaning determined in accordance with the above steps, or to establish the meaning 
where it would otherwise be ambiguous, obscure, or manifestly absurd or unreasonable”. Since 
human rights law is first and foremost a “system for the protection of human rights, the Court 
must interpret and apply it in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not 
theoretical and illusory. The Convention must also be read as a whole and interpreted in such a 
way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions”84. 
This advanced legislative technique reproduced in Vienna Convention on interpreting and 
applying international statutes (treaties), the legal, formal and written primary and most notable 
source of international law gives life to their words. Unity feature amounts the idea that the law 
is not anyone of its elements isolated but all of them combined and, to attain the raison d’être, we 
need to take into consideration simultaneously fact, rule and value, each one correlating to each 
other in a dialectic manner. As once said by a German international law professor, Josef Kunz, 
“the law is a normative integration of facts in accordance with values”85. International law no 
longer is conceived as a fact floating in the abstraction, lost in space and time, because now it is 
steeped in humanity, communicating with its agglutination of feelings and hopes. It is part of an 
existential process of both individual and community. On this end, individualism gives place to 
social and humanistic conception of law and, as a result of this valuative ethic, the provisions of 
 
84 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§65-66 (2008); Saadi v. the United Kingdom 
[GC], no. 13229/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., § 62 (2008); and Stec and Others v. The United Kingdom, nos. 65731/01 and 
65900/01 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§47-48 (2006).  
85 JOSEF LAURENZ KUNZ, LA FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO LATINOAMERICANA EM EL SIGLO XX 30 (BUENOS 
AIRES: LOUSADA S.A., 1951) 
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statutes, even without textual modifications, automatically come to mean something different, 
something in accordance with the paramount principle of justice and humanity86.  
So, the provisions of law intentionally encapsulate general concepts that need 
interpretation in every step of human evolution and advancement of civilization. These general 
concepts are represented in multisemantic words, called “general clauses”, which vagueness 
permits the interconnection of other fields of human knowledge, like sociology, economy, 
religion, politics etc., allowing them to function as truly elements of connection in the legal 
system through judicial interpretation and application of the law. Inevitably then, all kind of 
concepts and axiological vectors from these fields come to account for the solution of social and 
personal issues principally those related to the human dignity. Thus, legal provisions gain 
mobility through moral variables and then becomes an elastic tool to operate international justice 
and to affirm community values87. This methodology consents the entry of values to equip the 
legal system with ductile rules that can provide its openness hence avoiding the tension between 
normative rigid precepts and evolving values. Every regulatory rule becomes a vivid rule while 
connecting facts, norms and values of the whole legal system, which contributes on giving living 
meaning to legal provisions just as much as filling legal gaps. Both ways we satisfactorily fulfil 
the entirety of legal order88. 
International Court of Justice also encompassed a statement enforcing the lack of gaps in 
international legal system through interpretation and application of international law, for the sake 
 
86 MIGUEL REALE, TEORIA TRIDIMENSIONAL DO DIREITO 124-126 (5TH EDITION, SÃO PAULO: SARAIVA, 1994). 
87 ALBERTO GOSSON JORGE JUNIOR, CLÁUSULAS GERAIS NO NOVO CÓDIGO CIVIL 10-22 (SÃO PAULO: 
SARAIVA, 2004). 
88 NORBERTO BOBBIO, DA ESTRUTURA À FUNÇÃO – NOVOS ESTUDOS DE TEORIA DO DIREITO 102-128 
(BARUERI: MANOLE, 2007).  
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of unity, coherence and wholeness, “whether customary or conventional, does not operate in a 
vacuum; it operates in relation to facts and in the context of a wider framework of legal rules of 
which it forms only a part”89. Therefore, these general clauses of law bring effectiveness and 
allows the judgement of social values directly associated to treaties words, putting aside gaps and 
antinomies, and launching to first level doctrines and judicial decisions90. Additionally, European 
Court of Human Rights complements that such interpretation of the wide framework of 
international law must be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention 
while taking into account the special nature of the Convention on Human Rights as an instrument 
of human rights protection which such interpretation must be so far as possible consistently with 
the other principles of international law of which it forms a part91.  
Thus, in order to comply with Vienna Convention provisions on interpretation and 
application of international law, international courts must interpret in “good-faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose”92 “in accordance with the principle of effectiveness” that endorses human 
rights system of protection93. Yet, to maintain coherence in eventual conflicts between 
provisions, the principle of lex specialis is an accepted principle of interpretation in international 
law. It stems from a roman principle of interpretation, according to which in situations especially 
 
89 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between The WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 
§10 (December 20). 
90 NORBERTO BOBBIO, TEORIA DO ORDENAMENTO JURÍDICO 115-160 (10TH EDITION, BRASÍLIA: EDITORA UNB, 
1999).  
91 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 Eur. Ct. H.R., §111 (2005); and Al-Adsani 
v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., §60 (2001).  
92 LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), 2001 I.C.J. §99 (June 27). 
93 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§122-125 (2005).  
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regulated by a rule, this rule would displace the more general rule (lex specialis derogat leges 
generalis)94. 
There is an inseparability of international legal instruments and international adjudication 
by courts appreciation. International jurisprudence thereafter promotes and defines international 
law rationale and essence in order to develop its terms. Judicial decisions are inherent and crucial 
to international legal system workflow. It is a widely accepted truth that international law cannot 
be isolated from cases since it is fostered on a case-by-case basis. Formally, international judicial 
decisions are regarded as subsidiary means for interpreting international law. Apart from it, 
international courts and organs resort to previous judicial decision and arbitral awards frequently, 
which reveal the importance of jurisprudence for international law. Since international courts 
hold the duty to settle disputes between international subjects and to deliver advisory opinions to 
organs, they do not develop international law in the abstract, as primary sources of international 
law (Article 38 of ICJS), however “the very determination of specific disputes, and the provision 
of specific advise, does develop international law”. Judicial function is not simply the application 
of existing rules to facts, rather it elaborates content of a norm, “the expansion upon uncertain 
materials, all contribute enormously to the development of international law”95. 
One important premise we can retrieve form contemporary international law is the 
prevalence of the rule of law to appease conflicts; to investigate relevant international facts (fact-
finding proceedings); to form and strengthen judicial provisions; and to safeguard cultural 
 
94 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, in ISRAELI LAW REVIEW. VOL. 40, NO.2, 310, 338 (2007). 
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plurality and diversity96. The modern international law, pushed by the rising of a new human 
rights law regime mostly, has been reshaped in quantity and quality alike which turns 
international legal system into an authentic, prolific and autonomous legal order with less 
sovereign state power concentration and more diluted participation of different international 
actors, emphasizing the sense of community97. In this vein, all regional human right courts 
(European, Inter American and African) have been developing through the years a vast 
jurisprudence, mostly in substantive rights sphere, regarding the protection on human rights 
which has foisted a “humanization process of international law”98.  
Alongside the positive norms of international legal order, an international morality has 
arisen. It is no longer conceivable a construction of international law without morality. It is fully 
understood nowadays that the enhancement of international law only is possible whether we 
transcend the positivism to aim and depart from kernel values of social justice and solidarity99. 
Its concreteness is daily taken from general principles of law or general clauses found in 
international provisions, mainly human rights law provisions. A lot of contemporary 
international law groundwork comes from natural law, applied in combination of positive law, as 
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once grasped by Grotius and Pufendorf. Afterall, it is natural law conception of justice that gives 
dynamics and ductility to international positive law100.  
The strand of international positive norms that comprehend human rights bodies of law 
regulate and value action upon persons, individually or collectively. Its objective because is 
based on international society common welfare; it is rational because it is fruit of a process of 
plural dialogue built on practical consensual reason; and it is transcendent because its scope is to 
achieve the common good of international community which overrides any state position of self-
interest101. Therefore, international courts’ interpretation might go well beyond what is mostly 
envisaged and reach some creative actions through innovative decisions which reflect the 
evolving conditions of the international community, since all the possible situations cannot have 
been foreknown by the international law drafters of the time. Then it is also true that 
international courts have indeed shaped some rudimentary legal notions into more refined and 
precise definitions which gave legal order some maturity. These opinio juris process and 
international practices play significant role in crafting and ensuring unity, coherence and 
wholeness to contemporary international law102.  
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THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
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3.1. Historical Considerations 
 
When we talk about human rights, we are talking about current politics and ethics that 
reach both international community and states histories, socio-economic structures, legal 
systems, religions and cultures. Its legal dimension, therefore, usually mingles internal and 
international law towards a common goal, which currently counts with intergovernmental bodies 
as well in order to transform internal and international order. This “human rights movement” 
grapples for universal validity throughout the body of law, which has both horizontal and vertical 
strands that are equally important to concepts and moral development. The former purveys the 
widening process of constitutionalism among states through comparative law, while the latter 
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means the binding effect of international treaties on human rights held by international 
institutions103.  
Under such auspices, however, we must draw a line in human history which reveals to us 
different approaches, precisely on the Second World War onwards. A bridge is usually built 
between 1945 period to American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century. Despite 
several documents that are related to human rights historiography somehow, we ought to focus 
our approach in the eighteenth century, when declarations of human rights were proclaimed in 
America and France, and then move forward.  
Although it is common to find some declarations of rights recollection toward the English 
Declaration of Rights of 1689, most human rights advocates does not harbor on it. This 
declaration might be deemed the first declaration of rights. Nevertheless it remains attached to 
the medieval tradition and lacks the core elements proclaimed in the following ones. It is indeed 
influenced by the rationalism accordingly to the revolution it ensues, but still, it is related to the 
Middle Age precepts and the English parliamentary monarchy104. This bill of rights, for instance, 
recognizes only royal dignity attainable just for the nobility – what was later broadened to all 
humanity, as we shall see. 
The same must be said about older instruments, such as the Magna Carta of 1215 (usually 
cited as one of the first human rights precedents), the Petition of Rights of 1628 (where English 
Parliament offers to King Charles I the constitution of distinct rights) and the Habeas Corpus Act 
 
103 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 58-59 (3rd ed., 2007). 
104 RICARDO D. RABINOVICH-BERKMAN, DERECHOS HUMANOS: UNA INTRODUCCIÓN A SU NATURALEZA Y A SU 
HISTORIA 150 (Buenos Aires: Quorum, 2007). 
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of 1679105. Albeit they compose human rights historic ballast, they do not fit the purpose 
employed in this work as long as actual human rights resemble the rationalism and pluralism 
purveyed during the Enlightenment epoch. Therefore, we begin the current approach on 
eighteenth century’s declaration onwards.  
In this sense, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French 
Revolution Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 were the first documents to 
bear the idea of unalienable rights, regarding to life, liberty and happiness. Moreover, the French 
Declaration also brought the promise of universal human rights, as ascertained on its Article I: 
“men are born and remain free and equal in rights”106. Back in the day, the current designation 
was “rights of man” in France and “natural rights” notably in the US; no reference to “human 
rights” was circulated on those days107. Both instruments have laid out general principles of 
justice that were retrieved from natural law ideas, like the law should be the same for everyone, 
nobody should have his liberty constrained arbitrarily and so forth.   
However, the eighteenth-century breakthrough of universal rights encompassed a 
political and social exclusion of women, children, slaves, religious minorities among others. The 
connotation of “rights of men” – so called self-evident – did not carry equality on rights, which 
also has put in doubt their naturalness. So those declarations emancipatory meaning were not 
fully-fledged but instead, a very restricted ones. Nonetheless, they inaugurated the first 
generation of rights, strengthening the notion of liberty and individual rights which has contained 
 
105 CARLOS S. FAYT, DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL PODER MEDIÁTICO, POLÍTICO Y ECONÓMICO: SU 
MUNDIALIZACIÓN EN EL SIGLO XXI 56-70 (Buenos Aires: La Ley, 2001). 
106 LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS 15-17 (2007). 
107 SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF HISTORY 05-06 (2014). 
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the enlightened human autonomy and the discernment to distinguish good from evil, as free 
agents108.     
Notwithstanding, recent historians have repeatedly reported that the human rights we 
have today do not resemble the right of man or natural rights conceived in the eighteenth 
century. Even the abolitionist movement claimed by Jenny Martinez as foundational to human 
rights109 have been challenged by others who, in that sense, purvey the idea of rights as barely 
used by abolitionists those days, which convictions lied on Christianity, humanitarianism or 
other ideologies. Rights were never a cornerstone for those freedoms pursued110.   
The same happened to second generations rights built on the following century, where the 
so far political rights were not enough to embrace the society’s need to develop the welfare of its 
worse off members. The socialism retrieved from nineteenth century emphasized solidarity and 
the need for positive rights pursued by state intervention in order to fight economic inequality 
and to protect certain members of society considered vulnerable, especially by the cruel system 
of industries labor exploitation. Nevertheless, the breakthrough of the international human rights 
as we know today occurred in the twentieth century, as a revival of natural law and a redesign of 
human rights as moral111. 
Between the eighteenth century’s declarations and the mid-twentieth century, human 
rights remained a domestic concern only. It was after the Second World War that it became an 
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international concern actually. Suddenly, the birth of new values and commitments appeared to 
take place before international community’s eyes, regarding to be one of the greatest 
transformations started from modernization process112. The idea of universality came forward 
once more, but this time it took initially the form of universal in the sense that any state of the 
world could join – as a result of the openness character of the new international society’s 
framework. Along with the United Nations creation, the human rights movement arose. Not just 
a systematic ordering of fundamental postulates, ideologies and norms, but also as institutions – 
nationals and internationals; governmental and nongovernmental, also as a character of the new 
international society’s framework113. 
Therefore, in 1947 the UN General Assembly gathered representatives of all states that 
were members in order to draft a universal declaration of human rights which would serve as 
moral exhortation to state politics, but not a legally binding instrument. The promotion of human 
rights was a main purpose for the UN, which is clear in its Charter Preamble, where human 
rights are linked with human dignity as self-evident value that neither needs justification nor 
guidance. Then, in the end of 1948, the UDHR was adopted as a “common standard of 
achievement of all peoples and all nations”114.  
Right after the Second World War, human rights were minimal, individual and 
fundamentally moral. So, in order to pass in the UNGA, the Declaration of 1948 had to be 
 
112 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 78 (2003). 
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essentially not binding, what counted with 48 states voting in favor and eight abstaining115. The 
true fact is that states were not prepared “to derogate from the established character of the 
international system by establishing law and legal obligation that would penetrate Statehood in 
the radical way”116.  
Although deemed a mere moral instrument, the UDHR emerged linking itself to the 
Enlightenment and the French Declaration of 1789. Using the same language, the UDHR 
brought the references to ‘inherent dignity’, ‘equal and inalienable rights’, freedom and reason. 
However, all that happened without mentioning natural law or any other philosophy, what has 
kept the moral foundation of human rights undetermined. Nevertheless, remains undeniable the 
cultural influence upon philosophies that shaped the American and French Revolutions, chiefly 
on their development of democracy based on the rights of men. Philosophically, several concepts 
have shaped the features of modern age and our thinking on human rights, but their mainstay still 
is the idea of reason achieved in the Enlightenment era117.  
Moreover, as adjourned by Samuel Moyn, the idea of human dignity after human rights 
became current mostly after 1945. The previous declarations of rights of man did not take 
account of dignity in order to establish their standards. The notion of human dignity was only 
conceived and encoded in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 and German Grundsgezet – the constitutional Basic Law of 1949. Until that time, 
dignity was not human rights kernel, not even inviolable. It was at last mid-century where human 
dignity and democracy were translated as human rights. On that period of time, the notions of 
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human dignity and its non-negotiable character emerged largely from Catholic doctrine. Despite 
the Catholic origin of human dignity framed in international human rights bodies, the expression 
has gotten new interpretations through time as long as secularism policies advanced in western 
cultures, turning human dignity inviolable and a vivid mainstream to guide further human rights 
dispute and conflicts118.    
In spite of the non-binding character of UDHR, nowadays we have a very tenacious 
blend of international bodies that makes human rights enforceable as hard law – even knowing 
that many people consider the declaration enforceable since day one as part of customary 
international law. Straight after UDHR adoption in 1948, UNGA decided to split its provisions 
between two core treaties, one on civil and political rights and other on economic, social and 
cultural rights. Albeit it was conceived in 1952, only in 1966 the project was approved, uprising 
the two major Covenants on human rights: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). However, only ten years later, in 1976, the number of ratifications was met and both 
instruments of positive law entered into force, shifting human rights soft law structure to a hard 
law imposition119.  
On this regard, the division of UDHR into two Covenants was for both ideological and 
legal reasons, although both still share equal structure and refer to the inherent dignity of the 
person as a foundation of the proclaimed rights. The ideologies underneath both Covenants 
reflected the separation between East and West of the Cold War. Their legal significance came 
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through the codification of Article 2 of the UDHR they represented, which turned the 
dispositions thereof legally binding. Besides, the Covenants hold the universality and equality of 
their provision, also adding the so-called third generation of rights, people’s right to self-
determination. They all together form the International Bill of Rights, what have been enlarged 
by other human rights instruments that raise a treaty-based enforcement mechanism of the 
contemporary international human rights regime120.    
Therefore, enforcing Article 103 of the UN Charter, international jurisprudence has 
prevailed states’ commitment on human rights over any conflicting national obligation or any 
other international agreement. Human rights become the ultimate promise that trumps any other 
obligation, no matter what. As held by Inter American Court of Human Rights, in Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, human rights are currently peremptory norms of 
international law which cannot be circumvented by any state, not even by a parallel treaty121. 
Summing up, the law of human rights is deeply rooted on moral philosophy. Even after 
Second World War, modern international law of human rights has been indissolubly linked with 
moral concerns122. All conflicts addressed by human rights are also moral conflicts and 
throughout time and development of the modern international community, which counts with 
plural subjects and sources of law dynamism, the human dignity has served itself as guidance to 
human rights appeasement. Both old and new human rights framework have had the same 
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overall aim, the building process of a world more peaceful and humane that would lead to the 
fading away of war and all forms of human cruelty and barbarism123. 
 
3.2. The Rising of Human Rights Morality 
 
As stated in Article 1 of DUDH, “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights”. Since the birth of human rights in American Declaration of 1776 and French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (where the correlated statement was “men are born and 
remain free and equal in rights”), in order to fill the gaps of human rights fulfilment of almost 
150 years, there has been the addition of equality in dignity and rights. This subtle change 
encompasses a substantial reform upon what we conceive as human rights and, most of all, what 
we conceive as human beings.  
A context of value is merged to human rights comprehension, human values acquired 
through mankind history which composes the juridical inventory of humanity124. Although the 
process of modernization might seem to us appealing to values decline or erosion, in fact it has 
proven the opposite. Too many atrocities and cruelty were perpetrated during human rights 
building process. In general, human rights transgressions are being reduced while human dignity 
is being emphatically advocated, what might be accounted to several reasons125. However, one of 
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the most precious is that the notion of human dignity embraced by human rights encompasses 
human values related to religious and cultural traditions. These values compare themselves to the 
also general duty of helping people who is suffering, no matter where. This statement therefore 
emphasizes (i) the sacredness of human life, (ii) an ethos of love and (iii) universal respect126. 
 
3.2.1. The sacredness of human life 
 
Georg Jellinek was the first one to conceive the idea that the human rights in the French 
Revolution were not built over Enlightenment solely. The concepts of natural law could never 
have led to the codification of human rights by itself. There was also an equivalent force which 
traces them back to Christian roots. Human rights – or the ‘rights of man’ and ‘natural rights’, as 
they were called back in the day – as binding metanorms turned into positive law, could never be 
stemmed from any philosophy based only on reason, not even natural law or Kant’s theory, for 
instance. Instead, the dignity of all human beings also had truly deep roots in Christian 
tradition127. 
According to this view, the idea of legally establishing inalienable, inherent and sacred 
rights of men is not of political but religion foundation. For Jellinek, this is the source of all other 
individuals’ rights, those within and against the state. The rise of abolitionism, when the fight 
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against slave trade was simultaneously going on, for example, was built upon the laws of God 
and the rights of men to whom every human being is entitled to the fruit of his own labor and 
also his liberty128. Although it was not the only source for the abolitionist movement, since the 
slave owner also based their property rights over slave on God’s law, the Christianity had its 
undeniable argumentation contribution129.   
So, the core liberty rights of the first dimension of human rights actually have also 
Christian roots, even the American declarations previous to French’s have it. What was needed 
then was a language cognitively in secular terms, understandable to all sides, where the promise 
of a wide allegiance could be fulfilled, since the ‘rights of man’ was vigorously declared as self-
evident. Although there has been a lack of self-evident truths, it does not mean a loss of all 
common vocabulary where we may attain a consensus on values130. 
Therefore, analyzing human rights background history might give us the confidence to 
assure that there is in them features of both Enlightenment rationalism and Christian canons. 
These two components balance the understanding of human rights and this duality makes part of 
a large process that has been called the sacralization of reason131. The rationalism of the 
Enlightenment conveys the autonomy and the cultivation of reason which grant to human beings 
the cardinal instrument of independence, where Kant’s theory plays a major role – since 
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Kantianism has been regarded the most compelling theory on human rights and the modern 
philosophy of justice within132.  
The eighteenth-century philosophy of human rights asserted a refrained notion of human 
dignity, since its political and social applicability put aside relevant groups of people, such as 
women, children, slaves and religious minorities. All of that under a self-evidence moral power 
which set on march welcome social changes. After that, only the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the German Grundsgezet bring back the notion of 
human dignity (“inherent dignity” that leads to “equal and inalienable rights”), but this time quite 
differently from the past. Now, human dignity embeds respect for other people as a form of 
recognition of their moral standing, and this duty of respect, so broadly uphold nowadays, is 
what Kantian ethics and moral rights are based on, which inobservance ensues a denial of 
humanity itself133.   
So, both rationalism and religious tradition encompass the sacralization of reason that 
delivers a significant cultural twist in which human person becomes a sacred object. Human 
rights and universal human dignity become the “religion of humanity”134. The sacredness of the 
person overreached the boundaries of religion to take place in reason kernel during 
Enlightenment period, mostly through Kant’s theory which detaches the dignity from our 
likeness with God and replaces it in individual’s moral autonomy135. In doing so, the 
comprehension of the holiness of the person, which is grasped by most (if not all) religions in the 
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world, descends to human beings as dignity, which is bound to all of us due to the humanity we 
all commonly share. Thus, as rational beings, only our humanity can carry moral law within, 
which gives us autonomy and dignity136. Therefore, the notion of dignity that comes from our 
humanness and reason merges with the inalienability of human inner value prevailing in any 
religion precept.    
So human rights and human dignity rise as an expression and a process of the 
sacralization of the person which constitutes, as Durkheim has stated, the religion of humanity 
where “man is at the same time, both believer and God”137. The godliness and inward faith of the 
individual are now set up to hold a social cohesion of modern societies. But this endless and 
ongoing process of sacralization of the person, despite the Christian roots, also means 
overlapping old tradition in the sense that it has to continue as broader and more pluralistic as 
possible, in order to replace Christianity which is merely acknowledged to have paved the way 
for this new stage138. 
From Christianity we borrowed the idea that we are made in the image of God or we are 
the children of God. The former gives us a divine essence, the soul, while the latter brings the 
idea that our life (with soul) is a gift which demands some restraints about our disposal over 
ourselves. The former also encompasses the metaphysical sacred core of every human being, 
while the latter entails the sense of indisposability of our lives. The sacralization of the person 
embedded in human rights and dignity has become a challenge to religions (in general) once it 
beholds secular value which is reinterpreted over and over during the process. Consequently, the 
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articulation of this process reinterprets the values to a language attainable to believers and 
nonbelievers alike. The conception of the soul is translated into that of the ‘self’ endowed with 
reason; and the giftedness of life turns into a rational argumentation where we are not a fact of 
mere existence and our life is deemed a gift opposite to randomness and by gratitude and logic, 
we cannot dispose of it as we desire139. 
Then, through the novel process of sacralization of the person we understand the concepts 
of inalienability, inviolability and indisposability of rights and human dignity without embracing 
or worshiping any religion dogma of the sanctity of human life. Likewise, we comprehend the 
notion of life as a gift and the moral weight it contains, whether or not aiming the source of the 
giftedness to God140. The rational recognition of our finitude turns out to be the precondition for 
the genesis of human life; the self’s awareness of our own finitude becomes the main point to 
validate the giftedness of life141. Hence these ideals constitute the formation of human rights and 
dignity through time and mankind history. 
 
3.2.2. Ethos of love 
 
The notion of love has always been the innermost canon of Christianity. The conception 
of goodness descends from the divine love. All human rational principles, rules and the justice 
ballasts came afterwards. Love is anchored in the heart of social behavior that guides human 
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agency and set its values. Nevertheless, both religion and emotion have taken place on morality 
of law construction process, namely the morality of human rights law. The moral code contained 
in all religions has been added to human empathy over the history of mankind values which 
framed and keeps framing the understanding of human rights and dignity142.  
Historians trace the uprising of emotions in the mid of eighteenth century back to novels 
(mainly Samuel Richardson’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s) and newly notions of bodily 
integrity. Therefore, the comprehension over “bodily integrity” and “empathetic selfhood” 
served as mainstream to human rights history and their building process143. For example, 
Russeau’s book Julie ou La Nouvelle Héloïse, from 1761, provoked a viral reaction worldwide 
against bodily punishment and marriage freedom, reaction quite similar to the one caused by 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin against the cruelty of slavery in United States in the 
following century. All kind of violence – such as torture or those directed toward women, 
children, slaves and animals – began to gradually wane in Western culture, mostly. The rise of 
compassion for human suffering brought to light the need of political rights revolutions144. The 
Law of the Seas, for instance, was pioneer branch of international law in ruling against piracy, 
who has served so many years as hostis humani generis in human rights history and the combat 
over crimes against humanity, encoding many punishments to its perpetrators and vastly 
intensifying its pursuit145.  
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Likewise, renewal of collective ideas, especially after a great social trauma such as war, 
can only be achieved when the theory of learning is anchored in emotions. The need to uproot 
these collective ideas and replace them with new ones also anchored in emotions consists in a 
process of change that cannot be carried out simply through the non-violent compulsion of 
superior arguments. Hence war maintains an important teaching effect over the collectives 
affected and allows the overcoming of barriers which might block the uprising of learning new 
collective ideas which cognitive contents harbor in affective emotions. Thus, a multiplicity of 
collective experiences in war is featured by the common existential experience of many 
individuals who share empathy on the basis of association and cohesiveness that get stronger in 
the trauma of war146.   
The empathy (that moves toward a rational process where we put ourselves into other’s 
place) has arisen the mutual identity among men, which has served as a touchstone to the 
foundation of human rights. Lynn Hunt attributes to novels the awakening of inward feelings – 
the sense of equality and empathy through emotional attachment in the narrative – which pushed 
the claim for individual autonomy. Although empathy was not a new human feeling, it got a new 
way to express itself through fiction, which created the “ideal presence” cognition where the 
reader puts himself into the story as a subject of imaginative identification and this trancelike 
state nurtures morality. People become more interested to perform “acts of generosity and 
benevolence” and reprehensible to evildoings and immoral acts at same time. These new 
experiences have shaped new social and political concepts147. 
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Therefore, the comprehension over human rights outplays the relation between the 
aggressor and the victim – at domestic level and international as well – in order to put inside of 
the relation the rest of the humanity. The rights violations concern all mankind. This notion of 
humanity points to the “understanding and kindness towards other people”148. The source of 
empathy and its compassion had deep roots in Christianity and came out through a rediscovering 
momentum of human dignity. The Enlightenment age was a mixture of feeling and reason in 
order to foster the value of humanity149.  
From Christianity, the interplay between the principles of love and justice took place. All 
in all, love works as a moral dimension that matches with reason to apply and to organize the 
social milieu. As love empowers us to act morally it also enjoins endless reinterpretation of 
justice, since love and justice pose together a “relationship of indissoluble tension”150. This 
duality is what we conceive as morality of law; this duality governs the world, Nature and 
mankind, science and consciousness, logic and moral, economy, politics and history; and it is the 
semantic of all human rights151.    
The tonic, nonetheless, is the balance between both elements. Emotions engaged in 
empathy and love cannot operate moral judgments all by themselves, neither can reason. The 
former solely would rule a system toward impersonal criteria validity which leads to moral 
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disagreements and manipulative social relations152. The latter in turn cannot sustain moral 
axioms based on self-evident truths because there is no such thing; no substantive moral 
conclusion is capable to appease entirely moral disagreement in the real world153. No longer 
resists in contemporary philosophy of law the idea in which a genuine moral action can only be 
motivated towards what is morally right to be regarded moral.   
Joas and Durkheim criticize Kant when he states that only duty based on reason 
constitutes a necessary factor in the definition of moral rules. According to Kant, rational duty 
cannot be compromised with inclinations, what means that goodwill and good-doing would not 
have moral value if inspired by emotions154. Actually, human agency is unable to perform solely 
from a sense of duty. We must also add the common goodness; the human desirability and 
empathy which make part of morality just as much. Goodwill and good-doing, in fact, possess as 
much moral value as there is love in them. Under this auspice, there must be coexistence between 
rational duty and the goodness. The good interplays with duty to set up human obligations155.  
On this regard, Bernard Williams grasps that there is no need to deem an action or 
perspective moral only when guided by reason. There is no exclusion relationship between 
morality and reason156. Behind the smokescreen of our moral duties, our emotional life provides 
us access to ideal values. As glimpsed by Joas, our feeling-state of pain unites all mankind, since 
we all share the sensitivity to pain, not only physical but also in humiliation. The struggle for 
human protection and welfare is the common ground for shaping public life and the meaning of 
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solidarity that we achieve through our shared empathy. This is actually the value-quality which 
does not surface from abstraction, but real life. In this regard, the prevention of cruelty is the 
essence of an ethos of love which exceeds the spell of imperative morality of duty and formalism 
to break through to a new non-formal conception of values based on a phenomenology of value-
experience157. 
 
3.2.3. Universal respect 
 
The principles of justice and love form a complex interweaving formula of morality. 
From the Christianity notion of love and the principle of reciprocity it implies, we command our 
life as a gift. As life is viewed as a free gift from a giver, the reciprocity encompasses the idea of 
its inalienability, inviolability and indisposability and the duty to respect it comes along, even 
against our own will. Moreover, this central idea has turned itself politically and morally shared 
by all peoples, whether religious belief, or none, they hold. It really has been part of human 
rights tradition regardless of any religious belief. The notion of life as a gift has also reached the 
precepts of reason, being belief and reason complementary to each other on this way158. 
In fact, the value we praise to life nowadays and back in Enlightenment era would never 
thrive based solely in human reason. The idea of life as mere existence and the randomness it 
suggests would never survive without the belief of an immortal soul. That is the motivation why 
Lynn Hunt states that humans by themselves “cannot overcome their inner propensity to apathy 
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or evil”. The idea of life as a gift gives life its metaphysical raison d’être159. In this vein, the 
concept of life as a gift may arise from either religious or secular sources. According to Michael 
Sandel, it is needless to hold a religious belief to reverence the giftedness of life. Its inalienability 
and inviolability contain a moral weight whether or not embracing any sense of religious 
sanctity160.   
In secular terms, the giftedness of life sheds to light human dignity, the inner value of 
each human being acknowledged by our common reason. Therefore, the sacredness of modern 
human rights lies on those societies which hold the principles of inalienable rights and the 
dignity of the individual – and not dignity as social status, what was upheld by Catholic Church 
and religious societies of that time. Actually, human dignity comes from the democratization 
process of the high social status once reserved exclusively for the well-born. It entails a leveling 
up process where gradually more and more people have been treated equally in deserving social 
respect. Human rights have held that “everyone becomes a king where claims that basic human 
dignity is non-negotiable”161. Thus, dignity turns out to be the mainstay of the human rights 
morality. The estimate of human dignity which a rational being must give comes through the 
universal duty of respect. 
During Enlightenment epoch, as the notion of dignity progressively loses its linkage with 
religion and merges itself closer to reason, the very understanding of human autonomy connected 
with dignity is grasped for the first time in Kant’s Groundwork. In general lines, autonomy is the 
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idea that the moral law which governs us all also gives us the agency to be an end in ourselves, 
since the moral law is self-given to us. Dignity in turn is our priceless inner value, incomparable 
in nature. As dignity is something that we all share and possess pursuant our humanity, the moral 
law that drives us to autonomously treat each other as an end equally enjoins the duties of respect 
and self-respect162.  
Our rational capacity is what makes all human especial. According to Kant, rationality 
dictates our autonomy which means our endowment to be free and to act regarding the moral law 
we give ourselves. Heteronomy would be the opposite action to bend before desires we have not 
chosen to ourselves. It is the autonomy, by this mean, what gives human’s life its especial 
dignity, regarding persons not just as means, but also as an end in themselves. Thus, our 
rationality grants us the autonomy which makes us worthy of dignity and respect. It is the way 
we face human dignity that defines our current conceptions on universal human rights and our 
entitlement of respect, since we are all rational beings completely capable of thinking and 
autonomously acting and choosing freely163. More than acknowledging our own specialness, we 
ought to recognize in each and every individual the same dignity. The Article 1 of UDHR, in this 
sense, treats us all indiscriminately, no matter how reasonably and sensitively we differ from 
each other. We are all endowed with reason and conscience and we should interact among 
ourselves in a spirit of brotherhood164.  
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On this regard, Michael Rosen brings the deal of respect as a new strand of dignity, 
distinguishing the “respect-as-observance” from “respect-as-respectfulness”. The former implies 
the duty to respect human dignity albeit not necessarily justifying or matching with it on genuine 
doings. That means that our respect rather comes from an automatic setting made by social rules 
than by appraisal itself. The duty to respect in the latter derives from treating someone with 
dignity, truly showing him/her respect as moral action which, by this means, usually occur 
irrespective of positive law commanding you to do so165. This version of respect touches the 
morality of aspiration asserted by Lon Fuller, to whom the morality of law is composed by both 
morality of duty and morality of aspiration. Whilst the first keeps respect as minimum social 
duties required to a civilized society to function, the second goes beyond and reaches the utmost 
point of human moral behavior that, regardless mandatory minimum rules, acknowledges the 
respectfulness by the common sense of humanity and equality we all universally share166.  
Under Kantian terms, human rights are universal in the sense that we are free to act 
autonomously in accordance to a moral law that is self-given, whence the duty to respect each 
other flows. In case of acting heteronomously – moved by inclinations – the universality and 
equality of human dignity is overlooked besides turning itself into an instrumental value. 
Utilitarianism in turn supports that all human beings are worthy of respect because in the long 
run we attain the greatest happiness to the greatest number. In doing so, even a modern kind of 
utilitarianism computes human rights as an element of calculation that portrays the maximization 
of utility (overall happiness) in society. Hence the respect of human dignity remains instrumental 
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since it is not based on the respect of human life, but on the ultimate goal of making things better 
to the greatest number of people167. 
Nonetheless, as asserted before, the duty to respect another’s dignity must merge with 
inclinations without that compromising the meaningfulness of human rights law. Goodwill and 
good-doing do have relevant moral value even when inspired purely by emotions. It does not 
matter if motivated by inclination or by duty (although Kantian theory acknowledges only those 
acts performed by duty). Both motive and consequence of human agency are equally important 
to human rights morality168. Moreover, it is not all actions and practices based on self-interest 
that will be out of morality because it is focused on egoistic content.  
For example, someone who gives money to charity in order to enhance his social 
reputations is moved by egoistic purpose – and considering those beneficiaries as a mean, not as 
an end –, however there are people taking advantage of that donation and they are truly better 
off. Although those beneficiaries where not treated as an end – but as a mean – even though we 
can easily support that there is a difference between this donor and another man who chooses to 
spend the same amount of money purchasing a jet ski for his own amusement disregarding 
completely those who are in need. According to Kant, both men are equally and morally wrong. 
Nevertheless, we all do not dispute that the action of the donor is far better than the bon vivant’s 
action (albeit the donor did not have respect-as-respectfulness for those he was assisting, he 
complied with respect-as-observance in order to maximize the morality and benefit of charity for 
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human welfare). So, the donor is not entirely approved by morality but he possesses something 
in between that is somehow partial to the notion of morality169.  
Hence, we cannot conclude that moral actions only come from moral reason. Neither 
only interests to morality the behaviors that are performed upon moral aim or principles. 
Although to Kant the person who behaves honestly for his own sake is morally reprehensible – 
because is action based on inclinations –, an undisputable moral aftermath surfaces from this 
agency maximization. There are actions that, based on the outcome they intent to implement or 
modify, are morally relevant as an observance – not because of their motivation or individualistic 
outlook, but because of the benefit they provide to others170. Thus, the interplay between strict 
duty to respect and respect stemmed from good-doings represents exactly the interwoven 
between respect-as-observance and respect-as-respectfulness or, we should also say, the morality 
of duty and the morality of aspiration. Both of them, together, make the overall morality of 
human rights endorsable.   
As Fuller grasps, there are some corners of morality that not even the law can reach. 
There is and there always will be a gap between morality of duty and morality of aspirations and 
all human agency towards aspiration – even based on goodwill and good-doings – integrates the 
morality of law171. Therefore, there are some empirics elements around human rights that not 
even international law can reach and this grey zone comes very clearly to surface in wartime. As 
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Michael Walzer once said, “war is hell”. In a war, human cruelty usually arises as our 
civilization outfit slowly fades away172.  
Yet, human agency sometimes reveals aspiration and respect-as-respectfulness even 
when law does not pursue it. For instance, Robert Graves’ biography on his experience in the 
Second World War tells us a case where he was watching a frontline post when he saw a German 
soldier some yards away from him taking a shower behind German line. Grave had him on target 
but he chose not to shoot, rendering the rifle to his sergeant, who shot him. Both were under the 
same law and that death was lawful according to law. So, the difference between then remains in 
another level, a level that law does not reach. Graves said he refused to shoot because when that 
man was taking a shower, he did not see a soldier, but a simple man, like any one of us173. This is 
aspiration, respect-as-respectfulness, empathy, love and sacralization of life, all combined and 
together. This is what launched human rights in the first place and same elements remain 
precious nowadays. It is contained in the morality of law, whether it comes from inclinations or 
not; whether it encompasses utilitarian calculation or not.   
Besides, the interplay between human rights, Kantian human dignity and utilitarian 
calculation will be further explored in the following chapters. However, we shed to light that 
human agency complies with the moral philosophy of utilitarianism and this reveals us a noble 
contribution towards disciplining the human inclinations to frame the acts into rationality 
through clearly defined interests. The duty to respect human dignity as inviolable, inalienable 
 
172 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WAR 142 (2006). 
173 ROBERT GRAVES, GOOD-BYE TO ALL THAT 132 (2014). 
 72 
 
and indisposable right is not absolute, which makes inclinations and utilitarian calculations 
equally relevant174. 
 
3.3. Human Dignity 
 
When we talk about morality, we mean what is valuable to us as social beings. As 
suggested by sociobiology, our common reason shapes societies as an aggregation of its 
collective approvals and disapprovals and moves toward evolution in an expanding circle, which 
denotes our constant enhancement on good deeds and virtues175. Besides social evolutionism, we 
also have commitment to values that comes from experiences of violence and injustice (what is 
properly called as traumas) which have transformed our relationship to ourselves, the world and 
our values understanding. These experiences can be recollected from mankind history over 
human rights building process, especially by the central role played by human dignity in the 
recent international human rights bodies and modern Constitutions – to whom it has served as an 
“epistemic foundation”176.  
Notwithstanding, the history of human rights has demanded three interlocking qualities. 
Human rights have to be natural (as an inheritance in human beings), equal to everyone and 
universal. As mankind moral exhortation, all men in the world must possess them equally while 
sharing each other the common status of human beings. However, the naturalness is more 
 
174 HANS JOAS, THE CREATIVITY OF ACTION 23 (Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast trans. 1996). 
175 PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE 94 (2011) 
176 HANS JOAS, THE SACREDNESS OF THE PERSON: A NEW GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69-77 (Alex Skinner 
trans. 2013). 
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commonly shared than equality and universality, as rights of men vis-à-vis each other177. Since 
the Enlightenment, the equality and universality of human rights have been the unaccomplished 
elements of the equation. They have been easier to endorse than to enforce, since we have a 
permanent tension between practices and values.  
The very notion of dignity has significantly changed through human history. As a kernel 
value to humanity, its conception has evolved and still evolving especially after the Universal 
Declaration of 1948 and the international framework it launches. Thus, the modern 
understanding of human dignity applies equally to all men, instead of a few (overcoming the 
notion of dignity craved in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and getting closer to the 
naturalness, universalism and equality proclaimed in the declarations of eighteenth century). The 
comprehension departs form the idea that everyone is “subjected to the same obligations and 
entitled to the same benefits under the law”178 and its validity stems from international treaties 
and postwar constitutions and applied and enforced by both domestic and international courts. 
Dignity can be regarded either as right or as value, or even both. The UN Charter of 
1945, at the preamble, establishes dignity as value when reaffirming its “faith in fundamental 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person”. As value, it guides the interpretation and 
application of positive fundamental rights, but does not constitute a right per se. Rather it helps 
international courts to set their jurisprudence based on human dignity interpretation and embeds 
it into rights assured by human rights treaties. Additionally, the UDHR of 1948 brings the 
statement that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” which sets a new 
 
177 LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS 20-21 (2007). 
178 ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON 12 (2013). 
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moral paradigm that requires the equal and respectful treatment among men simply by virtue of 
being human. Underneath these documents rests the hope that the acknowledgment of human 
dignity may cease the abuses and cruelties.  
As well observed by Erin Daly, no matter the best interpretation we get from human 
dignity, it comes with enormous cultural influence all around the world and it does not transform 
dignity into a right at first glance179. On UDHR’s behalf, the following International Covenants 
of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
preambles recognize the dignity as inheritance of all humanity and assert the “equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world, recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person”. From that moment on, dignity is not a mere value, but the centerpiece from where all 
fundamental rights are rooted, the cardinal value180, such as the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, for instance, which 
preamble emphasizes in particular that discrimination against women “violates the principles of 
equality of rights and respect for human dignity”. It becomes a supervalue placed in between law 
and morality so the former can only be founded on the latter as a legitimate rationale181.   
Because of its multiple irradiating effects, human dignity has been developed by 
international courts – and some domestic courts alike – as the epicenter of all human rights and it 
has also been interpreted and applied as literally not treating man as a mean but an end in itself. 
 
179 ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON 15 (2013). 
180 ANA PAULA DE BARCELLOS, A EFICÁCIA JURÍDICA DOS PRINCÍPIOS CONSTITUCIONAIS: O PRINCÍPIO DA 
DIGNIDADE DA PESSOA HUMANA CHAPTER 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2002). 
181 BERNARDO GONÇALVES FERNANDES, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL 219 (Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 
3rd ed., 2011) 
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As a cardinal value (or supervalue), it has been set to appease human rights collisions, like 
liberty versus life. Thus, human dignity has been held inviolable, inalienable and indisposable to 
other and ourselves182. Despite the intent of implementing UDHR human rights kernel 
throughout human dignity enforcement, international bodies subsequently to UDHR have 
galvanized a “ubiquity of dignity in current legal discourse” which masks a “great deal of 
disagreement and sheers confusion”183 – the moral quandaries.  
Exactly to sustain human dignity, states and international community have the power to 
enforce the duty to respect ourselves and others. Following the Article 1 of UDHR, the Federal 
Republic of Germany reconstructed its constitutional framework pursuant to the new 
international law standards, particularly those concerned to human rights. In 1949 Germany 
enacted the constitutional basic law, the Grundgesetz. More than anyone, Germany had the moral 
obligation to fulfill human rights positivation process and galvanize the inviolable nature of 
human dignity, as affirmed on Grundgesetz’s first article: “human dignity is inviolable. To 
respect it and protect it has been the duty of all state power. The German people therefore 
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace 
and of justice in the world”. 
In one way or another, since the UDHR all domestic constitutions have been redrafted in 
such way that nowadays we might assure that almost all national constitutions utterly entail 
human dignity – some as value, some as right and some as both. In this vein, the Grundgesetz 
was pioneer in featuring human dignity. Henceforth German constitutional philosophy and 
 
182 DANIEL SARMENTO, LIVRES E IGUAIS: ESTUDOS DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL 60-61 (Rio de Janeiro: Lumen 
Juris, 2006). 
183 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 67 (2012).  
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theory have inspired and guided every constitutional law and jurisprudence of civil law systems, 
mostly. As highlighted by Samuel Moyn, UDHR and Grundgesetz put dignity into politics and 
turned it into a watchword in philosophy and political theory. Before that, he reminds, dignity 
was not even considered an inviolable value184.  
On this regard, many scholars grasp that both UDHR – and related international 
instruments – and Grundgesetz have played the concept of dignity and modern international 
human rights largely over Immanuel Kant’s theory185 (although the drafting process that 
occurred in the mid of last century gathered several moral philosophies, western and eastern), 
especially his categorical imperative of humanity as an end, never merely as a mean – also called 
the formula of humanity – and the bound connection between dignity and autonomy of human 
nature. In this sense, there are several international human rights courts’ precedents which report 
this phenomenon openly.  
The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1945) stresses the determination of 
the peoples of the United Nations “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small”. The concept of dignity, as mentioned, is also embedded in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights Preamble, which explicitly recognizes the inherent dignity and equal and 
inalienable rights of humanity, the same does the preamble of Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). The Preambles of 
 
184 SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF HISTORY 21 (2014). 
185 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 19 (2012); JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A 
MORAL HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY, 23-24 (2012); MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTIÇA: O QUE É FAZER A COISA 
CERTA, 135-137 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2012); SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF 
HISTORY 23 (2014); AND JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND 
THEM 108-116 (2013). 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966 make reference to principles 
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognizes that the rights there enlisted derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person, and, respectively, Article 10 asserts that all 
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person and Article 13 recognizes the right to education to the full 
development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity. The Preamble of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) affirms that being “conscious of its 
spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human 
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”, and Article 1 of which states that human dignity is 
inviolable and must be respected and protected. 
Although all human dignity references are part of preamble, Article 31 of Vienna 
Convention (1969) sets the general rules of interpreting a treaty which would occur in “good-
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose”. For that, the preamble is unambiguously 
included into the purpose of interpretation of a treaty – Article 31, §2. All regional human rights 
conventions also bring human dignity to their interior. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1981), in Article 5; the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), in 
Articles 5, 6 and 11; and the European Convention on Human Rights, in Protocol 13 and Article 
4 of Protocol 4. Yet, considering the vast and rich treaties containing the international human 
rights body of law, the great majority expressly contemplates human dignity as value and right. 
The list below is not exhaustive, but serves to make the point of human dignity deemed as value 
and right in international human rights law: 
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 (i) the Preamble and Articles 23, 28, 37, 39 and 40 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989) congregate the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and 
solidarity; 
(ii) the preamble and Articles 3, 8, 16, 24 and 25 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (2006) condemn the discrimination against any person on the basis of 
disability as a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person; 
(iii) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1979) emphasizes that discrimination against women “violates the principles of equality of 
rights and respect for human dignity”; 
(iv) The Preamble of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights on the abolition of the death penalty (1989) says that “abolition of the death 
penalty contributes to enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human 
rights”; 
(v) Article 18 of the Oviedo Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being (1997), with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine establishes 
that States Parties “shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee 
everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental 
freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine”; 
(vi) the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) sets its purposes as to 
ensure the respect for human dignity and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic data, human proteomic data and 
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of the biological samples from which they are derived, in keeping with the requirements of 
equality and justice; 
(vii) the United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning (2005) forbids all forms of 
human cloning in as much as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of 
human life, and the application of genetic engineering techniques that may be contrary to human 
dignity and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) proclaims the need 
for scientific research to occur within the framework of ethical principles and to respect human 
dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms; the fundamental equality of all human beings 
in dignity and rights is to be respected so that they are treated justly and equitably; and no 
individual or group should be discriminated against or stigmatised, in violation of human dignity, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
(viii) the preamble and Articles 6 and 16 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005) to whom human trafficking constitutes a violation 
of human rights and an offence to the dignity and the integrity of the human being. 
The Inter American Human Rights Court, for this matter, has been denoted to human 
dignity the broadest conception possible which the protection of private life encompasses a series 
of factors associated with the dignity of the individual, including the ability to develop his or her 
own personality and aspirations, to determine his or her own identity and to define his or her own 
personal relationships; also aspects of physical and social identity, including the right to personal 
autonomy, personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
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human beings and with the outside world186. Moreover, it has endowed human rights and dignity 
of erga omnes opposability as an expression of a collective interest of the international 
community as a whole187. 
In Pretty v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights overruled Diane 
Pretty personal and private family decision to put an end on her life because of untreatable and 
incapacitating disease with suffering condition. Accusing the United Kingdom state of inflicting 
her ill-treatment and torture in face of the denial of her “right to die”, she took her case to 
European Court to cease her suffering. Nevertheless, the court held the indisposability and 
inviolability of her human dignity, which does not give her the right to treat herself as a mean in 
order to “deny the principle of sanctity of life” protected under human rights bodies. The right of 
life does not encompass a negative form, not even when the victim consents. There is no “self-
determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather 
than life”. To the court, indisposing and assuring the inviolability of her life emphasizes her 
human dignity rather than the alleged “lack of respect” for diminishing her human dignity on 
letting her degrade and suffer according to her disease’s own pace188.   
So European Human Rights Court has established through rationale of the cases brought 
upon the court that the very essence of the Human Rights Convention is respect for human 
 
186 Artavia Murillo et al. (In Vitro Fertilization) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, §143 (November 28, 2012); and Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, 
Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, §119 (August 31, 2010).  
187 Case of the Members of the Village of Chichupac and neighboring communities of the Municipality of Rabinal v. 
Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No.328, §124 
(November 30, 2016); Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, §267, 463 (August 28, 2014); and Contreras et al. v. El 
Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232, §112 (August 31, 2011).   
188 Pretty v. United Kingdom [Fourth Section], no. 2346/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 37-39, 52 and 65 (2002). 
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dignity and human freedom. In other words, liberty and life human rights are intimately linked to 
human dignity as this intimate link has been repeatedly stated respectively in numerous 
international documents and suffices to refer to General Comment No. 12 and General Comment 
No. 15 adopted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at its 
twentieth and twenty-ninth sessions189. Therefore, Europe also requires broad human rights 
protection in the name of human dignity190. 
In Manuel Wackenheim v. France, the International Court of Justice upheld France’s 
decision in terminating Mr. Wackenheim job in order to prevail his human dignity. Mr. 
Wackenheim was hired by a French entertainment company who had dwarf tossing as an event 
and he was the one, among other dwarves, who had been tossed. Under human dignity auspices, 
the activity was banned by local mayor which emerged Mr. Wackenheim claim to overrule the 
ban, once he had not had his dignity dwindled whatsoever but, conversely, he was glad for 
having a nice job which he also shared a lot of fun. To him, the violation of his dignity was 
implied on not letting him continue working as he wishes, entailing violation to his freedom, 
employment rights and respect of private life. Moreover, he emphasized, “there is no work for 
dwarves in France and his job does not constitute an affront to human dignity since dignity 
consists in having a job”191. 
In Wackenheim case, France held the ban on dwarf tossing basing its arguments on the 
legitimacy of human dignity upon the alleged discrimination against dwarves. So it was deemed 
by France as a question of upholding the public order, furthermore, “human dignity is part of 
 
189 Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no. 46043/14, Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 142-143 (2015).  
190 Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, Eur. Ct. H. R., §§ 75, 82, 84-85 (2004).  
191 Manuel Wackenheim v. France, Communication No. 854/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002) 
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public order”, “despite the consent of the individual concerned”. In response, Mr. Wackenheim 
inveighed that “employment is an element of human dignity and depriving an individual of his 
employment is tantamount to diminish his dignity”192. Both sides were arguing the same human 
dignity and both sides were recollecting human rights on their behalves – such as Mrs. Pretty and 
her self-right to die without suffering. This and several quandaries regarding human rights and 
human dignity have been settled by international courts over Kantian formula of humanity as an 
end. 
Therefore, the reason why modern human dignity and its moral bounds are related to 
Kant is because the language widespread nowadays, mostly by scholars and 
international/domestic jurisprudence193, emphasizes the Kantian categorical imperative and 
notion of dignity as inherent value. Dignity has shown itself through different strands, like status, 
behavior and inherent value. Only the third was developed by Kant and is encompassed by 
modern international human rights, also unfolding and carrying within the universal duty of self 
and mutual respect. Through human autonomy, each human being bears his humanity that 
overreach the exercise of personal choices (inclinations); humanity, on this sense, sets 
boundaries to what human beings may do.  
Such value, by the way, transcends the human person and his own will. In Parrilo v. 
Italy, European Court of Human Rights recognized the dignity of an unborn human life, for 
example. In respect to dignity, as value and rights, the potential of being a born life is enough. In 
 
192 Manuel Wackenheim v. France, Communication No. 854/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002) 
193 For instance, in 2006, German Constitutional Court held unconstitutional the statute enacted by the Parliament 
regarding Homeland Security, which asserted that aircrafts taken by terrorist could be lawfully shot down in order to 
save the lives of those who would be on the ground. The Court rationale was in the sense that such provision erodes 
the human dignity of those who are inside the plane, even considering their death as certain outcome. Check on case 
1BvR 357/05, of German Constitutional Court. 
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such terms, “human embryos must be treated in all circumstances with the respect due to human 
dignity”, not even genetics science shall prevail “over the respect for human dignity”, since 
“scientific progress must not be built upon disrespect for ontological human nature” and the 
“scientific goal of saving human lives does not justify means that are intrinsically destructive of 
that life”194. The same depth of dignity beyond the person was held by Inter-American Court as 
well, where human dignity was found on human remains possession, especially by the dead deity 
beliefs and liturgy195. Likewise, as stated in Wackenheim case, France ban on dwarf tossing had 
“reasonable grounds”. Not every differentiation of treatment between people constitutes 
discrimination, what would occur when not based on objective and reasonable grounds. Human 
Rights Committee thus endorsed France’s policy regarding it “necessary in order to protect 
public order, which brings into play considerations of human dignity that are compatible with the 
objectives of the Covenant”196 – article 26, ICCPR. 
In modern international arena, Kantian theory is very appealing, emphasizes Martha 
Nussbaum. It is so because it brings into international politics and general relationships ethical 
content which forces all nations to comply with several moral mandatory statements. This 
approach outweighs the economic power in the sense that upholds universal equality and 
enhances the value of human life and dignity, which trumps any other interest (like in the case of 
the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay). Even though, she highlights that it has 
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196 Manuel Wackenheim v. France, Communication No. 854/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002) 
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not been enough to establish international social cooperation which grants all human beings’ 
equal respectfulness197.      
The reasons supported above are commanded by the categorical imperative of the 
formulation of humanity as an end, where there is an invisible (but not untraceable) power to 
enforce the duty of being respectful to ourselves and others. Human dignity, therefore, serve as 
mediator for moral quandaries, since each man, and in general every rational being, exists as an 
end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will198. However, as 
warned by Michael Rosen, to treat human beings as an end is an open question which remains 
unanswered by the formula of humanity, particularly because Kant does not forbid treating 
human as a mean totally but as means only, which arises a variety of semantic differences where 
our practices hold a grey zone of uncertainties about what is and what is not morally permissible 
on human rights199.  
Human dignity has become the foundational norm that guides all fundamental rights just 
as much as settle eventual conflict between them, even knowing that human rights morality did 
not derive entirely from Kantianism. Suddenly, every other values and rights become 
instrumentals200. For those constitutions and international treaties who treated human dignity as 
value, it becomes also an undeniable right mainly through constitutional and international human 
rights courts jurisprudence. To them, using the value of dignity to overcome individual’s 
 
197 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTEIRAS DA JUSTIÇA: DEFICIÊNCIA, NACIONALIDADE, PERTENCIMENTO À 
ESPÉCIE, 334-337 (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2013) 
198 IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAÇÃO DA METAFÍSICA DOS COSTUMES 68 (São Paulo: Martin Claret, 2006)  
199 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 83-86 (2012).  
200 CARLOS S. FAYT, DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL PODER MEDIÁTICO, POLÍTICO Y ECONÓMICO: SU 
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personal choices and behavior makes sense because what is protected underneath is the “respect 
for the dignity of the human person” In this vein, UDHR and the Grundgesetz foist “Kantian 
conception of dignity as an essential value as the central principle guiding state action”201. 
In a piecemeal, human dignity has revealed itself at once a universal value and a 
contextualized right. It is then both a principle to lead law interpretation and a right judicially 
enforceable, legally and politically202. However, far from being a universal and self-evident 
concept, the right to dignity has created an everlasting tension that neither positive law nor 
judicial interpretations have been able to appease. As remarked by Erin Daly, any effort to find a 
single, unifying theory of dignity will ultimately be thwarted by “the vast range of unconnected 
instances of its use”203, which requires human rights to be regarded in context of a “dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting” that takes into consideration plurality and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds204.  
 
3.4. Human Rights (wannabe) Universalism 
 
As we have mentioned earlier, the American Declaration of Independence and the French 
Revolution Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen borrowed the essence of natural law 
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RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 03, 20 (2013). 
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theories. The philosophy that departs from Hugo Grotius and moves further on establishes rights 
that are essential to human nature, irrespective of God. Human rights, which unite rationality 
with the idea that each person has rights simply by being human, have galvanized modern era by 
setting the rights of life, liberty, happiness and property as natural to any human being, even 
prior any political society. These precepts went deep into Enlightenment and the social 
transformations provoked in eighteenth century pursuant to the idea of universal natural rights 
which are, by this mean, inalienable. They cannot be taken away or conferred by society, since 
they are “self-evident” and a moral quality. All brought up again since the revival of human 
rights in the second half of last century205.  
However, since the beginning of UN human rights movement, the delimitation over what 
would mean universality has been a great problem. The diversity of philosophies on the UDHR 
drafting process was enough to symbolize the unravel nature of simple question just as where 
basic human values are concerned. All the philosophers gathered had to trace a “common 
conviction” because the outlooks upon human rights varied as Western and Eastern culture and 
philosophy do206. Hence Hans Joas supports a duty of value generalization in order to maintain 
the constitutive patterns of the system’s identity207.  
International human rights law has been broadly grappled and inveighed for being unfit 
for universalism in a pluralistic world. Some believe their universalism comes from the ability to 
autonomy and reason that all men share and yoke all of us through humanity. Jenny Martinez 
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points to the no-dissent ratification of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (the 
“positivist credentials”) and its moral exhortation force about right and wrong208. In addition, 
Lynn Hunt brings the claim that the moral rules framed in human rights are universal because 
they are “self-evident”209. Actually, neither of them is accurate.  
 
3.4.1 Positivist Credential 
 
The international law has been traditional on establishing the universality by configuring 
to its standards the related juridical positivism. Since the international community has always 
been detained by states – even nowadays, with the openness of international arena, states remain 
the prime subjects – and their will can only be granted and visualized on international positive 
instruments. On this regard, the positivism tradition of international law traces back to states 
sovereignty that supposedly implies the containment of human being complete emancipation 
from state power210.    
As cited before, the UDHR came to international law as a soft law instrument. Only later 
it became hard law by the enforcement of parallel treaties, such as the two Covenants of 1970s. 
Nowadays, several international bodies constitute the human rights bloc all over the world, each 
one with its own scope. Regardless of their positivism movement, transgressions over human 
rights become even more usual these days, meaning that universal respect is not such a universal 
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value like once portrayed. Hence, all international subjects and courts struggle every day to set a 
minimum of morality out of human rights, regarding the generalization of values and the 
sustenance of world plurality.   
Once again, we face the abysm between positivism announcement and human behavior 
and state policy. Beyond the letters of the positivism movement and out of its reach, however, 
we find and nurture goodwill and good-doing. On this regard, no matter if it comes from moral 
duty, religious principle of love or pure prudence (reason), they are all very welcome. What has 
really mattered so far and will always matter to morality of law is the international actions’ 
content; the judgment, practices and principles involved, whatever their motivation, they all 
might be moral. Along the process of distinguishing facts from values, we face the objective 
value of human welfare (objective in the sense that is not acceptable the idea of welfare upon 
anything that is deemed good individually). Rather, the value of human welfare as international 
moral posture ought to be grappled in a larger level where “welfare” might be interpreted in 
general terms. Therefore, values, practices and institutions must be approved in general terms in 
order to fulfill a global understanding of human welfare211.    
Therefore, the generalization of human rights and – the vagueness it implies – has given 
international courts enlarged powers to set the jurisprudence of the court freely. During this 
process of value statement, consensus over the core value is hard to achieve in international 
society where pluralism is also a mainstay value212. The current sense of humanness, as secular 
and anti-religious term, embeds the human welfare in happiness connotation. Even that moral 
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philosophies disregard happiness as fundamental notion, there is in it a nature of welfare which 
contains multiples meanings not disregarded by anyone in general terms213. 
 
3.4.2 Self-evidence 
 
To proclaim the human rights as self-evident, it has been required three intertwined and 
inseparable qualities. First, human rights must be natural, in the sense that they are inherent in all 
human beings; second, they must be equal, what means to be the same for everyone; and third, 
they must be universal, applicable everywhere. In sum, the human rights ought to attain equally 
all mankind in the whole world just because of the shared status of “human being”. Among these 
qualities, the naturalness has been easier to embrace than equality and universality. Besides these 
qualities, to turn them meaningful we also have to add the political content. Since they are 
human rights in society – domestically or internationally –, states must engage as well214. 
Samuel Moyn agrees with Hunt about the need of politic engagement. For him, human 
rights had been minimal from 1945 onwards. They had moral foundation but no political 
enforcement, since the United Nations role on that period insisted on its nonbinding character in 
order to make the Universal Declaration pass in the General Assembly. Only in the 1970s that 
human rights movement gained strength and achieved foreground beyond government 
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institutions, greatly by the hands of NGOs. Only then the human rights are galvanized as a moral 
alternative to the blindness of politics215.  
Notwithstanding, Hunt still believes the universality of human rights lies on our universal 
“effort to dislodge cruelty”, which has been part of mankind history since ever. This common 
effort chiefly erupts from our empathy, which has become a “more powerful force for good than 
ever before”; this makes human rights our bulwark against evil. Accordingly, human right are 
better defended by the sentiments, convictions and agency of peoples who seek answer for their 
outrage and it goes beyond law – which sometimes serves as instrument of oppression. This is 
enough to turn them self-evident and carry the potential for universality216.   
Likewise, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights holds an outlook very akin to 
Hunt’s. In Advisory Opinion OC-18/2003, it is endorsed that human rights emanate from “human 
conscience” rather than the will of states. They come as a consensus from all the subjects of 
international law – opinio juris communis – where the conscience occupies a higher stage than 
will. It is true that human rights are ostensibly and flagrantly violated every day and everywhere, 
acknowledges the court. However, against these transgressions, which affront the juridical 
conscience of mankind, international courts contribute to the ongoing process of international 
law humanization, where universality and unity of mankind rest217. 
In this vein, the international human rights movement has gradually overlapped the 
uneasy arguments of cultural relativism to enforce its validity instead. To overcome the alleged 
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cultural specificity and difference of origins and values, international community has been 
focusing on few universally shared cultural assumptions which are easily invoked to foster and 
implement a universal validity based on generalization of values218. To form these minimal 
shared values, we must perceive Habermas discursive dialogue process that lies on public and 
democratic reasoning which, in turn, allow us to constantly revise, interpret and apply human 
rights morality219.      
Regarding all of this, moral and political philosophy of twentieth century onwards has 
overcome the prevailing idea of early modern philosophy and natural law theory. Contemporary 
human rights justifications have to be more sophisticated to move beyond the moral reasoning 
from that age and the idea of self-evidence, especially in face of the moral, political and religious 
pluralism existent in the world220. A global demand on human rights generalization has been 
more and more suitable these days.   
 
3.4.3. Universalizibility 
 
Unlikely self-evident and potentially universal, human rights have many faces and 
multiples uses. Whilst Hunt asserts that rights cannot be defined once and for all because their 
emotional element keeps itself in permanent change, since our sense of right and wrong varies 
 
218 Xiaorong Li, “Asian Values” and the Universality of Human Rights, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
397, 406-407 (2001). 
219 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, DIREITO E DEMOCRACIA: ENTRE FACTICIDADE E VALIDADE 190-210 (Rio de Janeiro: 
Tempo Brasileiro, 2nd ed. 2012)  
220 PATRICK HAYDEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 07 (2001). 
 92 
 
through time221, Moyn thinks otherwise. According to him, it is a fiction that human rights 
convey an inviolable consensus everyone share. In fact, their interpretations and applications are 
inevitably partisan and, just like anything that calls itself universal, human rights are violated 
every time they are interpreted and encoded into a specific program222. 
The ICJ Justice Cançado Trindade, by his turn, believes that moral excellence is acquired 
by practices through time and experiences, giving shape to human behavior in a piecemeal. This 
process is part of what he calls “common right of mankind” (tantamount to Flavia Piovesan’s 
“juridical inventory of mankind”) which represents the evolution of the jus gentium. To him, 
rather than the positive law, the common rights of mankind – as a jus gentium evolution – 
disregard legislative authority because they are apprehended by human natural reason collected 
over human consciousness through history which also apply their universal validity223. 
International human rights courts seek to rescue human rights’ universalism and place it above 
states’ will and politics by recognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s 
being a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and 
that they therefore justify international protection224.  
This historical evolution and universal ethical compilation common to every man, which 
create the “universal juridical conscience”, have one single aim, the realization of the common 
welfare, addressed obviously to international society and law. In a world marked by peoples and 
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cultures’ diversity and plurality of ideas and cosmopolitan visions, the jus gentium becomes a 
societas gentium where its unicity is held by the universal juridical conscience. On this regard, it 
is placed above positive law that, in this respect, has revealed itself unable to protect 
humanity225. 
In addition, Helio Gallardo enlightens that since the rise of the second dimension of 
human rights, in nineteenth and beginning of twentieth centuries, the alleged universalism has 
been proven false. The expression of human rights, instead, takes into account the social-historic 
place of groups, nations and individuals, which means humaneness is always retrieved in a 
particular way, not universally, like abstractly envisaged by the drafter and supporters of the first 
dimension, back in eighteenth century. For him, the difficulties to establish social, economic and 
cultural rights uniformly in the whole world serve as evidence of the fallibility of universalistic 
enterprise, which also encompass an inner tension in human rights integrity – where he portrays 
the permanent conflict between capitalism and workforce which impairs the general right of 
life226.  
Although Gallardo is right on his observation, this relativism anti-universalization and 
human rights inefficiency has been already responded by some criteria. Beyond positivism, in 
the first place, the universalizibility is launched in morality227, even when progressing its terms 
and scope from tribal to humanity concerns. No longer remains the morality perfectionism of law 
which entails an unconditional and universal validity to human dignity. Like Joas' and Habermas' 
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criticism on Kant's theory, no philosophical development can be dealt with a morality 
irrespective of history. Conversely, a moral legal universalism must take into account historical 
and cultural sources which may merge a universality argument toward the genesis of values228. A 
universalistic morality cannot be based only on pure practical reason; it might also count on 
religious beliefs, emotions and cultural traumas.  
The fact is that true universality does not apply to mankind. In the real world, there is no 
such thing as universal identical form of autonomous and enlightened reason. The larger a 
society is – namely international society –, the harder is for it to achieve homogeneity of 
practices, mainly because of the historical and cultural inputs. Kant’s rationalism, therefore, is 
the secularized echo of religious absolutism229. Mankind does not need (nor even is 
pragmatically conceivable) to be morally perfect. We need to pursue and always be morally 
better, just as envisioned by Singer’s expanding circle230. Our moral values and progress are and 
always will be afoot.  
We do have too many relativist arguments attempting to erode human rights' 
universalizibility. Basically, the cultural differences and shift of empowerment between 
individual x social rights. Nevertheless, as asserted by Fernando Tesón, “the place of birth and 
cultural environment of an individual are not related to his moral worth or to his entitlement to 
human rights”231. Likewise, Xiaorong Li manifests that the origin of an idea in one culture does 
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not necessarily mean its unfitness to another culture232. Bernard Williams, in his turn, calls this 
misunderstanding as “relativist error” in which no injustice can find comfort on subjective 
morality neither can it provoke a complete absence of protest. This kind of relativism and 
subjectivism is more than incoherent, it is false233.      
Neither prospers the outlook difference from Western and Eastern cultures on human 
rights. The idea that Eastern philosophy outweighs community over individual in opposition of 
Western individuality is also a fallacy. The so-called Western rights (first dimension of human 
rights), the political and civil rights, are actually indivisible to Eastern rights (second dimension 
rights), the social, economic and cultural rights. Albeit they are represented in two Covenants, 
both together makes part of the whole body of international human rights. Each one of them is 
indispensable for the effective exercise of the other. Nowadays, political and civil liberty and the 
rule of law improve social and economic opportunities, especially because the history has 
denounced that what begins as an endorsement of the value of community and social harmony 
ends in a support of authoritarian regimes where anything that opposes to the “community 
interest” is erased234.   
As warned by Samuel Moyn, if human rights do not offer “more realistic and politicized 
utopia, something else will take its place”. The multipolarization that has prevailed in 
international arena is no longer supported by a morality above politics235. In the same sense, 
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Jürgen Habermas asserts that human rights values are inevitably particular and cannot be 
subjected to universalization validity through normative process236. Both Habermas and Moyn 
believe we might attain universalism, but it must not come as binding by international law. The 
universalism on human rights by normative validity claim is unsuitable in a plural and 
cosmopolitan environment such as international community. As Hans Joas states, “the only hope 
of universalization lies in the spheres of law and normative morality”; the communication about 
values ought to depart from our own commitment; our immanent sense of morals which enables 
us to differ good from evil237. 
As grasped by Jonathan Glover, respect and sympathy are the heart of our humanity and 
the cornerstone of all human values, regardless of its codification in positive law. This immanent 
morality is the main source to the process of universalization and values generalization238. As an 
illustration, he cites some events where morality prevailed over law, such as Sargent Anton 
Schmidt, who was in charge of a German army patrol in Poland and gave forged papers and the 
use of military trucks to the Jewish underground until he was arrested and executed239. We may 
also add the German and anti-Nazi students who were executed for distributing subversive 
pamphlets in Munich, all led by a young girl named Sophie Scholl which has today schools and 
streets named after her240; and the Le Chambon village which hidden several jews in Dutch 
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homes occupied by Nazi's forces241. These acts of “civil courage” served universally in several 
different places and among different people and this is the morality that might reach 
universalization, unrelated to any binding normative process.  
Although reality does not support universalistic claims, human rights utopia must endure. 
What is needed, in fact, is not a blind belief on universal values toward a moral perfection of 
mankind. Rather, we need a new language process that fits human rights morality in a real 
geopolitical and plural world, where humanity moves forward to moral improvement, taking into 
consideration the generalization of values and setting process of common and shared beliefs (a 
common currency). We do not need to be moral perfect, but morally better, albeit the moral 
perfection must endure in order to keep us going forward. Pursuant to the gradual objective of 
this work, we are going to reintroduce this subject on Chapter 6, when we are going to direct the 
matter to the aftermath envisioned.   
 
3.5. Apparent Conflicts 
 
Each legal system that is constituted by multiple sources of law is deemed a complex 
system. Therefore, each complex system must possess unity, completeness and coherence to 
keep itself rigid and sustainable. So, from the highest norm to the lowest, they all must be 
logically linked and content-based among themselves; all situations brought out on day by day 
routine must have an answer by law; and all legal instruments, no matter how diverse they are, 
must hold together coherence in order to not embrace law contradictions. During this process of 
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eschewing contradictions, multiples scenarios of conflicts between legal instruments occur, 
among higher and lower statutes (in hierarchy systems), older and newer norms, general and 
especial norms, domestic and international laws and so on so forth. Thus, all these situations 
must have solutions within the system, reason why they are called apparent conflicts – otherwise, 
if it is real, the only solution would be to eliminate one of the conflicting norms242.  
Same dynamic flow happens in modern international law, especially after article 38 of 
ICJ Statute and its plural sources of international law. Moreover, we still have conflicts inside 
the same international treaty or international bodies it belongs to, such as human rights243. 
Likewise, the inclusion of new participants in international politics through the new international 
community framework has contributed to a rich and endless building process over human rights. 
International courts, organizations and treaties have been shaping solutions and interpretations 
which guide human rights applicability on international and domestic politics in order to solve 
apparent conflicts that appear every single day. All international subjects together follow the 
development of the caselaw that has been made upon human rights courts and treaties, leading 
towards a particular interpretation and application which carry legitimacy to form a consistent 
jus commune among nations.      
Marcelo Neves mentions a transconstitutionalism which does not mean an international 
constitutionalism, there is no transnationality here. The concept encompasses in reality an 
unfolding process to appease and solve juridical problems which go through and are common to 
all legal systems. Therefore, a transconstitutionalist problem involves states, international, 
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transnational courts just as much as local legal institutions, all committed in a role to solve and 
suppress the problem. What this comprehension entails nowadays is the problems related to 
fundamental and human rights, what goes way beyond any modern Constitution244.  
To Marcelo Neves, thus, the challenge we currently face is not to set an inward solution; 
it is not a constitutional problem solely. Rather, the cornerstone is to precise the problems that 
emerge in all democratic legal systems and draw a solution which can settle all of them equally, 
intermingling the response through system so it can be called universal. For that, international 
community needs to adopt cooperation among its members to dwindle their conflicts and 
propose mutual appeasement245.  
All in all, during the process of settling apparent conflicts over human rights, the 
constitutional and international kernels depart from the same place: human dignity. This is so 
simply because dignity is the universal boundary set where every time it is crossed, the state and 
international community are called upon to intervene. Then, the governing rule has been a 
formula to affirm human dignity, taking into consideration that its deprivation does not ensue 
dignity disappearance – since it cannot be detached from our humanity – but the denial of rights 
employment. However, this general rule applied to human rights interpretation and applicability 
does not appease modern conflicts which have entrenched moral quandaries.  
With that being said, the usual rule would argue that one kind of value should override 
the claims of those values that are inferior. Nevertheless, on human rights all claims are the same 
kind because all of them derive from human dignity. There is no hierarchy among them and that 
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pushes us to a dead end. How can we appease the weighing of competing dignity-claims of life 
and safety, liberty and privacy, for instance? Rosen, on this account, brings a very keen 
observation when asserting that in such cases, human dignity is not been balanced, since it is the 
core of both conflicting rights. So, dignity is the foundation of rights and the rights are the ones 
who can be weighed, not the dignity. That means that inviolability of rights and inviolability of 
dignity are not the same thing246.  
Therefore, the idea of transconstitutionalism embeds the idea of universalizibility of 
human rights. Where you have same problems and same moral values, the solution should be the 
same. However, the reality disagrees. As stated by Bernard Williams, there is not just one way 
from human nature and morality; there is no universal and unique moral ideal247. This notion 
becomes very clear when we cross exam the rationale conveyed in Princess of Monaco case. 
When challenging the paparazzi's conduct of taking pictures of her on her moments of family 
privacy, the German Constitutional Tribunal held that as public figure she is not entitled to a full 
guarantee of privacy as an ordinary citizen248. Nevertheless, when the case reached the European 
Court of Human Rights, dealing with the same facts and moral values, the morality and law 
solution was entirely reverse. To the Court, there is no freedom of press or expression that erodes 
the Princess' human right of family privacy249. Same facts, same human rights law, same moral 
values and two completely different outcomes.   
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3.6. Incommensurability 
 
When we deal with social values and their penetration into law’s decision-making 
process, we shed into light social goals which are based on reason towards individual and 
collective welfare. Morality and welfare, on this token, are not two independent institutes; one 
does not exclude the other; and there is no collision between them. Therefore, there is no specific 
prior tendency towards their demands.  
If we have two co-existing values, liberty and equality, for instance, we shall cogitate that 
liberty prevails over equality or the other way around or even they are both equivalent with equal 
potency. It is within this inaccuracy zone where the relativist judgement develops itself about the 
strength of two co-existing values. However, in social science field we dare to go further on. 
More than working on relativist interplay between two values, we grasp the idea of the 
incommensurability of these two values, moreover two values which are rooted so fiercely into 
human rights history.  
Thus, incommensurability departs from two premises: (i) that no value override another; 
and (ii) at same time, they are both unequal. So, X and Y are incommensurable whether none of 
them are better than the other nor equal in value. Incommensurability hence is defined in the 
sense that only what bears inner value (or possess negative value) is incapable of being measured 
in your value in face of another element which likewise bears inner value250. Claiming the 
outweigh of one value upon another raises a multitude of issues and, at bottom, it conflates the 
category of the incommensurable with the category of the incomparable. There is no common 
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scale on which X and Y can be put together, such that Y can be seen as proportionate in value to 
X, but they can share comparability without proportionality251.  
When we work the idea that X is not better than Y and Y is not better than X and they are 
also unequal in value depth we entail a second stage of rationale where this statement does not 
present itself as false or true because their value are unmeasurable. Moral quandaries are part of 
human sociology. When we grasp apparent conflicts inside of human rights list, we are truly 
facing a moral quandary of sociological background. As there is no hierarchy nor equality 
relationship among them, the judgement to bring solution to this conflict must dive into social 
value dimensions to set which is going to be the prevailing right. As long as we organize 
ourselves like a pluralist society, there is no prevailing understanding of rights. The prevailing 
right is going to be revealed after robust argumentative debate developed from our 
communicative action skills which push us away from statics pre-comprehension of values252. 
This formula is fostered on jurisprudence rationale where normativity and rationality 
mingle towards a reconstructive theory of society based on communicative reasoning253. Also, it 
does not constitute an axiom because morality does not contain self-evident truth and also 
because substantial moral conclusions are uncapable to appease moral disagreement in the real 
world. That means that a certain action might be wrong under certain circumstances and right 
under others254. For example, we can easily say that is wrong to kill a person, but there is no 
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mischief in killing a homicide which is trying to kill other people whether it is the only way to 
spare victims’ lives. In this vein, the savior killer who decides to kill to prevent other deaths does 
not choose to act wrongly while in fact he is under certain circumstances which turns out to be 
correct to do what usually is deemed a wrongdoing. That explains that in each conflicting 
situation there is at least one option where no error can be found, and this comprehension does 
not encompass the erosion of any social value encapsulated into norms content whatsoever. The 
reason that guides the choice made in conflicting situations, whatever it is, shall be linked to 
some social value because all human action is embedded in values which drive rational human 
agency. The social value underneath action will surface regardless the agent ability of choosing 
under certain circumstances.   
Even though, international law has given hierarchy status over some cardinal values in 
order to secure the sacredness of the person and the new set of human values which foster human 
rights enforcement. Appearing as international undisputable acknowledged values, international 
community frame these values as jus cogens containing erga omnes nature because of the 
importance of the values it protects. Under the auspices of article 53 of Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (1969), jus cogens appertains to the area of international enforcement related 
to the hierarchy of rules in the international normative order, enjoying a higher rank in the 
international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’ customary rules. The most 
conspicuous consequence of this higher rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated 
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from by States through international treaties or local or special customs or even general 
customary rules not endowed with the same normative force255. 
Moral actions are not dogmas or mathematical axioms. Human agency can be wrong in 
some circumstances and right in others. Like, it is wrong to kill for pleasure, but it is right killing 
a murderer while he attempts to kill someone else. In such case, there is no choosing between 
two wrongs. The latter action is right, but the action entailed is normally wrong. What is 
interesting in a plural society just as international community is that we have a lot of values 
coming and going, and a lot of moral quandaries. So, two lessons promptly emerge: moral 
pluralism asks for reasons for action and incommensurability makes conceptual room for 
wrongdoing as justification for action which becomes right according to circumstances. They are 
moral dilemmas because “they are cases in which the act which is morally required of one is 
wrongful”256.  
Basically, we have two driving forces that are incommensurable to each other and both 
regulates international law morality and statutes. In consequence, some moral dilemmas might 
arise. Deontology and individual welfare advocates take opposite side with teleology and social 
welfare advocates. Nonetheless, it is essential to the very notion of community the survival of 
incommensurable social values. The choosing process of which will prevail in an apparent 
 
255 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija [Trial Chamber], Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1998 I.C.T.Y. §153 (December 10); and 
Case of Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, no. 35763/97, §60, ECHR (GC), 2001. 
256 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 361-365 (1986). 
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conflict shall be solved by moral reasoning grappled through democratic discourse, creativity of 
action and communicative performance of rational morality and positive law257. 
 
3.7. Enclosing Considerations 
 
Human rights have been deemed as a body of hard law which enshrines morality through 
the force of law. Human rights composition takes into account multiples human values that – 
regardless the religious and cultural traditions and idiosyncrasies – have been upheld globally by 
several international and national institutions and subjects. The main scope of this brand of 
international law, however, remains on human rights inefficiency to appease real conflicts and to 
solve moral dilemmas. 
Human rights under a Kantian perspective proclaim a moral perfection ruled by the 
categorical imperative of humanity as an end. However, there is no room for absolutism in such 
applicability in international arena, as mentioned by Michael Rosen. To treat human beings as an 
end has been an open question which remains unanswered by the formula of humanity where the 
prohibition seems to embrace exclusively the idea of treating human as means only, which arises 
a variety of semantic differences where our practices hold a grey zone of uncertainties258. 
Therefore, a moral perfection would only be possible if we achieve universal moral standards – 
what has been unsuccessfully tried since the Enlightenment.   
 
257 HANS JOAS, THE CREATIVITY OF ACTION 160-161 (2005); and 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, DIREITO E 
DEMOCRACIA: ENTRE FACTICIDADE E VALIDADE 139-140 (Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 2nd ed. 2012)  
258 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 83-86 (2012).  
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The multiplicity of human rights dimensions – Neves' transconstitutionalism – provokes a 
moral quandary that is becoming natural in our globalized and complex international law. For 
that, Neves defends a transverse rationality which allows a constructive dialogue among legal 
systems in order to sustain the pluralism and respect for diversity without commeasuring and 
outweigh values that are, for the sake of pluralism and diversity, incommensurable, the same 
idea also captured by Hans Joas and Jürgen Habermas. Notwithstanding, to Neves, the world’s 
plurality ought to be fulfilled by identity and otherness. Each state then should give a self-
solution to your problem in order to build its identity which is gradually intertwined with other 
states from the core notion of otherness. Only through permanent exchanges the international 
community can provide a constructive dialogue among nations and enhance its human rights 
decisions and articulations259. 
Joas and Habermas, in their turn, propose a constructive and democratic dialogue over 
social values as well. To them, the universalizability of human values to set human behavior will 
come from a process of value generalization where the society will openly and democratically 
discuss ideas towards social enhancement and moral improvement. To reach that, however, it is 
needed first to set the social values to subsequently put them into social practices to only then 
permit them becoming a social institution260. Moreover, during this process of values 
generalization, we might find a common currency, as espoused by Bernard Williams and Joshua 
Greene, a core of minimal shared beliefs where mankind might rest universal understanding, 
interpretation and application of law and the morality it entails. Conversely to any Kantian 
 
259 MARCELO NEVES, TRANSCONSTITUCIONALISMO 264 (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2009). 
260 HANS JOAS, THE SACREDNESS OF THE PERSON: A NEW GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (Alex Skinner 
trans. 2013); AND 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, DIREITO E DEMOCRACIA: ENTRE FACTICIDADE E VALIDADE 158-159 
(Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 2nd ed. 2012). 
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premises, this new approach needed does not mean a denial of human rights, but a new 
densification of them on moral common-sense grounds261.  
At least, the search for this universal common value must not diverge from the universal 
principle carried by human rights rationale – that follows them since their origin process-making 
– which is the universal effort to dislodge cruelty. This has been unquestionably a common goal 
to mankind, to empower the good against evil, and also the aim of all morality of law262. 
Especially in international arena, where plurality and cosmopolitism prevail, there must be a 
thriving process of communicative action over values and their universalizability enforcement 
based on their generalization and adoption of common grounds.   
 
261 BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL: UMA INTRODUÇÃO À ÉTICA 117-134 (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005); AND 
JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 306-345 (2013). 
262 LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS 212-214 (2007). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 
 
 
4.1. Historical Background; 4.2. International Humanitarian Law 
contemporary traits; 4.3. Geneva Conventions, rules and 
development; 4.4. The Common Article 3 and the rule of civilians’ 
immunity; 4.5. Principles of Necessity and Humanity; 4.6. The 
contemporary wars and their hostis humani generis; and 4.7. 
Enclosing Considerations. 
 
 
4.1. Historical background  
 
The understanding of just war has arisen very early in international law history. As the 
crowning achievement of the jus gentium in the Middle Ages, just war doctrine would be a body 
of law which stipulates when armed force can justifiably be resorted in order to put a stop to 
some kind of evildoing. The main concern then was the permissibility of resorting to force, not 
the methods by which the hostilities were conducted. On this regard, it has been noted that just 
war doctrine had no specific rules about the conduct of war but one, a general prohibition against 
purely gratuitous violence which means that it is in the building core of just war doctrine the 
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cornerstone idea that, irrespective of the rules over conducting methods of combat, nihilist evil 
and hollow violent acts should not be tolerated263. 
Even for liberals, whose discourse aims the limitation of state power followed by 
individual agency enhancement, wars have always been immoral just as much as harmful. Wars 
cause too much damage in the economics sphere and domestic and foreign free trade policy. The 
depopulation of entire tracts of land, the destruction of capital, the increasing burden of taxes, the 
growth of government debt, the shrinking of international trade, general impoverishment and so 
on so forth have been traced as devastating impacts of wars in economics264.  
The rise of Fascism and National Socialism and their relation to the spirit of war brought 
the hope that the war would have a revitalizing effect in society. More than a continuation of old-
fashioned militarism, this idea was conceived as hindsight modernity. War itself was deemed as 
modern revolution. Therefore, violence and terror against enemies were not only practiced but 
they were also encouraged even in cases of no instrumental purpose265. Because of that the Pact 
of Paris of 1928 (or Kellogg-Briand Treaty) is the most prominent treaty on the subject of armed 
conflicts for launching the vivid prohibition of war as an instrument of national policy266.  
As some scholars emphasize, the reality is that international law currently changes its 
foundations after incredible and barbaric totalitarian regimes which invariably pursue, destroy 
and humiliate ethnic groups or peoples through war. In time of war the law is silent. The war 
interrupts the peace, not just the absence of fighting but the peace-with-rights that represents 
 
263 STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67-83 (2014). 
264 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 34 (2003). 
265 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 49-51 (2003). 
266 STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (2014). 
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liberty and safety. The outcome always turns out to be a union of nations and peoples committed 
to set new moral guidance based on ideas of democracy, liberty, equality and justice just as much 
as the fostering necessity to preserve peace before new risks of destructions from the 
enhancement of technology and modern war methods. Nowadays, there is a strong conviction 
and shared consensus among nations that human dignity and fundamental liberties and rights 
must endure and be indivisibly and universally attained by all267.  
With the precipitation of the downfall of colonial empires, the framework of the 
upcoming international community was designed to make armed clashes exceptional events 
besides their constant control and dissolution by means of international institutionalized 
cooperation. The Charter of the United Nations then banned the use of threat of force and 
simultaneously granted to the Security Council of the United Nations the power to take sanctions 
and proper measures involving the use of force against any State breaking that ban. For the first 
time an international instrument expressly prohibit not just war but any threat of or resort to the 
use of military force. From that time forward, the fundamental principles of the international 
relations were: (i) the substantive equality of States; (ii) non-intervention in the internal or 
external affairs of other States; (iii) prohibition of the threat or use of force; (iv) peaceful 
settlement of disputes; (v) respect for human rights; and (vi) self-determination of peoples. 
Creating the new order became a peace aim and the international protection of human rights 
 
267 Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, El Valor Del Derecho y La Jurisprudencia Internacionales de Derechos Humanos en 
el Derecho y la Justicia Internos – El Ejemplo de Costa Rica, in LIBER AMICORUM, HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUNDIO, 
VOL. I, 169, 174 (SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA: CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1998). 
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came to be presented as such an aim, principally by those who placed primary importance on 
individualism, political freedom, and the furtherance of democracy268.  
After the end of twentieth century, history has pointed us towards an investigation into 
the conditions of peace with a sober analysis of specifically modern tendencies to war. For that, 
there is a need to justify the normative premises underlying the modern theory and its 
regenerative effect of violence. Thereafter, we have launched a clear consciousness that 
democracy is the yardstick of social progress – although the twentieth-first century has shown an 
astonishing recession on democracy regimes269 – and the social and legal reinforcement of 
crucial values and their foundation and development through civilization process270. It is the 
research on the role of war in social changes that promotes impacts and configurations in 
international law which allows modernization processes, moreover through international courts 
jurisprudence who pragmatically sets the genesis of new values and the tension between them 
and existing institutions271. 
Out of the law of war, comes a type of international law strengthened by the regent 
principle of humanity to govern the use of principles of necessity and proportionality in armed 
conflict situations. Therefore, a solid preoccupation on victims of the conflict, civilian or 
military, arises in order to regulate means and methods of engagement in war. These new traits 
become intense from the half of twentieth century onwards. Its codifications are developed in 
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DIGNIDADE DA PESSOA HUMANA 236 (RIO DE JANEIRO: RENOVAR, 2002) 
271 HANS JOAS, THE SACREDNESS OF THE PERSON: A NEW GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 86 (2013). 
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Hague, Geneva and New York, basically. So, this international humanitarian law is configured 
by primary international law sources towards the respect to human dignity and the flourishment 
of mankind. It is compatible to contemporary international legal order and maintains unity, 
coherence and wholeness towards the system even in wartime. Hague statutes regulate jus in 
bello and its methods combat and use of force. For this work, Geneva and New York are more 
relevant, since the former deals with the victims of armed conflicts and the latter with human 
rights within armed conflicts272. 
Then, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a specialized branch of international law 
that is applied in armed conflicts. That expression may be understood in a very broad sense as 
covering any rule of international law, applying both in times of peace and war, which has a 
humanitarian purpose. This would include branches of international law such as Human Rights 
Law, Refugee Law, International Criminal Law and so on. There are different expressions used 
to designate that body of law. The "Law of War" or "Laws of War" (jus in bello) is the oldest 
expression which is still used today. However, the "Law of War" is not the most suitable 
expression, nevertheless, we understand it as synonymous to international humanitarian law for 
the purpose of this work. After the Second World War, when the material and objective notion of 
armed conflict replaced the formal and subjective notion of war, another expression has been 
used: The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Despite this, international humanitarian law is used 
to cover the whole body of rules regulating all aspects of armed conflicts, including those rules 
that regulate the conduct of hostilities273. 
 
272 JOANISVAL BRITO GONÇALVES, TRIBUNAL DE NUREMBERG 1945-1946 207-208 (RIO DE JANEIRO: 
RENOVAR, 2004) 
273 NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 56 (2016). 
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4.2. International Humanitarian Law contemporary traits 
 
Therefore, the main sources and subjects of IHL are the classical sources and subjects of 
international law. The extent to which those rules apply depends upon whether the armed 
conflict in question may be qualified as an international armed conflict or non-international 
armed conflict. This means that treaties and customary law are the most important sources while 
states, as well as international organizations, are the most important subjects. The inclusion of 
armed groups in the study of IHL is becoming ever more important because today classical 
international armed conflicts, between two or more states, are relatively rare in comparison to 
what we call internal or non-international armed conflicts, which are contested by a state and an 
armed group or between armed groups. 
IHL is the result of a delicate tension between two major preoccupations: military 
necessity on one hand, which means that belligerents must have enough freedom to fight the war; 
and, on the other hand, humanitarian considerations which seek to minimize unnecessary 
suffering. Furthermore, IHL is the result of an equilibrium between two fundamental principles: 
the principle of military necessity and the principle of humanity. IHL seeks to achieve this 
equilibrium by regulating two aspects of warfare. The first aspect concerns the protection of 
individuals under the control of the enemy. It is often referred to as the Geneva Law which 
regulates a wide range of issues that arise in armed conflict such as the treatment of prisoners of 
war; medical aid for wounded soldiers and the detention of civilians. A significant part of the 
Geneva Law also deals with a particular issue, the occupation of the territory of a state by 
 114 
 
another state. This is the law of occupation. The law of occupation sets the duties and rights of 
the occupying power in relation to the occupied population. It is particularly relevant in relation 
to the occupied Palestinian territories. The second part of IHL, concerns the actual conduct of 
hostilities. To regulate the conduct of hostilities is to set the rules regarding who or what can be 
lawfully targeted and which arms or methods of warfare can be used (the Hague Law). 
We should always keep in mind that international humanitarian law was conceived as the 
legal regime which limited the behavior of parties in warlike situations. In the respective treaty 
laws, war-like situations are referred to as armed conflicts. Thus, IHL limits the behavior of 
parties to armed conflicts. IHL only applies to situations which have reached a special threshold 
of armed violence. Either between states, between states and certain non-state actors, or even 
between non-state actors. Therefore, IHL does not apply to internal disturbances or tensions 
falling below that threshold such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, or acts of terror. 
In these latter situations, human rights law and domestic law would apply. International 
humanitarian law recognizes two types of armed conflict. International armed conflicts or IACs 
which occur between two or more states and non-international armed conflicts, also known as 
NIACs or civil wars, which usually occur within a state. As you might already know, both 
international and non-international armed conflicts are governed by a different set of rules as a 
result of political history274. 
Traditionally, states expressed their intention to start a war through a formal declaration. 
Today however, international armed conflict is presumed to exist as soon as a state uses armed 
force against another state, regardless of the reasons for the confrontation, the intensity of the 
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violence or the existence of a formal declaration of war. The rules of IHL governing situations of 
international armed conflicts have been codified primarily in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 
four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocol I supplemented by Customary 
International Law. Armed conflicts derive their international character from the fact that they 
occur between states. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides that, "The present 
convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the high contracting parties. Even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them". An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies 
from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a 
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement 
is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole 
territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the 
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there275. 
The insights and practices of human rights movement and the placing of humanitarianism 
within the context of International Humanitarian Law creates an important connection to Human 
Rights Law and their interwoven moral revalidation, since the language of rights proves itself 
alluring in warlike zones. The confluence of interests between IHL and HRL has restored human 
dignity at large and allowed charity from other, especially NGOs. The moral code underneath 
 
275 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic [Appeal Chamber], Decision of the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
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such bond is impregnable276. A process of humanization driven by human rights norms and 
principles of humanity took place. Although both branches have your specifics traits and scopes, 
it is undeniable that they also share a common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common 
purpose of protecting human life and dignity which makes their provisions be a mutual 
reinforcement to each other instead of any contradiction277. Despite their divergencies, these two 
branches seem to be commonly conflated, they share the same essence. “Under the influence of 
human rights, the law of war has been changing and acquiring a more humane face: the inroads 
made on the dominant role of reciprocity; the fostering of accountability; the formation, 
formulation and interpretation of rules”278. 
Universal human rights law, on the other hand, protects all persons against “arbitrary” 
deprivation of life, thus suggesting that the same standards apply to everyone, irrespective of 
their status under IHL. In such cases, the respective provisions are generally reconciled through 
the lex specialis principle, which states that the law more specifically crafted to address the 
situation at hand (lex specialis) overrides a competing, more general law (lex generalis). 
Accordingly, the ICJ has held that, while the human rights prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of 
life also applies in hostilities, the test of what constitutes arbitrary deprivation of life in the 
context of hostilities is determined by IHL, which is the lex specialis specifically designed to 
regulate such situations. Similarly, the question of whether the internment of a civilian or a 
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prisoner of war by a State party to an international armed conflict amounts to arbitrary detention 
prohibited under human rights law must be determined based on the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions, which constitute the lex specialis specifically designed to regulate internment in 
such situations279.  
 
4.3. Geneva Conventions, rules and development 
 
Wars have destructive consequences that go on long after they have come to an end. Over 
post war period, there is not only mourning for human lives suppressed by violence, but also 
social relations teared apart, cities and countryside turned into pieces. Even survivors bear 
eternal scars of destruction and violence. It is true that social life is never entirely free from 
violence or the threat of violence, but in war the degree of this threat and the fear tagged along 
surpass for the most part of imagination of it entertained by people who grow up in peacetime280. 
The Geneva Conventions were conceived after the publication in 1862 by Henri Dunant 
of A memory of Solferino, in which he wrote of the horrors he had witnessed at that battle. To 
alleviate them, he proposed the creation of neutral relief groups to provide humanitarian aid in 
time of war. So, the Red Cross was born and so the First Geneva Convention on protecting 
wounded and sick soldiers on land in time of wars was passed in 1864. The Second Convention, 
enacted in 1907, extended those protections to those who needed it on the sea. The Third 
Convention, guaranteeing decent treatment for prisoners of war was concluded in 1929. In 1949, 
 
279 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. §25 (July 8). 
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all three Conventions were updated, and a fourth Convention was created. The basic intention 
was to protect innocent civilians by deterring violations of the laws of war. To that end, the 
Convention also offered protection to combatants who followed the laws of war281. So, First and 
Second Geneva Conventions deal with the sick and wounded of armed forces on the field and on 
shipwrecks at the sea, the Third takes care of prisoners of war and the Fourth of civilians.   
Thus, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 was drafted to protect civilian populations 
in wartime. Nowadays, it is Geneva Conventions who lead the role in international humanitarian 
law. The Common Article 2 of Geneva Conventions sets that their provisions shall be 
implemented in peacetime and applied to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more states, even if the armed conflict is not recognized by one 
of them. It is also applied to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a state, even 
if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Furthermore, an armed conflict exists 
“whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”. 
International humanitarian law applies from the beginning of such armed conflicts and goes on 
beyond the termination of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached. Until that 
moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring 
States282. 
International humanitarian law distinguishes between two types of armed conflict, 
international armed conflicts, which occur between two or more States, and non-international 
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armed conflicts, which take place between States and non-governmental armed groups, or 
between such groups only. This categorization follows political history instead of being 
constructed by military necessity or humanitarian need, albeit their rationales are essentially the 
same for both types of conflict. The incorporation of the concept of non-international armed 
conflict (NIAC) in Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions instituted a landmark in the 
development and codification of this branch of international law. From that moment forward, 
organized armed groups, such as terrorists’ groups, are considered “parties” to an armed conflict 
with their own obligations under international law. Although the historical retrospective of 
international armed conflict is more extensive, non-international armed conflicts are the main 
concern on contemporary international law283. 
Non-international armed conflicts are non-international in character because they occur 
between on the one hand the government forces of a sovereign state, and on the other hand, what 
are known as organized armed groups. Yet, in certain cases, a non-international armed conflict 
can also exist between two or more organized armed groups without the involvement of the state. 
The reason is that treaties applicable to non-international armed conflicts are much more limited 
than those applicable to international armed conflicts. The behavior of the parties in a non-
international armed conflict is limited mainly by the rules laid down in Common Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II. The inclusion of this provision in 
the Geneva Conventions after World War II was a major achievement. This provision contains a 
series of rights and duties, which ensure a minimum level of protection to civilians and other 
persons who are not or who are no longer taking an active part in hostilities. The International 
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Court of Justice has even held that Common Article 3 embodies elementary considerations of 
humanity. Thereby, implying that respect for Common Article 3 is supposed to make situations 
of war more humane. 
Meanwhile, Protocol I of 1977 and Protocol III of 2005 deal with victim’s protection on 
international armed conflicts and the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 
respectively. Even the law of war is currently centered in humanity. This shift of center values 
between old and new regimes intends to build a bridge between power (generally assumed in the 
hands of States) and transpolitical moralism. Thus, the legal humanity discourse provides as 
alternative an entire body of law, full of principles and values, towards global governance284.    
As well kwon, the international community has banned the separatism between the law of 
armed conflicts and HRL, which for a long time – 1940s and 1950s – were predominantly 
considered mutually exclusive.  Their kernel reasoning was the non-binding force of UDHR of 
1948 and the different material scope between branches – HRL applied in peacetime and IHL in 
times of armed conflict. However, after the adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention on 
civilians’ protection during hostilities, a humanitarian element has been added to the equation 
and this principle of humanity has been enough to change the approach for a humanitarian law 
instead of simply law of armed conflict. Likewise, the two Covenants of 1966 have put human 
rights obligations as positive international law, eroding the so far non-binding ideology. These 
humanitarian features have gradually established the common ground for HRL on the protection 
of the human person, shifting the IHL military-oriented and state-centered outlook to a person-
oriented law.  
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In this vein, one of the great advances of last century in international law is the Fourth 
Geneva Convention that came into play to create a legal regime to protect civilians in wartimes 
improving Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 on this regard. The treaty sees civilians as either 
those who are in the hands of an adverse part of the conflict or nationals of a belligerent state 
who are in the territory of the adversary and also expand its spectrum to protected persons in 
Article 4, who are those that, “at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find 
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not national”. The principle of distinction between 
combatants and civilians became extremely important in international humanitarian law, which 
strength comes from a comprehensive framework of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Common 
Article 3, the Additional Protocols and customs, all combined to ensure the protection of 
civilians in armed conflicts and occupations. Adopting a binary concept, Article 50 of Additional 
Protocol I considers civilian everyone who is not legally defined as combatant. If any doubt 
arises, the person’s status is deemed civilian in order to afford as much protection as possible. 
Also, civilian population does not lose its civilian character in case of a combatant within its 
midst hiding or just intertwined285. 
The assumption that derives from this comprehension is that civilians include all those 
who are innocent in the sense that they do not present current threats or who are not part of a 
recognized fighting group. F. M. Kamm adds that even if civilians take up arms and become 
threats to combatants do not thereby acquire combatant status if they are not being part of a 
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recognized fighting group286. In this respect, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
has specified that Common Article 3, customary law principles applicable to all armed conflicts 
require the contending parties to refrain from directly attacking the civilian population and 
individual civilians and to distinguish in their targeting between civilians and combatants and 
other lawful military objectives. In order to spare civilians from the effects of hostilities, other 
customary law principles require the attacking party to take precautions to avoid or minimize 
loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property incidental or collateral to attacks on military 
targets287.  
The provision that forbids military attack on civilians is Article 51 of Additional Protocol 
I. Only whether they take part in hostilities that a military against them is admissible. Under this 
provision, the principle of proportionality prohibits “attacks which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.” However, precedents from International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia make a side note, encompassing that targeting civilians is an offense when not 
justified by military necessity. Therefore, attacks on civilians are forbidden when launched 
deliberately in the course of an armed conflict without military necessity as justification288. The 
principle of necessity justifies only those measures of military violence, not specifically 
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forbidden by international law, which are relevant and proportionate to securing the rapid 
submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of human and economic 
resources289. Military necessity means “doing what is necessary to achieve a war aim” and it 
acknowledges the potential for unavoidable civilian death and injury290. 
 
4.4 The Common Article 3 and the rule of civilians’ immunity 
 
Despite the lack of a legal definition, it is widely accepted that non-international armed 
conflicts governed by Common Article 3 are those waged between state armed forces and non-
state armed groups or between such groups themselves291. Two criteria are considered 
indispensable for classifying a situation of violence as a Common Article 3 armed conflict, thus 
distinguishing it from internal disturbances or tensions that remain below the threshold. First, the 
existence of parties to the conflict, with a minimum requisite of organization but, at least, a 
command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the armed group; the existence 
of headquarters; the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms; the group’s ability to plan, 
co-ordinate, and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its 
ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace accords; and so forth. 
Second, the intensity of violence involved, which is measured by the number, duration and 
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intensity of individual confrontations, the type of weapons and other military equipment used, 
the number and caliber of munitions fired, the number of persons and types of forces partaking in 
the fighting, the number of casualties, the extent of material destruction, and the number of 
civilians fleeing combat zones292. 
Common Article 3 simply identifies a number of key duties and prohibitions providing a 
minimum of protection to all persons who are not, or who are no longer, taking an active part in 
the hostilities. In return, the provision must be applied minimally by each party to any armed 
conflict not of an international character. To this end, some acts are “prohibited at any time and 
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of 
hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”. 
Common Article 3 permeates all four Geneva Conventions and defines certain rules to be 
applied in the armed conflicts of a non-international character. It is unquestionable that, in the 
event of international armed conflicts, these rules form a minimum yardstick to be added to other 
rules which are also to apply to international conflicts. Also, this article encompasses rules which 
reflect “elementary considerations of humanity”293. Therefore, it has been settled by international 
courts that common Article 3 is binding as international customary law regardless of the 
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293 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), 1986 I.C.J. §218 (June 27). 
 125 
 
character of the armed conflict, either non-international or international, and it is not restricted to 
the territory of a single state, confirming its extraterritoriality effect294. 
International humanitarian law has drawn a great importance on protecting civilian 
populations who are caught up in conflict zones and most part of the time suffer the horrors of 
war without being part of the combat. This protection ensues both positive and negative 
obligations. One account of negative obligation is the example of Second World War on British 
army bombing policy at the beginning of hostilities. Initially, it was not directed at civilians, the 
targets were military, but the bombing was inaccurate and civilians who lived or worked near 
military installations were often hit. Nontetheless, the inevitable civilian casualties were accepted 
as a reasonable price to pay for helping to defeat Hitler, even making the choice between 
abandoning bombing altogether or intentionally continuing to bomb civilians. The bombing of 
Germany has killed 593,000 non-combatants, because Churchill was an advocate of bombing 
strategy in war295. Whilst we still have double effect doctrine, this scenario is completely out of 
question pursuant Common Article 3 and Geneva Conventions provisions on civilians’ 
protection, States now have the negative obligation to refrain from hitting civilians in military 
operations. 
The evils that fall upon civilians are unimaginable and the sole speech of peace being the 
main aim of contemporary international law does not seduce or convince the endurance of 
suffering, since ignoring the hell experienced by civilians is also forbidden in Common Article 3 
and binds States to do something to refrain the suffering. In fact, the word ‘peace’ provokes a lot 
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of disdain and uneasiness among people who pass through wars and its hellishness. It happens 
because peace was so many times employed to justify foreign policies which were not defensive 
at all. Therefore, the word has become devaluated in such way that people have not payed 
attention to any discourse about peace interruption or threats of it296.  
For that reason, when the United Nation Security Council's back in 1990s made the 
statement that violations of international humanitarian law constitute a threat to international 
peace and security and that the establishment of the war crime tribunal for Yugoslavia would 
contribute to the restoration and the maintenance of peace is of ground-breaking importance it 
did not appease social community. Afterall, as stated by a Bosnian woman who had been raped: 
“at the end, I get a bit tired of constantly having to prove. We had to prove genocide, we had to 
prove that our women are being raped, that our children have been killed. Every time I take a 
statement from these women, and you journalists want to interview them, I imagine those people 
disinterested, sitting in a nice house with a hamburger and beer, switching channels on TV. I 
really don’t know what else has to happen here, what further suffering the Muslims have to 
undergo … to make the so-called civilized world react”297. Not doing anything is also 
inadmissible in Common Article 3. 
Overcoming the sufferings that happen in real combat zones, the moral exhortation to 
relentlessly repudiate these vile actions becomes cardinal principles in the fabric of humanitarian 
law and human rights law298. For that, principle of distinction plays an important role. It is based 
on the recognition that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
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during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”, whereas “the civilian population and 
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military 
operations.” Therefore, the parties to an armed conflict must “at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”. Accordingly, parties to 
the conflict must distinguish between military objectives and civilians and launch attacks only 
against the former. Likewise, it must distinguished between persons who, by their actions, 
constitute an imminent threat of death or serious injury, or a threat of committing a particularly 
serious crime involving a grave threat to life, and persons who do not present such a threat, and 
use force only against the former299.   
So basically, in international armed conflict, all persons who are neither members of the 
armed forces of a party to the conflict nor participants in a levée en masse are entitled to 
protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In 
non-international armed conflict, all persons who are not members of state armed forces or 
organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to 
protection against direct attack unless they take a direct part in hostilities300. 
 
4.5. Principles of Necessity and Humanity 
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The fundamental principles of international humanitarian law are universal directives to 
nations and binding to states as they stem from Geneva Conventions basic standards, and the 
Additional Protocols. These principles determine, limit and channel the conducts of international 
actors in armed conflicts. By this token, a proper interpretation of them is required in order to 
complement one another within the scope of refraining act that might endanger the life and 
integrity of civilian population and their property301.   
International humanitarian law is based on a balance between considerations of military 
necessity and of humanity. On the one hand, it recognizes that, in order to overcome an 
adversary in wartime, it may be militarily necessary to cause death, injury and destruction, and to 
impose more severe security measures than would be permissible in peacetime. On the other 
hand, IHL also makes clear that military necessity does not give the belligerents carte blanche to 
wage unrestricted war. Rather, considerations of humanity impose certain limits on the means 
and methods of warfare and require that those who have fallen into enemy hands be treated 
humanely at all times. The balance between military necessity and humanity finds more specific 
expression in the core principles of humanitarian law. The principle of humanity complements 
and inherently limits the principle of necessity by forbidding those measures of violence which 
are not necessary, relevant and proportionate to the achievement of a definite military 
advantage302. 
The first principle is military necessity does not detach its actions from the law scrutiny. 
Military conducts consequently should be controlled, and your necessary spectrum is to achieve, 
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as quickly as possible, the complete or partial submission of the enemy. The military action that 
does not provide this achievement purpose is deemed unlawful, especially when it involves 
wanton killing and destruction. Necessity has been a bulwark for the law of war way before the 
world wars of last century, it has now to be applied in harmony with humanity concerns. Hence, 
the principle of military necessity exists in a delicate balance with the second core principle of 
international humanitarian law, the principle of humanity303.  
It is necessity that generally allows the employment of violence and shrewdness in the 
edge of their indispensable use to achieve the end of the war or a great advantage. The interesting 
thing about the principle of necessity is that it was argumentatively applied at Nuremberg trials 
as a defense maneuver. Not just German defendants argued it to justify their hideous practicing 
and acts, also the United States decision on bombing Hiroshima was justified on necessity to 
save uncountable human lives and to eschew Japan invasion would cause another significant 
number of military casualties. As Nuremberg trials refused the necessity justification, new base 
on international law of war was set, permitting the imperative approach of the principle of 
humanity. Nevertheless, necessity still a core principle in law of armed conflicts, even the statute 
of the recent International Criminal Court brings it as exculpatory feature of international 
criminal justice (Article 31)304. Yet, United Nations conveyed on its Annual Report on 
Afghanistan in 2010 that when a “raid by military forces is conducted against a legitimate 
military objective, such as combatants, it is largely governed by the same standards of 
international humanitarian law that govern other attacks, including rules and principles 
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pertaining to the verification of the target as a military target, proportionality, precautions in 
attack and military necessity”305.  
The Common Article 3 of The Fourth Geneva Convention conveys the principle of 
humanity, which enshrines the minimum applicable in all armed conflicts. The Geneva 
Conventions, when dealing with civilians, slowly opened the door to building bridges, because of 
the inevitable link between “civilians” and “human beings”. “elementary considerations of 
humanity” are “illustrative of a general principle of international law” and “should be fully used 
when interpreting and applying loose international rules” of treaty law306. Nevertheless, the 
principle remission has occurred far back, in the preamble to the Hague Convention IV of 1907, 
and replied later in Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions as well. 
Humanity implies a moral force. Under international law terms, humanity is interpreted 
in terms of people’s security and well-being. Therefore, a universally applicable and objective 
definition of humanity is proposed that helps to clarify the complex relationships between 
humanity, inhumanity, the capacity for armed violence, the restraint of armed violence, and 
international law. The word humanity possesses a vague dimension of meaning, nonetheless we 
all attain it as a sentiment of active goodness which with no doubt places itself in an ethos of 
love deeply connected with the sacredness of human life and universal respect to all fellow 
human being307. Not only it embeds the elimination or mitigation of unnecessary suffering to any 
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human being, it also affirms the immunity of civilian populations and serves as essential 
counterbalance to the principle of military necessity308. 
Regarding these two intertwined principles, humanity does not govern necessity in 
reality, as theory would endorse. The decision-making process in international politics not 
always follow the rhythm set in theory. Reality and pragmatism overcome theoretical humanity 
daily. Even though, some scholars argue that international pragmatism should be mitigated by 
idealism, especially in wartime when necessity must step back in face of general principle of law 
salus populi suprema lex esto, the welfare of the people should be the supreme law309. Therefore, 
in between necessity and humanity, we shall convey a third principle who serves to moderate 
necessity based on humanity, the principle of proportionality. The concept of proportionality is 
inherent in the complementary customary law principles of necessity and humanity which 
underlie the law governing the conduct of all armed conflicts310. 
Proportionality is too a very relevant principle to international humanitarian law. To fight 
justly (jus in bello) two points are considered: civilian immunity and proportionality, as a mean 
to reduce or eliminate excessive harm it must commit to save as many civilian lives as possible. 
Proportionality is weighed between the mischief done (immediate harm and permanent injury to 
the interests of mankind) and the contribution that this mischief makes to the end of the armed 
conflict. That is a hard criterion to apply. That is a calculation of costs and benefits in terms that 
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interests of civilians might have lesser value than the gain or victory that is being sought and 
pursued, since it is imperative to soldiers to try to win the wars they are fighting with all assets at 
disposal even the actually related to winning311. Afterall, the legal provision on targeting 
civilians does not extend to an entire prohibition on all civilian casualties, interestingly law has 
always tolerated some civilian deaths as consequence of military maneuvers312.  
Principle of proportionality has its modern formulation inscribed in Additional Protocol I 
to Geneva Conventions. Envisaging protecting civilians in general, it forbids any “attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated”. Subsequently, some provisions of the Protocol set warnings on 
precautions that must be followed by military activities in attacks pursuant their restriction to 
what is indispensable to achieve the military gain sought. It can be said that the principle of 
necessity looks toward the lawful military objectives of the armed conflict, while proportionality 
looks toward humanitarian protections of noncombatants, which means that the balance of the 
two is a central concern of international law313.    
Contemporary international humanitarian law then applies vigorously the combination of 
these three principles, especially toward military response to terrorism in international arena 
today. Inter-American Commission Report on Terrorism underpins that international 
humanitarian law “imposes a general limitation on military operations by requiring that parties to 
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an armed conflict respect the principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity. 
These principles seek to limit the sufferings of the victims of armed conflicts, including the 
unnecessary loss of lives”314. The rule of proportionality applies in peacetime and during 
situations of armed conflict too. It has a different meaning and different implications in each 
context though. 
 
4.6. The contemporary wars and their hostis humani generis 
 
In 2002, the Council of Europe has issued some guidelines over terrorism, the 
contemporary warlike fight. For that, all “States are under the obligation to take the measures 
needed to protect the fundamental rights of everyone within their jurisdiction against terrorist 
acts, especially the right to life”. “All measures taken by States to fight terrorism must respect 
human rights and the principle of the rule of law”. “In their fight against terrorism, States may 
never act in breach of peremptory norms of international law nor in breach of international 
humanitarian law, where applicable”315. At same time, United Nations Security Council issues 
Resolution 1373, in 2001, that calls upon all States to comply with all obligations under 
international law pursuant taking “the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist 
acts”316. 
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Once Paul Butler asserted that there is a big difference between terrorism and traditional 
war. The former is illegal while the latter is legal; the perpetrators and the intended victims of the 
former are often civilians, whereas in the latter the perpetrators and victims are both soldiers317. 
Also, the legal and practical difficulties arising as a result of changes in the contemporary 
security environment have caused confusion and uncertainty not only about the distinction 
between armed conflict and law enforcement, but also about the traditional categorization of 
persons as civilians and combatants and the temporal and geographic delimitation of the 
“battlefield.” The most urgent humanitarian need, however, is not to adopt new rules but rather 
to ensure actual compliance with the existing legal framework318. 
Although recurring to terrorism might be efficient under unattached consequentialist 
analysis, the fundamental critique harbors on a diverse ground, which is paramount to 
humanity’s law: morality. Terrorism may be rational, but it is also evil. The immorality of 
terrorism lays at the sense of risk that it causes the public at large; the powerlessness people have 
from being put at risk; and the instrumentality of attacking innocent people in pursuit of an 
alleged political goal. Nevertheless, it is important to establish the separation between 
immorality and the killing of innocent people because they are not always mutually inconsistent. 
There are cases in which taking innocent lives in pursuit of an urgent objective is warranted. 
Moral standing, on this regard, is about legitimacy and not about right. In the context of 
international law, politics and morality matter319. 
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Whilst killing combatants still a huge point of controversy between human rights and 
humanitarian law, the main focus remains at a more advanced perspective of noncombatants 
killing which, in two occasions, is tolerable in the law of war. Generally, when the military 
necessity demands a double effect conduct, that aims military and nonmilitary targets, for its 
legitimation, we have to extract utilitarian arguments. To perform an act with evil consequences 
(noncombatants casualties), the good effect ought to be sufficiently good to compensate the 
allowance of the evil effect. However, in the modern comprehension of humanitarian law, the 
double effect theory is defensible only when the good end is achieved, and the evil consequence 
is reduced as far as possible. Although the utilitarian grounds of the theory, it must have some 
kind of commitment to save as many civilian lives as possible, since principle of proportionality 
demands moral maneuver to repute it appropriate.  
Also, there is a second situation that the killing of innocent people occurs fairly. It is 
when we have a self-determination of a group or people ongoing. As stated in the Protocol of 
1977 of the War Convention and United Nations Resolutions 1514 and 2908, the armed struggle 
is justified against (i) alien occupation, (ii) colonial domination and (iii) racist regimes. Thus, 
these causes are just causes for fight and they must observe the same rules of proportionality and 
civilian immunity of an armed conflict. However, if there is no more space for deliberation and 
nonviolence policy and the oppression is such that it justifies turning to violence as a last resort, 
then the moral issue sets that the weak has the right to fight dirty to have a chance on wining 
over the strong. If we oblige the weak to fight clean, the strong will always win. The only tactic 
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that converts weakness into strength is terrorism, hitting the enemy at its most vulnerable point, 
its civilian population320. 
This second scenario presents the lesser evil argument. In order to overcome the greater 
evil of injustice and oppression, the weak must be entitled to resort to the lesser evil of terrorist 
violence, otherwise the weak will be condemned to an eternity of subjugation. Nonetheless, that 
justifiable innocent targeting is restricted to the right of self-determination of a people or group 
under alien occupation, colonial domination or racist regime. The lesser evil argument does not 
apply to nihilist terrorism. Conversely, they aim attacking the enemy, but they intentionally 
choose to attack noncombatants rather than combatants to cause a higher impact and humiliation, 
to destroy the morale of a nation. There is no commitment to spare civilian lives, their method is 
the random murder of innocent people.  
 
4.7. Enclosing considerations 
 
The systematic use of remote-controlled drones for counterterrorist operations in 
countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen raise questions as to the applicability of IHL 
to these operations and, consequently, as to the rules governing the use of lethal force against the 
persons targeted. Where IHL is applicable, the systematic use of drones raises concerns with 
regard to the reliability of the targeting information used, the exposure of the civilian population 
to incidental harm, and the inability of the attacker to care for the wounded, or to capture rather 
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than kill. Another relatively recent development is the expansion of military operations into 
cyberspace, the so-called “fifth domain of warfare” next to land, sea, air and space. While it is 
generally uncontested that IHL would also apply to cyber operations conducted in relation to an 
existing armed conflict, it is unclear whether cyber operations, in and of themselves, could give 
rise to an armed conflict and, thus, trigger the applicability of IHL. Also, once cyber operations 
are governed by IHL, questions arise as to what exactly amounts to “attacks” – defined in IHL as 
“acts of violence” – in cyberspace, and how the proportionality of “collateral damage” to civilian 
infrastructure should be assessed, particularly in view of the fact that military and civilian 
computer networks are generally interconnected. This ongoing process, however, should not lead 
to the misperception of a legal void in this “fifth domain,” but must build on the premise that 
existing international law fully applies in cyberspace. In situations of armed conflict, that 
includes all relevant rules and principles of IHL321. 
Consequently, international humanitarian law and human rights law arose at international 
arena in different times of the history, under different circumstances and with different aims. 
Even the recent edition of UDHR and Geneva Conventions were clearly not mutually inspired. 
Although sharing common ground – principle of humanity and all it entails – there were an 
understanding that they would have overlapping areas of application and so human rights would 
not be applied in situations of armed conflicts, but in times of peace, since peace was what 
United Nations has struggled to achieve322.  
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Yet, there is a resounding reminiscence of war in the debates on the Universal 
Declaration. Since then, international community has acknowledged that human rights are 
relevant in armed conflict, as ascertained in United Nations General Assembly of December 3, 
1953, where Resolution 804 invoked human rights in the context of Korean armed conflict323:  
Having considered the item “Question of atrocities committed by the North Korean and Chinese 
Communist forces against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea” […], Recalling the basic 
legal requirements for humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in connection with the 
conduct of hostilities are established by general international law and find authoritative 
reaffirmation in the Geneva Convention of 1929 and 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoner of 
war and in Geneva Convention of 1949 relative the protection of civilians in times of war, 
Recalling that these Conventions also embody precise and detailed provision for giving effect to 
the basic legal requirements referred to above, and that these provisions, to the extent that they 
have not become binding as treaty law, have been accorded most general support by international 
community, Desiring to secure general and full observance of the requirements of international 
law and of universal standards of human decency, (1) Express its grave concern at reports and 
information that North Korea and Chinese Communist forces have, in a large number of 
instances, employed inhuman practices against the heroic soldiers of forces under the United 
Nations Command in Korea and against the civilian population of Korea; (2) Condemns the 
commission by any governments or authorities of murder, mutilation, torture, and other atrocious 
acts against captured military personnel or civilian populations, as a violation of rules of 
international law and basic standards of conduct and morality and as affronting human rights and 
the dignity and worth of the human person. 
 
Same happened few years when Soviet army invaded Hungary, when the United Nations 
General Assembly, in December 12, 1958, issues Resolution 1312 invoking human rights 
boundaries into armed conflict in course, “Again calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialists 
Republics and the present authorities in Hungary to desist from repressive measures against the 
Hungarian people and to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the 
Hungarian people’s enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms”324.  
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against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea, U.N. Doc. A/RES/804/VIII (Dec. 3, 1953). 
324 G.A. Res. 1312 (XIII), The Situation in Hungary, U.N. Doc. A38/49 (Dec. 12, 1958). 
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Not less, in December 19, of 1968, the United Nations General Assembly designates that 
year as International Year for Human Rights by Resolution 2441 and, by Resolution 2442, 
confirms and endorses the Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights held at 
Teheran some months earlier. Thereafter, edits Resolutions 2443 and 2444 that embodies the 
respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories and in armed conflicts, 
respectively. So, these United Nations Resolutions expressly bear in mind the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of civilian people in time of war, however 
convey for the respect and implementation of human rights in conflict zone as concerns pulled 
out from “the violation of human rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel, (…) the disregard 
of fundamental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories, (…) acts of destroying homes 
of the Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel”. For that, United Nations 
calls upon Israeli government “(…) to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in occupied territories, (d) 
affirmed the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who have left their homes as a result of the 
outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return home, resume their normal life, recover their 
property and homes, and rejoin their families according to the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”325.   
At same token, Resolution 2444 recognizes the necessity of applying basic humanitarian 
principles in all armed conflicts, such as the prohibition “to launch attacks against the civilian 
population” and the distinction between people “taking part in the hostilities and member of the 
civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible”. On the urge of the 
 
325 G.A. Res. 2443 (XXIII), Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2443/XXIII (Dec. 19, 1968). 
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“need for additional humanitarian international conventions or other appropriate legal instrument 
to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed conflicts”, the 
Final Act of International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran is hold as legal instrument 
for human rights respect in armed conflicts326. In sum, even during the periods of armed 
conflicts, principle of humanity must prevail, either by international humanitarian law or human 
rights law. 
 
326 G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), Respect for human rights in armed conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2444/XXIII (Dec. 19, 
1968). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
 
5.1. Initial Thoughts; 5.2. Human Dignity Relationship; 5.3. 
Derogation on Human Rights in Times of Emergency; 5.4. Today’s 
Assessment by Courts’ Precedents; 5.5. The Burden of Morality; 
and 5.6. Doctrine of Double Effect and Utilitarianism. 
 
 
5.1. Initial thoughts 
 
In international legal order there are innumerous bodies of law which belongs to Human 
Rights Law web and, simultaneously, International Humanitarian Law also has some statutory 
instruments under its wings. Like approached at second chapter of this book, all bodies of law 
pertain to the general and complex international legal system whose traits of unity, wholeness 
and coherence are imperative. Nonetheless, each branch of international law covers specific 
aims. While HRL always deals with the inherent rights of the person to be protected against 
abusive and arbitrary actions, the IHL regulates the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. 
Since Human Rights Law applies at all times, it is based on principle of universality and 
therefore possess, at first glimpse, a lex generalis character. On the other hand, International 
Humanitarian Law have a narrower scope of application, reaching only factual cases under 
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armed conflict spectrum, thus acquiring to itself a sense of lex specialis. Although inherently 
distinct one to another and their rules are not necessarily consistent with each other, it is taken 
for granted today that international humanitarian law and international human rights law 
maintain between their respective bodies both subtle and multiple relationship, with one branch 
of the law complementing, strengthening or filling the other’s gaps. From a theoretical 
standpoint, both branches of the law have some shared or common legal ground on which they 
can interact327.  
Afterall both share the major principle of humanity. Human rights and humanitarian law 
share a common ideal, protection of the dignity and integrity of the person, and many of their 
guarantees are identical, such as the protection of the right to life, freedom from torture and ill-
treatment, the protection of family rights, economic, and/or social rights328. While human right 
law has been recently developed and contains a lot of national, cultural and religious antecedents, 
humanitarian law has served as “an important historical foundation for the development of 
human rights law, resting on the notions of protection of human dignity inherent” in the law of 
armed conflicts329. The United Nations Charter preamble then is addressed to all international 
bodies of law, humanitarian law and human rights law included. It says that one of the four key 
purpose of the United Nations is “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
 
327 Robert Kolb, Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law Between 1945 and the aftermath of the 
Teheran Conference of 1968, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 35, 35 
(2013). 
328 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, in ISRAELI LAW REVIEW. VOL. 40, NO.2, 310, 312 (2007). 
329 LAURIE R. BLANK AND GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS: FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 27 (2013) 
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and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small”. 
Thus, the question arises whether there is conflict and tension or synergy between these 
regimes, as we seek to analyze the possible ways in which the interplay between human rights 
law and humanitarian law can work in practice. There is some dispute over the matter, but even 
though legal authorities of international law massively support that human right law is applicable 
alongside international humanitarian law in combat situations on the position of harmonious 
convergent bodies of law. Two main concepts inform their interaction: complementarity between 
their norms in most cases and prevailing of the more specific norm when there is contradiction 
between the two. The question is in which situations either body of law is the more specific.   
Accordingly, the ICJ has held that, while the human rights prohibition on arbitrary 
deprivation of life also applies in hostilities, the test of what constitutes arbitrary deprivation of 
life in the context of hostilities is determined by IHL, which is the lex specialis specifically 
designed to regulate such situations. Similarly, the question of whether the internment of a 
civilian or a prisoner of war by a State party to an international armed conflict amounts to 
arbitrary detention prohibited under human rights law must be determined based on the Third 
and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which constitute the lex specialis specifically designed to 
regulate internment in such situations330. Lex specialis sets the priority norm, and that would be 
the case of respect to life regarding the targeting of combatants. IHL as special regimes overlaps 
HRL, according to Advisory Opinion on the Legality of th Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.  
 
330 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. §25 (July 8). 
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However, years later, the ICJ ruled a different understanding in Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
rejecting the cartesian application of human rights law governing in peace time and humanitarian 
law governing in wartime and, because of that, as lex specialis, humanitarian rules override 
human rights law. Under a different outlook, the Court now holds that human rights are 
cherished and duly protected in armed conflicts situation by the standards of human rights law, 
only the actions of the perpetrators shall be contrasted before the feasible justifications inserted 
in humanitarian law. Therefore, the lex specialis serves to evaluate whether human rights 
violations are arbitrary or not, particularly taking into considerations the military necessity and 
proportionality of actions. In this sense, “the Court considers that the protection offered by 
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict”331. And in Case Concerning 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, international human rights prevailed, especially 
before Congo’s civilian population, in order to condemn Uganda to be in absence with its 
international legal obligations332. 
In summary, the Court sets three possible situations coming out of the interplay between 
these two branches of law: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian 
law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; and others may be matters of both 
these branches of international law333. Chiefly, the separatism between both branches takes 
account for the difficulties for a shift from a military-oriented law to a protected person-oriented 
 
331 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 
I.C.J. §§105-106 (July 9). 
332 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. §§217-220 (December 19). 
333 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 
I.C.J. §106 (July 9). 
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law. Therefore, the analysis is made rule by rule and context by context, not broadly as whole 
body of law prevailing over the other. So, there is no longer doubts of IHL and HRL co-
application. However, which remains unsettling, challenging and ongoing is the grey zone 
between both bodies of law to set how this co-applicability works in day by day judicial 
experience.   
Regarding United Nations Resolution 2444 of 19 December 1968, human rights are 
officially inserted in armed conflicts legal order. The Final Act of International Conference on 
Human Rights in Teheran upheld in that document proclaims that the “primary aim of United 
Nations in the sphere of human rights is the achievement by each individual of the maximum 
freedom and dignity”. Furthermore, urges “all peoples and governments to dedicate themselves 
to the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to redouble their 
efforts to provide for all human beings a life consonant with freedom and dignity and conducive 
to physical, mental, social and spiritual welfare”334. Regarding specifically human rights in 
armed conflicts, the Final Act brings at provision XXIII: “Considering that peace is the 
underlying condition for the full observance of human rights and war is their negation, Believing 
that the purpose of the United Nations Organization is to prevent all conflicts and to institute an 
effective system of peaceful settlement of disputes, Observing that nevertheless armed conflicts 
continue to plague humanity, Considering, also, that the widespread violence and brutality of our 
times, including massacres, summary executions, tortures, inhumane treatment of prisoners, 
killing of civilians in armed conflicts and the use of chemical and biological means of warfare, 
 
334 UNITED NATIONS, FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TEHERAN, 22 
APRIL TO 13 MAY 1968, A/CONF.32/41, SALES NO. E68.XIV.2, 04-05 (1968). 
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including napalm bombing, erode human rights and engender counter-brutality, Convinced that 
even during the periods of armed conflicts, humanitarian principles must prevail”335.   
The United Nations Teheran Conference of 1968 on human rights in armed conflicts, 
Resolution 2444, and the two Covenants of 1966 – on civil and political rights (Covenant II) and 
on social, economic and cultural rights (Covenant I) – turn human rights law in a fully-fledged 
positive law. The question of the application of this branch of law in the times of armed conflict 
now appears on the very level of positive law. All these factors, among others, pulled 
consistently towards a convergence and some form of cooperation between both branches of the 
law336. 
Afterwards, the United Nations General Assembly, in December 09, 1970, enacts 
Resolution 2675 which, recalling and expressly creating its connection to Resolution 2444, sets 
international basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts “to 
ensure the better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all types”. So eight principles 
have been issued and here they are: (1) Fundamental Human Rights fully applied in situations of 
armed conflict; (2) distinction between people actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian 
populations; (3) precaution and maximum effort in military operations to spare civilian 
populations from ravages of war and eschew injury, loss or damage to them; (4) Civilian 
population should not be object of military operations; (5) Places and installations inhabited by 
civilians should not be object of military operations; (6) Places or areas designated for the 
 
335 UNITED NATIONS, FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TEHERAN, 22 
APRIL TO 13 MAY 1968, A/CONF.32/41, SALES NO. E68.XIV.2, 18 (1968). 
336 Robert Kolb, Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law Between 1945 and the aftermath of the 
Teheran Conference of 1968, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 35, 45 
(2013). 
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protection of civilians or refugees should not be object of military operations; (7) civilians, 
collectively or individually, should not be object of reprisals, forcible transfer or other assaults 
on their integrity; and (8) The provision of international relief to civilians “is in conformity with 
the humanitarian principles of the Charter of United Nations, the Universal Declarations of 
Human Rights and other international instruments in the field of human rights”337. 
It is clear that all principles announced are those already embedded in International 
Humanitarian Law theory but the first and the last. The first that calls the full application of 
human rights in armed conflicts is underpinned by previous instruments and resolutions. 
However, the last one unambiguously encompasses the shared principle of humanity and all 
provisions and concepts tailored in the Charter of United Nations and Universal Declarations of 
Human Rights. International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law are hitherto living a 
biological symbiosis or, we also shall call, mandatory mutualism. 
Taking some guidelines from Biology, mandatory mutualism (or symbiosis) occurs when 
two different species associate one to another creating an interspecific relationship in such way 
that both species intervene on each other metabolism and start to depend one another for the sake 
of the benefits of this association. Some difference between mutualism and symbiosis is drawn 
though, being mutualism considered the relationship where both species benefit from the 
association, while symbiosis has a broader meaning, also entailing commensalism, where only 
one of the species benefit from the association338. With that in mind, from now on, we shall refer 
 
337 G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2675/XXV (Dec. 09, 1970). 
338 LIBRETEXTS LIBRARY, https://bio.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Human_Biology/Book%3A_Human_Biology 
_(Wakim_and_Grewal)/24%3A_Ecology/24.04%3A_Community_Relationships (last visited September 2, 2019) 
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to International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law fusion and co-applicability as 
mandatory mutualism because it is for the benefit of both branches and, above all, the benefit of 
principle of humanity and the pursue of peace by mankind. 
In 1977, United Nations sets a diplomatic conference where two Additional Protocols 
join international humanitarian bodies of law. These Protocols deal mostly with human rights 
guarantees and proceedings during armed conflict situations. Even though, until today we still 
have a grey zone over the details of their mutual interaction. The adoption of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and two Additional Protocols have progressively ventilated a new conception of law, 
creating a common ground on the protection of the human being based on fundamental principle 
of humanity. Any gap left utterly open by international humanitarian law is hitherto filled by 
human rights law, giving a perfect harmony among bodies of law within international legal 
system. 
In this vein, complementarity that comes out of the mutualism between the two branches 
of international law reflects a method of interpretation enshrined in Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which allows, in interpreting a norm, to take into 
account “relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” As 
aforementioned, this provision entails the idea of international law understood as a coherent 
system which observes unity and shows wholeness among its legal sources. It sees international 
law as a regime in which different sets of rules cohabit in harmony, providing mutual benefits 
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one another. Thus, human rights can be interpreted in the light of international humanitarian law 
and vice versa339. 
Article 72 of Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions already stresses that 
humanitarian law provisions are supplementary to any other applicable rule of international law 
relating to the protection of fundamental human rights during armed conflicts, international or 
non-international. Yet, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights elucidates that it is 
because of their mandatory mutualism and the fact that “both normative frameworks are based 
on common core principles and values”, international human rights law and humanitarian law 
“can provide reciprocal influence and reinforcement”. So, the conclusion is that “international 
human rights law can be interpreted in the light of international humanitarian law and the latter, 
in turn, can be interpreted in the light of international human rights law, if required”340. 
Moreover, the mandatory mutualism is applied entirely in cases of belligerent occupation as 
well. As alien occupation is also a matter of humanitarian law, according to the Hague 
Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention, the enjoinment of human rights law stands, 
especially to protect civilian populations. Not just ICJ341 has reached this conundrum, but 
European Court342 and Inter-American Court343 likewise.    
 
339 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, in ISRAELI LAW REVIEW. VOL. 40, NO.2, 310, 337 (2007). 
340 Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 121/18, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §328 (2018); same conclusion at Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador v. 
Colombia, Case IP-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140, doc. 10, §121 (2010). 
341 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. §§172-173 (December 19); and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. §178-179 (July 9). 
342 Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§90-91, 142 (2011) and Ilascu 
and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99 Eur. Ct. H.R. §370 (2004).  
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5.2. Human Dignity relationship 
 
As we worked previously, international legal system is a complex one which contains 
multiple sources of law and also open clauses in order to provide law its dynamics and ductility 
for settling hard cases and embrace new traits of law regarding the civilization process and 
science (in general) rapid development. So, regarding human rights law, we have human dignity 
being applied in international courts either as a right or a value, mostly on hard cases where we 
might find some apparent conflict of legal provisions of international bodies of law. This moral 
contribution from human rights law touched law of war giving it a more humane contour, what is 
often called as humanization process based chiefly on principle of humanity. 
Thus, it is largely conceived that law of war, or law of armed conflict, shall be 
appropriately named as international humanitarian law, since it shares with human rights law the 
same values and moral, i.e., the same essence. Hence, a mandatory bound between that is 
endorsed in order to purport mutualism to both branches of law, benefits for both sides. 
Furthermore, “the essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as 
human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or her 
gender. The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and indeed 
the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law”344. It is then 
 
343 Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 
22, §238 (September 15, 2005); and Norín Catrimán et al (Leaders, members and Activists of the Mapuche 
Indigenous People) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser.C) No. 279, §197 (May 29, 
2014). 
344 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija [Trial Chamber], Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1998 I.C.T.Y. §183 (December 10). 
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undeniable the strength that human dignity exercises in this mandatory mutualism, both as right 
and value.  
The major key we are trying to uphold here is that, either right or value, international law 
and jurisprudence on human rights have applied human dignity largely as human rights law 
centerpiece. That means human dignity is grappled as a supervalue; the core from where all 
provisions on human rights emanates and develops their constitution and comprehension. This 
irradiation process might be seen on several international bodies of law – expressly – or 
contextualized on jurisprudence semantics and rationale, as being part of the provision 
referenced to.  
Portraying an international wide scenario, we shall shed light to some relevant bodies of 
law whereas human dignity is expressly conceived, if not in the preamble, in the provisions set. 
Even when established in the preamble which possesses a moral codification esteem, the 
supervalue of human dignity yokes the applicability of all human rights provisions, chiefly by 
jurisprudence rationale. The positive credentials of human dignity in international law, just like 
the majority of modern national constitutions, has purported a great ideological latitude that may 
propitiate different degrees and shapes of realization, but it is undeniable human dignity have 
reached general acknowledgement in international community. Although we have experienced 
some punctual setbacks during the way, it cannot serve to dwindle or compromise the main goal 
that is to increasingly enforce the respect on human dignity and to densify its content in an 
irreversible manner345.    
 
345 Peter Harbele, A Dignidade Humana como Fundamento da Comunidade Estatal, in DIMENSÕES DA DIGNIDADE 
89, 150-152 (PORTO ALEGRE: LIVRARIA DO ADVOGADO, 2005). 
 152 
 
The aforementioned United Nations Resolution 2444 of 19 December 1968, which puts 
human rights law in the center of armed conflicts legal order, foists The Final Act of 
International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran as human rights icon. At provision XXV, 
giving publicity for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it expressly recognizes that “in 
order to make effective use of human rights, everyone must understand the nature of these rights 
and his responsibility to exercise and defend them in fulfillment of the dignity of man”346. On 
previous chapters, we worked into the nature of human rights and their responsibility to mankind 
and for that we might assert we understand perfectly.  
Besides the several international statutes indicated on previous chapter on human rights 
law, we shall recall some core references for the sake of congruency in our discourse. United 
Nations, encompassing the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights issues Resolution 1904 that proclaims the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination fully convinced that racial segregation and discrimination hamper the 
“respect for the dignity of the human person”, which is thereof considered as an “offense to 
human dignity”347. And more, the realization of economic, social and cultural rights lies at the 
core efforts to realize all human rights since an existence worth of human dignity is only possible 
if both categories of rights are fully enjoyed348.  
 
346 UNITED NATIONS, FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TEHERAN, 22 
APRIL TO 13 MAY 1968, A/CONF.32/41, SALES NO. E68.XIV.2, 19 (1968). 
347 G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1904 (Nov. 20, 1963). 
348 E.S.C. Report on the Thirty-Sixth Session, Official Records, 1980, Supplement No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/1980/13, 
E/CN.4/1408, §116 (February 4 – March 14, 1980). 
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All regional conventions on human rights also entail human dignity and, no matter 
whether expressed in preamble solely or not, the characterization of value and right fall within 
the orientation set in Article 31 of Vienna Convention of 1969, to whom interpreting a treaty 
occurs in “good-faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” and inside of the treaty is  the 
preamble which also serves into the purpose of interpretation. The application of Article 31 is 
duty bound to work towards mandatory mutualism between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, according to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights349.  
It is also interesting that in spite of European Convention on Human Rights does not 
explicitly ascertain human dignity, neither as value nor right, the later Protocol 13 and Article 4 
of Protocol 4 bring their comprehension, like a principle, when banning death penalty, for 
instance. Nevertheless, European Court of Human Rights has already recognized human dignity 
as value too, doing the interpretation exercise that allows full applicability of international legal 
order with unity, coherence and wholeness. Human dignity “has been taken into account when 
interpreting the Conventions and substantive judicial decision-making has been produced350. In 
Bouydi v Belgium and Khlaifia and Other v. Italy, the recognition of human dignity was 
galvanized as a value of civilization closely bound to respect. Any act that humiliates, debases an 
individual, shows a lack of respect for or diminishes his or her human dignity shall be forbidden. 
 
349 Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 121/18, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §328 (2018); same conclusion at Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador v. 
Colombia, Case IP-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140, doc. 10, §121 (2010). 
350 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND JUSTICE WORKING PAPERS 2008/8, 57 (2008). 
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Thus, the “respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the Convention”351. 
Parrilo v. Italy went far beyond, it recognized the dignity of an unborn human life, embracing 
the notion of ontological disrespect of human nature in a way that means of working 
scientifically through genetics to reach the end of saving human lives is not acceptable352. 
Inter American Court has held a wide outlook over straight tie between human dignity 
and personal integrity. Citing Articles 5 and 11 of Inter American Human Rights Convention, the 
court hold that embedded in the provision that sets personal integrity as a fundamental right we 
shall find human dignity since “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect 
for the inherent dignity of the human person” and “everyone has the right to have his honor 
respected and his dignity recognized”353. Besides that, human dignity is turned into an erga 
omnes international obligation towards American States, which means that rights to life, personal 
integrity, honor and dignity not only need to be respected – negative obligation – but also require 
from all States the adoption of all appropriate measures to enforce and guarantee them to every 
individual – positive obligation354. 
 
 
351 Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§81-89 (2015); and Khlaifia and Other v. Italy [GC], no. 
16483/12 Eur. Ct. H.R., §158 (2016).  
352 Parrilo v. Italy [GC], no. 46470/11 Eur. Ct. H.R., §47 (2015).  
353 Case of the Members of the Village of Chichupac and neighboring communities of the Municipality of Rabinal v. 
Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No.328, §124 
(November 30, 2016); Caso Velásquez Paiz y Otros v. Guatemala, Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones 
y Costas, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 307, §173 (Noviembre 15, 2015); and Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, 
Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 83, §52 (March 14, 2001). 
354 Velásquez Paiz y Otros v. Guatemala, Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 307, §106 (Noviembre 15, 2015); Caso Gonzales Lluy y otros Vs. Ecuador, Excepciones 
Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 298, §168 (Septiembre 1, 2015); Caso 
Defensor de Derechos Humanos y otros Vs. Guatemala, Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 283, §138 (Agosto 28, 2014); and Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras, Fondo, Inter-
Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No.4, §163, 165-166 (Julie 29, 1988). 
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5.3. Derogation on Human Rights in times of emergency 
 
Although the mandatory mutualism between international humanitarian law and human 
rights, it is well spread through human rights conventions that some human rights can be 
derogated during emergency times upon a State-Party request. This becomes relevant to this 
work because armed conflict usually falls within the concept of this state of exception that 
invites to the use of exceptional law in order to eschew a state of anomie, since a moral legal 
order, just as contemporary international law, does not comprise with moral abstention or 
neutrality, not even in the edge of a breakdown355.  
Like Carl Schmitt once grasped, the state of exception is called when the political unity 
of the state is under threat, putting its own existence at risk of extinction. Therefore, the system 
requires a decision-making, and only the sovereign in power is entitled to do so, because he is 
the Chief of State. The sovereignty does not mean monopoly of coercion or domination, but the 
burden of decision which emerges as the genuine tool to reestablish the safety and public order. 
The sovereign then can suspend the Law as a political maneuver for self-preservation of the State 
and its subjects. Every order, consequently, rests on a decision – reason why this doctrine is 
often called as political decisionism – leaving the state into anomie. Only after the elimination of 
threat and the end of abnormality that the legal order shall be restored and all rules reinforced356. 
To him, the Chief of State is the guardian of the Constitution and the law and even nowadays 
Schmitt remains a controversial scholar in international law and social theory, afterall his 
 
355 VLADIMIR JANKÉLÉVITCH, O PARADOXO DA MORAL 05 (SÃO PAULO: MARTINS FONTES, 2008). 
356 CARL SCHMITT, TEOLOGIA POLÍTICA, 11-16 (BELO HORIZONTE: DEL REY, 2006); AND CARLOS A. 
FERNÁNDEZ PARDO, CARL SCHMITT EN LA TEORÍA POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL 25-28 (BUENOS AIRES: BIBLOS, 
2007). 
 156 
 
contributions to international legal theory have been denounced as ideological and 
propagandistic Nazi bric-a-brac357. Since Nuremberg trials, this theory of international law is 
unconceivable.  
International law no longer comprises with a total regime of absence of rights, especially 
human rights. State of exception situations is always something different from anarchy and chaos 
and, under legal perspective, there still exists an order. Modern understanding on state of 
exception is far from being a legal loophole. Conversely, it is an international law provision 
which keeps inside the legal system its own exception clauses358. For this account, this 
exceptional situation allows solely a partial fulfillment of human rights and hence is viewed like 
an especial application of the law out of general provisions and applicability whose 
interpretations shall be as restricted as possible359. 
So, the international human rights conventions call this exception of law as derogation 
clauses. Article 15 of European Convention on Human Rights enables all but the absolute rights 
in the Convention to be suspended in “time of war or other public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation” provided this is “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. Nevertheless, 
interferences on human rights must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that this 
will vary from case to case, the background circumstances, the right in question and the type of 
interference concerned”360. Article 27 of American Convention on Human Rights in turn enables 
all but the absolute rights in the Convention to be suspended in “time of war, public danger, or 
 
357 CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2006). 
358 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, ESTADO DE EXCEÇÃO 39-54 (SÃO PAULO: BOITEMPO, 2004). 
359 CARLOS MAXIMILIANO, HERMENÊUTICA E APLICAÇÃO DO DIREITO 183 (RIO DE JANEIRO: FORENSE, 2006). 
360 STEVEN GREER, THE EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLES 8 TO 11 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
15 (1997). 
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other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party, (…) to the extent 
and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. Following Article 
30 also envisions and strengthens the submission to necessity and proportionality for adopting 
such exceptional measures361. 
Accordingly, most human rights can be derogated from in time of public emergency, 
which includes situations of armed conflict. Nevertheless, it is a common misconception to 
dismiss the application of human rights in armed conflict situations, because derogability is 
understood as entirely suspending the right, even not being what international law says362. It is 
lawful to detain suspects and keep them imprisoned  to unfold the risks they represent. 
Nevertheless, some fundamental juridical guarantees must be left for them, such as the right to a 
counselor and judicial review over their detention, since their rights restriction are limited and 
temporary, not giving permission to a “black hole” in the law363. 
Likewise, American Commission on Human Rights have held that the Convention’s 
derogation clause gives room to continental deliberations about the emergency time which does 
not signify the explicit suspension or restriction on human rights. These deliberations, by the 
way, shall observe the requisites of proportionality, necessity and distinction before a very grave 
situation of armed conflict in which state’s order and safety is really threatened364. Whilst any 
state-party may have this legal reserve to derogate human rights, the international court has 
 
361 COMISSIÓN INTER AMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME SOBRE TERRORISMO Y DERECHOS 
HUMANOS, PAR. 360 (2002). 
362 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, in ISRAELI LAW REVIEW. VOL. 40, NO.2, 310, 318 (2007). 
363 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 29-30 (2004). 
364 COMISSIÓN INTER AMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME SOBRE TERRORISMO Y DERECHOS 
HUMANOS, PARS. 50-51 (2002). 
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secured that this option is greatly forbidden and deemed incompatible with the scope and aim of 
human rights convention, therefore not authorized whatsoever365.   
Both European and American Conventions – Articles 15 and 27, respectively – and also 
Article 4 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) set derogation clauses 
limit of exercising to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with states’ other obligations under international law and do 
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social 
origin. Nevertheless, we now know that even before an armed conflict situation, there are some 
rights that are not susceptible to derogation since such derogation would imply an 
incompatibility with the very existence of human rights protective bodies of law. Such 
inderogable rights belongs to jus cogens block, as international peremptory norm366. There are 
some scholars that struggle with the idea of all human rights being considered jus cogens, but 
regarding those chosen as inderogables by international law, these indisputably are367.  
European Court has recognized these inderogable rights as jus cogens in some cases 
brought before the court, at least. It is jus cogens, as it says, because of the importance of the 
values they protect368. Meanwhile, Inter-American Court gives a much wider sense on jus cogens 
 
365 Restricciones a la Pena de Muerte (artículos 4.2 y 4.4 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), 
Opinión Consultiva OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. Fallos y opiniones) No. 3, §61 (September 08, 1983). 
366 TANIA GABRIELA RODRÍGUEZ HUERTA, TRATADO SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS: EL SISTEMA DE RESERVAS 
58 (PORRUÁ, MÉXICO: ITAM, 2005). 
367 Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, El Valor Del Derecho y La Jurisprudencia Internacionales de Derechos Humanos en 
el Derecho y la Justicia Internos – El Ejemplo de Costa Rica, in LIBER AMICORUM, HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUNDIO, 
VOL. I 169, 185 (SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA: CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1998). 
368 Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§60-62 (2001).  
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norms, contemplating human rights in general369. Besides being jus cogens, these inderogable 
rights are treated differently from European and American law, where the latter contains a wider 
spectrum of human rights protection in comparison with the former. European Convention 
selects only four rights as inderogable: life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery or 
servitude and no punishment without law. American Convention in turn selects these rights: to 
juridical personality; to life; to humane treatment; freedom from slavery; freedom from ex post 
facto laws; freedom of conscience and religion; of the family; to a name; of the child; to 
nationality; to participate in government; and of the judicial guarantees essential for the 
protection of such rights. 
Afterwards, Article 2 of Protocol nº 6 to the European Convention made an adjustment 
on right to life in order to permit any State to “make provision in its law for the death penalty in 
respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war” but some time later, this 
permission on death penalty was withdrawn on Protocol nº 13, Articles 1 and 2, where death 
penalty is abolished completely and no derogation is accepted on this regard. Moreover, 
European Court of Human Rights has even widened the idea of life protections holding that 
states not only shall refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also must take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction370. Meanwhile, European 
Court has put great emphasis to compel torture, enshrining the prohibition of torture as one of the 
most fundamental values of democratic societies. “Even in the most difficult circumstances, such 
 
369 Juridical Conditions and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. 
(ser. A) No. 18, §101 (September 17, 2003); Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 282, §264 (August 28, 2014); and Norín 
Catrimán et al (Leaders, members and Activists of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser.C) No. 279, §197 (May 29, 2014). 
370 L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 23413/94 Eur. Ct. H.R., §36 (1998).  
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as the fight against terrorism and organized crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” tolerating no “exceptions and no 
derogation from it is permissible under Article 15”, even in the event of a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, The inderogability then is in absolute terms371, no matter the 
evil perpetrated by the enemy in an armed conflict372. Even the deportation of the individual to a 
country where the belief that he would be subjected to torture or any inhuman or degrading 
treatment remains vivid, is not permissible under the convention’s provisions. In such cases, 
European Convention of Human Rights implies an obligation not to deport the individual373. 
On the top of the four inderogable rights, the ICCPR, Article 4, added three more, which 
remain less than American provisions: the rights to juridical personality and to not be imprisoned 
merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. The European Court in turn has acknowledged the broader scope of 
inderogability in observance of international law unity, wholeness and coherence, giving 
instructions to states to observe the additional criteria of temporality brought by ICCPR, 
combining with necessity and proportionality374. Moreover, such derogation can only be 
conceived whether previously and formally submitted by the State-Party before the regional 
court to grant it (Article 4, ICCPR; Article 15, ECHR and Article 27, ACHR). Additionally, 
European Court of Justice, in Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, moves the mutualism of international humanitarian law and human 
 
371 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, no. 22414/93 Eur. Ct. H.R, §79 (1996).  
372 Labita v. Italy, no. 26772/95 Eur. Ct. H.R, §119 (2000).  
373 Saadi v. Italy, no. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R, §125 (2008) and Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948/04 Eur. Ct. 
H.R, §135 (2007).  
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rights law away from prevailing state-centricity and toward anthropocentricism, declaring the 
guidance by human rights law as fundamental principles of the Union and solely condition of the 
lawfulness of Community acts375.  
At the other side, Inter American Court of Human Rights has understood that Article 27 
of the Convention enjoins limits to states power on suspending rights and liberties. On this view, 
some suspensions are not tolerated no matter what circumstances, not even judicial guarantees to 
pursue them under human rights protection. Judicial guarantee and proceeding to ensure human 
rights are indispensable in armed conflicts or emergency situations376. The control over legality 
of perpetrated acts in armed conflicts by an impartial and autonomous judicial organ is a key trait 
to establish the state of exception as legal377. Consequently, Habeas Corpus is the major 
guarantee to enforce human rights protection on liberty and personal integrity, besides the 
guarantee of due process of law378. In sum, Inter American Court takes very seriously the picture 
of human rights violations. No state can justify human rights violations as a consequence while 
declaring going through a state of exception379. 
Notwithstanding the regional conventions on human rights, the content of common 
Article 3 of Geneva Convention constitutes a minimum legal guidance that is applicable to any 
type of armed conflict. Thus, with respect to armed conflict, it is not possible to draw a 
 
375 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities [GC],2008 E.C.R. §§284, 344.  
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Humanos), Opinión Consultiva OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R., §§23, 28 (January 30, 1987). 
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conclusion from the absence of derogation clauses that the respective treaty does not apply. 
Today, human rights law is an integral part of international law for the common welfare of 
humanity and represent common values that no State may revoke, even in times of war. The 
mandatory mutualism ensues the objective of protecting and safeguarding individuals in all 
circumstances. 
In sum, despite the common ground they actually share, IHL and HRL core nature and 
law-processing are quite diverse and such diversity brings an endless debate about the 
preciseness of their mutual complementarity and enforcement. We deal in daily basis with this 
grey zone, where remains a permanent struggle to settle under which circumstances the HRL 
should prevail and overlap the military-based rationale of the IHL and vice-versa. 
Notwithstanding, since the end of 1960s, especially after the two Covenants, it has been 
established worldwide that the HRL is mandatory, being only excepted a restricted and 
temporary suspension-clause claim from a State in emergency times which shall follow 
procedural and substantive safeguards regarding the declaration and implementation of such state 
of exception – as stated in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Article 15 of the ECHR and Article 27 of American Convention on Human Rights.   
 
5.4. Today’s assessment by Courts’ precedents 
 
Regarding the public emergency and situations of state of exception of contemporary 
international law, we have a lot of new kinds of armed conflicts. We have seen armed conflicts, 
international and non-international, in Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and onwards. Nonetheless, one 
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intriguing model of armed conflict has shaped deeply the way we conceive the mandatory 
mutualism, particularly in respect of human dignity and personal rights, is the war on terror. We 
are not focusing on terrorism in this work. Rather, we focus on breaches and understanding 
mutation it has provoked during the years, what can be seen in international jurisprudence of the 
part of international community who is intimately engaged in this type war which is carried out 
by belligerent groups, not States; unidentified, because they are all mixed in the middle of 
civilians; with no political agenda but inflict terror and nihilism; they do not recognize or follow 
international and civilized moral standards of combat, principally those related to principles of 
distinction and humanity; and their acts are artfully and artistically cruel, eroding any moral 
identity.  
It is imperative, by this token, that some jurisprudence of recognition of this particular 
and exceptional situation must be forwarded. Karl Laurenz grasps that this method of law 
pragmatism is called “jurisprudence of interests”. Not on a demeaning sense of outset, but as an 
instrument of refurbishing concepts according to specific situations. It is the logic submission of 
facts to juridical concepts where the “interests” points to priority values and these values must be 
linked to some idea of justice380. Therefore, European Court of Human Rights has generally 
recognized the application of the European Convention in situations of international armed 
conflict, following the footsteps left by International Court of Justice in The Construction of a 
Wall and Congo v Uganda cases. However, we can sense a setback in recent jurisprudence of the 
court. In Hassan v. The United Kingdom, the court envisages the precedent rules set by ICJ 
pointing out the continued application of human rights law within armed, but makes a side note 
 
380 KARL LARENZ, METODOLOGIA DA CIÊNCIA DO DIREITO 163-164 (3RD EDITION, LISBOA, PORTUGAL: 
FUNDAÇÃO CALOUSTE GULBENKIAN, 1997). 
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encompassing that it does not work in a formal or absolute way and the exception that war 
causes cannot be overlooked when determining what standards should be used to judge behavior 
in those exceptional circumstances. The formal or absolute predominance of human rights law 
consequently would be “too idealistic, bearing in mind the speciality and persistence of armed 
conflict”. Humanitarian law is related to today’s reality while human rights law is related to 
tomorrow’s promise, for that the court needs to ensure “the survival of a State”381. 
The twist point on all of this is that the UK requested the Court to not apply its 
obligations under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights – right to liberty – 
while no formal derogation request was filled under Article 15 or Article 4, ICCPR – derogation 
in time of emergency. Yet, even not requesting the suspension clause, in Hassan, the Court has 
conveyed the constant practice of interpreting human rights law in the light of the rules set out in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that, according to its terms, when 
interpreting a treaty, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, it is necessary to take 
into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in international affairs.  
In this respect, the Court has noted that it is not the practice of a State to derogate from 
their Article 5 obligations in order to detain persons on the basis of the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions during international armed conflicts. Moreover, the human rights law has to be 
interpreted in harmony with the rules of international law as a whole, of which it forms part, 
applied equally to the rules of international humanitarian law, such as those set out in the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Court considered that, even in situations of international 
armed conflict, the human rights safeguards continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the 
 
381 Hassan v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §38 (2014).  
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background of the provisions of humanitarian law. But, by reason of the co-existence of the 
safeguards provided by humanitarian law and by human rights law in time of armed conflict, the 
grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty set out under human rights regime should be 
accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of 
civilians who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.  
In this vein, the Court upheld that the exercise of the derogation clause in emergency 
times is not mandatory under international armed conflict, which falls into Geneva Conventions 
broad powers, amazingly overruling its previous case A. and others v. the United Kingdom382. 
Therefore, Hassan’s capture and detention had been consistent with the powers available to the 
UK under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, not unlawful, since the court has upheld a 
previous analogous case happened a couple of years before, in Al-Jedda, where imprisonment or 
preventive detention without intention to bring criminal charges is deemed lawful within a 
reasonable period of time383. 
The catch in Al-Jedda was the argument by UK Government that since the state was part 
of United Nations Security Council task force in the war on terror, by Resolution 1546 of June 8, 
2004, the rules of engagement in war were already issued by UNSC, which makes innocuous any 
petition before European Court asking for derogation clause applicability. Nevertheless, the court 
has dismissed the argument noting that ICJ has already held in Advisory Opinion of Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia that “the relevant 
Security Council resolutions are couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory language and that, 
 
382 A. and others v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2009) 
383 Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08 Eur. Ct. H.R., §100 (2011).  
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therefore, they do not purport to impose any legal duty on any State nor to affect legally any 
right of any State”384. Also, in Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 
ICJ has vividly established that occupying forces shall fall within Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations of 1907, which demands respect and full observance of international human rights 
law to protect civilian populations of occupied territory385 – which was the case of the United 
Kingdom in Al-Jedda. Hence, in Al-Jedda, the protection international law on civilians was 
maintained386.  
Additionally, it is important to shed into light that in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the United Kingdom Government had notified the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe for a derogation clause pursuant Article 15 of the ECHR, in order to engage on the war 
against terror. On this regard, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly enacted the 
Resolution 1271 (2002), which paragraphs 9 and 12, respectively, resolve that “in their fight 
against terrorism, Council of Europe members should not provide for any derogations to the 
European Convention on Human Rights”, so all Member States should “refrain from using 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (derogation in time of emergency) to 
limit the rights and liberties guaranteed under its Article 5 (right to liberty and security)”. 
Dealing with that, the Court, in A. and Others had also considered the British exercise of 
derogation clause disproportionate and discriminatory under human rights commitments387, 
which matched with the general grasp provided in Bouyid v. Belgium and Khlaifia and Other v. 
 
384 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
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386 Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08 Eur. Ct. H.R., §107 (2011).  
387 A. and others v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05 Eur. Ct. H. R., §§ 144, 172-190 (2009).  
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Italy, where has been emphasized that respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence 
of the Convention, alongside human freedom. Yet, the general purpose the Convention’s 
provisions were to protect “a person’s dignity and physical integrity” and to prevent “serious 
interferences with human dignity”388. In Khlaifia, the Court added that “even in the event of a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation or in the most difficult circumstances, such as 
the fight against terrorism and organized crime, irrespective of the conduct of the person 
concerned”, human dignity core prevails389. 
By the same token, United Nations Security Council issues Resolution 1373, in 2001, that 
calls upon all States to comply with all obligations under international law, including human 
right law and humanitarian law, meaning recognition over the fact that upholding human rights 
and protecting the public from terrorist acts are not antithetical, but complementary, 
responsibilities of States390. Nevertheless, Resolution 1373 also decides that all States shall take 
“the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts”391. 
Regarding the experience in Al-Jedda, the United Kingdom Government did not build its 
case upon derogation clause in Hassan: “in the present case, the United Kingdom did not purport 
to derogate under Article 15 from any of its obligations under Article 5”392. Setting as a leading 
case, the court emphasizes that this “is the first case in which a respondent State has requested 
the Court to disapply its obligations under Article 5 or in some other way to interpret them in the 
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light of powers of detention available to it under international humanitarian law”393. So, the 
argument has mutated from Al-Jedda, which has served no obstacle at all before the Court. 
Rather, it was observed the necessity to interpret and apply the HRL in a manner which is 
coherent with the framework under international law, by the scope of Article 31 of Vienna 
Convention of 1969.  
Suffices from Hassan case the proceeding of the court to examine the mandatory 
mutualism in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 
May 1969, Article 31. So, the court holds that judicial interpretation shall keep harmony with 
other rules of international law of which it forms part. Emphasizing the mutualism, it grasps that 
the “four Geneva Conventions of 1949, intended to mitigate the horrors of war, were drafted in 
parallel to the European Convention on Human Rights and enjoy universal ratification” and also 
were designed to protect captured “civilians who pose a security threat”. Thus, the interpretation 
pushed forward is that in armed conflict situations, the right to life (Article 2 of European 
Convention) follows the rule of international humanitarian law – not human rights law – which 
play “an indispensable and universally-accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity” 
and, for the same reason, the right to liberty (Article 5) falls within the same context394.  
An interesting finding in Hassan is that the court has been acknowledging the mandatory 
mutualism between international humanitarian law and human rights law for a long time, even 
following the footsteps of prior ICJ Nuclear Weapons and The Construction of a Wall advisory 
opinions. Hassan’s rationale makes reference to Varnava and Others v. Turkey case, where 
 
393 Hassan v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §99 (2014).  
394 Hassan v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §102 (2014).  
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people who were under government’s custody went missing during an armed conflict period and 
claims over rights to life and liberty were submitted before the court. There, the mutualism was 
acknowledged and set that the right to life follows the rule of international humanitarian law, 
which play “an indispensable and universally-accepted role in mitigating the savagery and 
inhumanity”. However, the court found a violation to the right of life under European 
Convention, Article 2, the lack of obligation from the government “to account for the 
whereabouts and fate of the missing men”. Regarding the right to liberty, Article 5, under 
European Convention a violation was found395. Thus, the mutual benefit from both branches 
were duly co-applied on that occasion. 
On the other hand, in Hassan the court overrules Varnava and Others and other 
precedents. It extinguishes the mandatory mutualism to recognize a mandatory commensalism 
instead, where only international humanitarian law benefits from the union of two branches. 
Recalling the footstep left by The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion, there are three possibilities that come out 
from the interplay between international humanitarian law and human rights law: “some rights 
may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters 
of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law”396. 
The mutualism is represented by the third option, understanding which has prevailed until 
Hassan case.  
 
395 Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 
16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§185-186, 208 (2009).  
396 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 
I.C.J. §106 (July 9). 
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Arguing that the court’s interpretation propitiates a consistency to the framework under 
international law, it accepts the United Kingdom inobservance to the obligations of formalizing 
derogation under Article 15 of European Convention and Article 4 of ICCPR and holds that this 
proceeding is forfeited before international humanitarian law provisions. The court now 
understands that the obligation of formal derogation is applied in peacetime only. In situations of 
armed conflicts, consequently, human rights safeguards continue to apply, although it will be 
always interpreted “against the background of the provisions of international humanitarian law”. 
So, from now on, in time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty 
should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the detention of civilians who pose a risk to 
security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. International humanitarian law 
becomes the governing rule for possessing “broad powers”, while human rights law adheres as 
subsidiary source. “This means that the detention must comply with the rules of international 
humanitarian law” and Article 5 comes to play only to protect individual from arbitrariness 
which is absent pursuant the periodical review of the imprisonment allowed by Articles 43 and 
78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention397.  
Mandatory commensalism takes over mutualism in European international law. Prior 
precedents who had enshrined the prevalence of human rights were overlooked. Once the court 
stressed that human rights embedded in European Convention and bodies of law constitute first 
and foremost a “system for the protection of human rights, the Court must interpret and apply it 
in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. The 
Convention must also be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal 
 
397 Hassan v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§103-106 (2014).  
 171 
 
consistency and harmony between its various provisions”398. That was not the regent 
understanding held in Hassan, apparently. 
In summary, “the Court does not consider it necessary for a formal derogation to be 
lodged, the provisions of Article 5 will be interpreted and applied in the light of the relevant 
provisions of international humanitarian law”399. Its hindsight overcomes former understandings 
ruling that the civilian imprisonment in wartime shall fall within the scheme of deprivation of 
liberty upon the exercise of the derogation clause (Article 15, ECHR, and Article 4, ICCPR). 
Conversely, human rights law ought to be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such 
humanitarian law broad powers. The Court even diminishes the human rights content and value 
behind Article 5 when it entails that the right to liberty, at first glance, seems the most relevant 
provision, however “there does not need to be any correlation between security internment and 
suspicion of having committed an offence or risk of the commission of a criminal offence”. 
Therefore, the court considers that it would not be appropriate to hold that this form of detention 
on civilians detained as prisoners of war falls within the scope of Article 5 right to liberty400. 
Underneath these arguments, the ECtHR has established a threshold of proceedings and 
application of the two bodies of law. In doing so, the Court launches a remarkable perspective 
about enjoining human rights unbinding obligations over armed conflicts, namely those 
concerned with civilians. The Vienna Convention directives recall, in a certain way, the old 
separatism once mitigated in international arena and open a whole new path of international 
 
398 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§65-66 (2008); and Stec and Others v. The 
United Kingdom, nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§47-48 (2006).  
399 Hassan v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §107 (2014).  
400 Hassan v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §97 (2014).  
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lawyering and decision-making. Although the rationale embeds an easygoing detention approach 
against the civilians’ right to liberty, its grounds might go further in order to reach other values 
conflicts and dilemmas within the grey zone between IHL and HRL. 
According to primary scope of this work, targeting civilians is what puzzles us for the 
continuity of the thesis rationale. If we consider Article 2 of European Convention, which 
stresses the right to life, we hereinafter link it to the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional 
Protocol I, particularly Common Article 3. As aforementioned,  the recent interpretation of the 
Court is that in armed conflict situations, the right to life follows the rule of international 
humanitarian law – not human rights law – which play “an indispensable and universally-
accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity”401, overruling some other 
precedents402. 
It worths noting that, nationally, the idea of human rights, particularly the right to life, 
being balanced with action perpetrated under “absolute necessity”. In McCann and Others v. The 
United Kingdom, the Court addresses that human right to life ranks as one of the most 
fundamental provisions in the Convention, enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic 
societies and sets out the circumstances when the deprivation of life may be justified. Then, the 
court emphasis: “indeed one which, in peacetime, admits of no derogation under Article 15”. The 
Convention  describes the situations where it is permitted to "use force" which may result, as an 
unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life and must be no more than "absolutely necessary" 
for the achievement of the defense of any person from unlawful violence, to effect a lawful 
 
401 Hassan v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R., §102 (2014).  
402 For example, Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§185-186, 208 (2009).  
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arrest, to prevent an escape for someone lawfully detained or in action lawfully taken for the 
purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. The term "absolutely necessary", then, indicates that 
the principle of necessity must be more compelling than the usual necessity employed in normal 
application from a state action as "necessary in a democratic society"403. 
In 2011, in Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, the court took into account 
civilian deaths by British soldiers during Iraq invasion by Coalition of armed forces led by 
United States and approve by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, issued in 
November 8, 2002. Civilians died during belligerent occupation of Iraq, where international 
humanitarian law and human rights law are applicable under Articles 42 to 56 of the Hague 
Regulations, Articles 27 to 34 and 47 to 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional 
Protocol I. At this point, where military necessity is at stake in the rules of engagement, the court 
acknowledges that the civilian deaths happened during a period when crime and violence were 
endemic and bring to the table the arguments of “absolute necessity” crafted for domestic crisis, 
in McCann and Others404.  
Likewise, in Al-Skeini and Others it is stressed that Article 2, the right to life, ranks as 
one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, enshrines one of the basic values of 
the democratic societies and sets out the circumstances when the deprivation of life may be 
justified. Consequently, the court matches the prior understanding and adapt it to international 
law frame, encompassing that no derogation from it is permitted under Article 15, “except in 
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”. On this regard, Article 2 covers both 
 
403 McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 18984/91 Eur. Ct. H.R., §147-149 (1995).  
404 Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R., §161 (2011) 
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intentional killing and also the situations in which it is permitted to use force which may result, 
as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life and any use of force must be no more than 
“absolutely necessary” for the achievement of one or more purposes set out, just like previously 
held in McCann405.  
It is paramount to highlight that in Al-Skeini and Others the court still had the 
comprehension of mandatory mutualism, which means that it was recognized the full 
applicability of Article 2, right to life, in armed conflict situations. This understanding, as 
abovesaid, was overruled three year later, in Hassan. The excuse to Article 2 from human rights 
law was admitted as principle of necessity, from international humanitarian law, the supreme 
military necessity. This mutual relationship between human rights and humanitarian law held in 
Al-Skeini and Others no longer endure though. Although the court established the mandatory 
mutualism which would waive charges on unlawful depravation of life because supreme military 
necessity in armed conflict, the case had no conclusion on the matter for lacking procedural 
measures. Uncertain whether civilian killings were an outcome of arbitrariness or supreme 
necessity, the court did not judge the fact-found, and affirmed the violation of the procedural 
duty to review and investigate the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by the state under Article 
2 of the Convention406. 
In contrast, the Inter-American Commission and Court have strictly kept the general 
conception of mandatory mutualism and equal cooperation and benefits between humanitarian 
law and human rights law regarding the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 
 
405 Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R., §162 (2011) 
406 Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§163-177 (2011) 
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and the American Convention on Human Rights. It has been almost a dogma the understanding 
that modern human rights law, particularly the American Convention, is not performed by 
multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of 
rights for the benefit of states. The object and purpose of human rights law are the protection of 
the basic rights of human beings and states can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order 
within which they, for the common good, assume various obligations to mankind. These views 
about the distinct character of humanitarian law and the consequences to be drawn therefore 
apply with even greater force to the American Convention whose preamble vehemently reaffirm 
the consolidation of a “system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the 
essential rights of man”; and recognize these rights as essentials and “based upon attributes of 
the human personality, and that they therefore justify international protection”407.  
Taking a step forward, Inter-American Court, regardless of its reach only over applicable 
human rights bodies of law, has also applied humanitarian law by interpreting the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the light of the Geneva Conventions because of their mandatory 
mutualism408. Likewise, Inter-American Commission has used the prerogative of expressly 
assigning itself the competence to apply humanitarian law: “the Commission’s competence to 
apply humanitarian law rules is supported by the text of the American Convention, by its own 
case law, as well as the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”409.  
 
407 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 
75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) No. 2, §§29-31 (September 24, 1982). 
408 Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 91, §§207-210 (November 25, 2000). 
409 Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, 
doc. 7 rev. at 271, § 162 (1997). 
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It is held in Abella v. Argentina and Coard et al v. United States, and also in some 
posterior analysis, that human rights bodies of law and Geneva Conventions share a common 
nucleus of inderogable rights and a “common purpose of protecting human life and dignity”. 
There is an “integral linkage between the law of human rights and humanitarian law”. Moreover, 
human rights law applies both in peacetime, and during situations of armed conflict, while 
international humanitarian law generally does not apply in peacetime. Although one of the 
purposes of human rights law is to prevent warfare, none of its provisions was designed to 
regulate such situations and, at same time, humanitarian law purpose is to place restraints on the 
conduct of warfare in order to diminish the effects of hostilities410. Hence, common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man share humanity core that makes indispensable to resort to humanitarian law in situation of 
armed conflicts, but with an interpretation to make possible the application of the American 
Declaration “with due consideration for the specific characteristics of this situation”. Even 
pursuant Article 27 of American Declaration and Article 4 of ICCPR, it is impossible “to 
suspend the validity of the Convention in its entirety”411. 
In occasion of mandatory mutualism, the Commission believes that the so-called "most-
favorable-to-the-individual-clause", Article 29(b) of American Convention shall give full legal 
effect to co-apply humanitarian law properly. Thus, there is no scenario where human rights 
become restricted under Commission’s landscape. Where there are differences between legal 
 
410 Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, 
doc. 7 rev. at 271, §§ 158-159 (1997); Coard et al v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
Nº 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 6 rev, §39 (1999); and Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., §108 (2002). 
411 Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 121/18, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §§323-324 (2018). 
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standards governing the same or comparable rights in human rights law and humanitarian law, 
the Commission is duty bound to give legal effort to the provision with the higher standard 
applicable to the right or freedom in question. It is this interplay that authorizes the Commission 
to vigorously apply humanitarian law where and when relevant412. According to Article 27 of the 
American Convention and Article 4 of ICCPR, the Commission is also duty bound to analyze the 
state’s obligations under human rights law in light of the standards of international humanitarian 
law that apply as lex specialis for the purpose of interpretation under Article 31 of Vienna 
Convention guidance, being “advisable to address both systems simultaneously striking a 
balance between the interpretation and application of the lex specialis and international human 
rights law so that humanitarian considerations and military needs are respected”. Thus, the 
establishment of humanitarian law as lex specialis by ICJ precedents, does not mean that human 
rights are inapplicable. Just the opposite, it means that applying human rights law under its 
mandate may and sometimes must turn to international humanitarian law “for the purpose of 
interpretation as the more specific normative framework that governs situations in armed 
conflict”413.    
When reviewing the legality of derogation measures taken by a state, the Commission 
should not resolve this question solely by reference to the text of Article 27 of the American 
Convention or Article 4 of ICCPR. Rather, it must also determine whether the rights affected by 
these measures are similarly guaranteed under applicable humanitarian law. If it finds that the 
rights in question are not subject to suspension under humanitarian law, the conclusion shall be 
 
412 Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, 
doc. 7 rev. at 271, §§ 164-168 (1997). 
413 Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador v. Colombia, Case IP-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 
112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140, doc. 10, §122 (2010); and Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 
10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 121/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §§325-329 (2018). 
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that the derogation measures are in violation of the state’s obligations under both the human 
rights law and the humanitarian law treaties concerned. “It is also worth noting that the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has viewed with approval the Commission's practice of 
applying sources of international law, other than the American Convention”414. Furthermore, the 
Commission can manage the rules of international humanitarian law as a concrete legal 
framework in order to give more specific application to the contents of human rights law when 
defining state’s obligations. In addition, when dealing with this mandatory mutualism, the 
interpretation and application of international law must take into account the general framework 
of the legal system, preserving its unity, coherence and wholeness415. 
Regarding the right to life applied to civilians in armed conflicts, as retro approached, the 
Inter-American Commission makes no concession over its absolute and inderogable value. Quite 
different from the evolutive argumentation developed by European Court of Human Rights in 
MacCann and Others, Al-Skeini and Others and, finally, Hassan, to undermine and displace 
human rights protection on life, the Inter-American international legal order, besides of 
recognizing the mandatory mutualism of human rights law and humanitarian law, conveys that 
the arbitrary depravation of life is completely forbidden even in situation of armed conflict. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the case performed by the Commission or the court shall comply 
with principles of proportionality and necessity in the use of force, taking into attempts to limit 
 
414 Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, 
doc. 7 rev. at 271, §§ 170-171 (1997). 
415 Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador v. Colombia, Case IP-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 
112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140, doc. 10, §124 (2010); and Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 
10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 121/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §§330-331 (2018). 
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the suffering of civilians and unnecessary loss of life416. It is imperative that whether in times of 
peace, emergency situations or armed conflict, the right to life governs the use of lethal force by 
states and their agents by prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of life and summary executions. 
The contours of the right to life may change in the context of an armed conflict, but the 
prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life remains absolute, since this right cannot be suspended 
under any circumstances, including armed conflicts and legitimate states of emergency417. 
The mutualism is preserved in Inter-American legal system because all cases and reports 
merge international humanitarian law and human rights law into one guidance book. Prior cases 
brought to Inter-America Commission on Human Rights has appreciated the interplay between 
the two branches of international law in detentions and liberty restrictions, like the central right 
grappled in Hassan. In Coard et al v. United States, therefore, is launched the primary idea of 
mutual benefit of mutualism that human rights law has not been designed to apply in absolute 
terms. Conversely, some permissible and non-permissible limitations must be monitored in 
accordance to humanitarian law418. Considering the right to life, the Commisssion, on its Report 
on Terrorism and Human Rights, takes note that, even the right being an absolute right, the use 
of lethal force when strictly unavoidable to protect themselves or other persons from imminent 
threat of death or serious injury, or to otherwise maintain law and order is permissible where 
 
416 Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 121/18, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §§338-339 (2018).  
417 Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., §§86, 
106 (2002).  
418 Coard et al v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, 
Doc. 6 rev, §§38-50 (1999).  
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strictly necessary and proportionate419. The Court has explained that, in such circumstances, 
states have the right to use force, “even if this implies depriving people of their lives”420. 
All in all, it would be too simple to say that while humanitarian has an underlying 
realistic philosophy based on military necessity, human rights law is idealistic and inappropriate 
for situations of hardship. The application of human rights to situations of armed conflict is 
compatible with the drafting and wording of human rights treaties and of the two Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions421. Besides, this mandatory mutualism combined with 
international jurisprudence on human rights interpretation and application are an outcome of 
international law evolution in general terms which tame states’ obligations toward human rights 
law and international humanitarian law422. 
 
5.5. The Burden of Morality 
 
It seems evident today that the essential point in international law is the full protection of 
human rights, either individual or collective. After the Second World War the international 
human rights became extremely significant, turning itself into the modern utopia. Morality 
became the aspiration of mankind worldwide, leaving a heavy burden based in two visions. First, 
 
419 Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., §§87, 
112 (2002).  
420 Neira-Alegría et al. v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, §74 (January 19, 1995). 
421 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, in ISRAELI LAW REVIEW. VOL. 40, NO.2, 310, 324 (2007). 
422 COMISSIÓN INTER AMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME SOBRE TERRORISMO Y DERECHOS 
HUMANOS, PAR. 46 (2002). 
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it carries pure moral content within with great antipolitics potential; and second, in order to 
survive, human rights had to build a political agenda with programmatic scope to inject morality 
into foreign policy, which is initially contradictory with the antipolitics position taken by the 
utopia. The profound moral quandaries faced by human rights today point us to the very meaning 
of the ideal and movement appearance as utopia, which is its moral survival in a moment of 
history where all other political utopias died. Therefore, human rights were compelled to define 
the good life and offer a plan to keep them pulsing in international community in accordance 
with their suprapolitical birth423. 
Besides the understanding grasped in Hassan and so many other cases that gives support 
to emergency times and the following derogation of human rights law, it is certain that 
international law has changed to embrace a broader perception of armed conflicts and emergency 
situation. Targeting on morality compliance, some scholar and international precedents ascertain 
that international humanitarian law, as lex specialis, prevails in conduct of hostilities under 
international law spectrum, because humanitarian is the more refined body of law. On the other 
hand, domestic law enforcement has human rights law as its more refined version. “Thus, the 
closer a situation is to the battlefield, the more humanitarian law will prevail over human rights 
law, whereas for law enforcement, human rights law prevails”424. This notion is exactly what we 
attempt to overcome on this work. 
Firstly, we need to clarify why such notion is current in doctrine and some jurisprudence. 
Both contemporary domestic and international law share the values of human dignity to endorse 
 
423 SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 213-214 (2010). 
424 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict, in ISRAELI LAW REVIEW. VOL. 40, NO.2, 310, 344 (2007). 
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and reinforce human rights. However, as we have seen chapters earlier, the smaller social 
structure we have, the better is to uphold a unison grasp of human dignity, because the values 
congregated in such social body are less plural and more homogenic in society. Conversely, the 
larger social body we have, the wider has to be the grasp of human dignity through a process 
identified as generalization of values. As more plural society becomes, more generalized and 
broader shall be its values. In this vein, human rights are easier to be enforced domestically than 
internationally, while humanitarian law is today a branch of law crafted in principle of humanity 
duly designed to operate internationally, containing broader notions of law in accordance to its 
wider range of cover. Humanitarian law, albeit principle of humanity, possesses other rules that 
do not converge to human dignity, what generally do not happen within human rights law, which 
has human dignity as its axial value. 
Therefore, it is commonly assumed that in some cases, international humanitarian law 
and human rights law are incompatible because of their inner divergence toward aims, the former 
has a social value predominance while the latter centralize individual value kernel. Something 
we have learned throughout mankind history is that violence has a tendency to perpetuate itself, 
like an autonomous process, and historically its power condemns all the participants to 
impotence. Hence, every serious effort to change quasi-institutionalized violent conditions 
cannot limit itself to such factors as insight and means-ends rationality, or personal morality and 
values like the one supported by human dignity and its Kantian roots425.  
Paying the due heed to the conditions and the phases of violence in armed conflicts, we 
want to uphold the opposite idea related to targeting civilians. There is some argumentative 
 
425 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 193-194 (2003). 
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space where the mutualism may stand with some adaptation on morality background to sustain 
the mutual reinforcement; “to address both systems simultaneously striking a balance between 
the interpretation and application of the lex specialis and international human rights law so that 
humanitarian considerations and military needs are respected”426. Juridical perspectives 
eventually face moral dilemmas. That happens because international law does not provide a 
precise account on moral behavior enforced by law, as natural sciences usually do. What shall be 
demonstrated is a balance in moral argument to push the action forward, in order to justify 
reasonably the perpetration of such conducts. Thus, the incongruence of morality and law shall 
be lifted, since the morality behind of any act may differ among individuals or communities427.   
When we deal with social values into decision-making process, we shed into light social 
goals which are based on reason towards individual and collective welfare. Morality and welfare 
merge to a common ground. The conventional philosophy of social science has asserted that the 
task of the social scientist is the production of law-like generalizations, this is the contemporary 
duty of social scientists who have to foresee the outcomes of alternative policies that derive from 
a knowledge of law-like generalizations. MacIntyre inserts a very interesting comparison in the 
debate, he considers that chemistry law equations relating pressure, temperature and volume of 
gases have a very well-defined set of counterfactual conditionals, as natural science, in the way 
that law-like generalizations do not entail. Natural science has universal quantifiers which do not 
serve in law-like generalizations of social science. Although we have universal values, they 
mutate from case to case, regarding probabilities and social phenomena. Pure contingency is a 
 
426 Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report Nº 121/18, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, doc. 138, §326 (2018). 
427 HEIDI M. HURD, O COMBATE MORAL 21 (SÃO PAULO: MARTINS FONTES, 2003). 
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social modifier; even trivial contingencies can powerfully influence the outcome of great 
events428. 
This is interesting because one of the most amazing things about gases that we have 
learned from our high school days is that, in spite of wide differences in chemical properties, all 
the gases obey the gas laws which deal with how gases behave with respect to temperature and 
pressure. The famous NTP, or STP, for Normal Temperature and Pressure, or Standard 
Temperature and Pressure, which creates normal conditions to gas laws to form patterns. Since 
temperature and air pressure varies from place to place a standard reference is necessary for 
comparing the measurement and documentation of chemical and physical processes. Thus, the 
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) has established the pattern as “air 
at 60oF (520oR, 15.6oC) and 14.696 psia (1 atm, 1.01325 bara)”429, which means that always 
when conditions of temperature and pressure is at 60oF and 1 atm, the gases will behave 
repeatedly the same way. If conditions of temperature and pressure change, gases behave 
differently pursuant new conditions appropriateness430. Again, NTP is the regular bases of gases 
reaction, but, eventually, exceptional conditions arise which provoke natural adjustments of 
reaction while perduring such irregular conditions. Surpassed that, normal reactions take 
command.  
MacIntyre assessment in chemistry rationale is interesting because natural science works 
with logic and patterns, looking for different results where stabilization and normality can be 
 
428 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 88-100 (3RD EDITION, 2007). 
429 THE ENGINEERING TOOLBOX, https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/stp-standard-ntp-normal-air-d_772.html 
(last visited September 21, 2019) 
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found, no matter original conditions shift. In social science, just as international law, the same 
logic applied in natural science is not enough, since we have social elements that overload the 
equations in such way that we have multiple answers to the same scenario and standard 
conditions. As grappled by Michael Rosen, to treat human beings as an end is an open question 
which remains unanswered by the formula of humanity, particularly because Kant does not 
prohibit treating human as a mean totally but as means only, which arises a variety of semantic 
differences where our practices hold a grey zone of uncertainties about what is and what is not 
morally permissible on human rights431. Besides that, some fruitful knowledge may be assessed 
in this comparison, since we can infer that applying in human rights law in peacetime, when you 
have political stability and social normality. Under certain standard conditions, the answer to 
ensure and protect human rights shall be repeatedly the same, to fully respect and endorse human 
dignity. Furthermore, in occasions we breach political instability and social abnormality, the 
answer may not be the same if the main goal becomes the reestablishment of status quo, stability 
and normality. 
This very notion is achieved by scholars and international jurisprudence, and that is why 
their response is the overall predominance of international humanitarian law, as lex specialis, 
over human rights law. They see that human rights law is NTP, is the answer for our social 
pattern of 60oF and 1 atm, while humanitarian law is the answer for the unbalanced conditions, 
the social contingencies, until restored normality. Obviously it was acquired through course of 
time that international humanitarian law and human rights law do not exclude each other, rather 
they share a common nucleus – principle of humanity – which cannot be set apart, reason why 
 
431 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 83-86 (2012).  
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the mutualism theory was developed in ICJ precedents and reproduced in regional human rights 
courts.  
Even with mandatory mutualism recognized, in certain cases such as targeting civilians in 
wartime, the understanding of the court is to displace human rights law to open the avenue to 
international humanitarian law, whose rules are more appropriated to certain unbalanced 
conditions since it carries the existential paradox of inserting moral and legal restriction within a 
scenario where a lot of aggressions and violence is assumedly committed. When human rights 
law harbors in humanitarian law domains, there is who believes that this junction leads to 
unavoidable respect on human dignity as minimum and essential core to rule humanity, although 
others who lean on longstanding lessons of Emer de Vattel defend that morality is sacrificed in 
face of the priority goal of keeping stable State’s political system, so justice is henceforth found 
in necessity432. Human dignity therefore not always serves a great deal to international law and 
international community and, as it is seen as a unremovable core of human rights law and 
morality, the answer to fulfill certain conditions and justify actions aimed to public order 
reestablishment or maintenance is usually the commensalism; the human rights withdrawal for 
the solely benefit of international humanitarian law. Afterall, men do whatever it takes to save 
themselves and their community, so morality is generally detached from law during wartimes433. 
Notwithstanding courts’ decisions, for the sake of Habermas’ communicative action 
theory and Joas’ creativity action theory of law, we present a different formula to this equation, a 
formula where human rights law does not need to be put aloof, standing still the mandatory 
 
432 RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 47-74 (2011). 
433 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 03-21 (4TH EDITION, 2006). 
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mutualism to its full application towards mutual benefits for both branches of law. Nevertheless, 
as a rule, it regards some military acts towards civilians as rational actions that are retained 
inbounds of legality and certainly are also morally acceptable. The unbalanced conditions of 
instability and abnormality described in Article 4 of ICCPR, Article 15 of ECHR and Article 27 
of ACHR changes human rights law NTP response on human dignity morality to resort on 
utilitarianism as metamorality for the sake of normality and stability recovery. As demanded by 
United Nations, these new conditions of abnormality must be of exceptional and temporary 
nature and their unbalanced features are well defined by United Nations as “public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation, and the State party must have officially proclaimed a state 
of emergency” pursuant the main goal of regain normality, noting as well that “not every 
disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation”434.  
We talked earlier that international legal framework embraces a plurality of values which 
goes through a process of generalization of values. So, all beliefs, all opinions and thoughts can 
harbor peacefully in international community. Consequently, in order to apply a metamorality 
concept over human dignity, a shared value must take place as common currency to all. Plurality 
of thoughts and opinions and values acknowledge justice as a common currency very well 
represented by achieving the greatest good for the greatest number. This utilitarian conception of 
justice as social value is indisputably a common currency in our plural international society 
which fits to solve moral quandaries and controversies, keeping concurrently all members of 
society united under a common goal. Therefore, metamorality functions as a second moral 
 
434 C.C.P.R. General Comment No. 29, State of Emergency (Article 4 of International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, §§2-3 (August 31, 2001). 
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compass, coming into action when the first moral compass – human dignity – fails to deliver 
controversies solutions. The second moral compass, since its pragmatic nature, is more suitable 
to deliver satisfactory answers435. 
As aforementioned, today it is global terrorism who plays the role of hostis humani 
generis. We are not talking about the terrorism largely accepted by United Nations resolutions, 
those alien occupation, colonial domination or racist regimes436. Rather, hostis humani generis is 
the nihilist terrorism which purpose is to destroy the morale of a nation or a group of people 
adopting random method of murdering innocent people and undercutting any sign of solidarity. 
The revolutionary terrorism, like IRA, had a minimum of honor in their actions. As Walzer 
narrates, IRA bombing maneuvers avoided unnecessary suffering from children, for example. 
“Even in destruction there is a right way and a wrong way, and there are limits”. Children, 
policeman, pedestrians, these people are like civilians in wartime and they are innocent 
politically as civilians are innocent militarily. It is precisely these people that contemporary 
terrorists aim to kill. There is a moral difference between aiming at particular people because of 
things they have done or are doing and aiming at whole groups of people, indiscriminately, 
because of who they are437. 
There are moments of extremity and crisis when state’s right and human rights have to be 
violated for the greatest good of all. For these extreme moments, the war conventions solely do 
not provide an answer; these extremities lie beyond the reach of conventional provision. The 
 
435 JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 290-292(2013). 
436 G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960); and G.A. Res. 2908 (XXVII), Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2908 (XXVII) (Nov. 02, 1972). 
437 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WAR 199-200 (2006). 
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greatest the justice of the cause, the more rules I can violate for the sake of the cause – though 
some rules are always inviolable (like torture438). The same argument can be put in terms of 
outcomes, so the greater the injustice likely to result from my defeat, the more rules I can violate 
in order to avoid defeat439. For that, we have to look upon the principle of necessity. One 
criterion of lawful necessity is to submit the enemy with least possible expenditure of time, life 
and money. At this point of view, the military necessity determines whether the civilians 
involved are attacked or not, according to the theory of double effect. At the actual humanitarian 
law, we need to match the military necessity with the protection of life (respecting the war 
principle that noncombatants can’t be attacked at any time) and moral maneuvers in a way to 
consider the war justly fought (there is a moral distinction between people who can and people 
who cannot be killed in a war), and this is the big modern challenge, the constant tension 
between winning and fighting well.  
On this regard, the restoration of normality and NTP answer would be the inverse 
comprehension, which is peacetime, political stability and social normality where public 
emergency and threats to the life of the nation are absents and, under such conditions, the pattern 
reaction of international law shall be the same that normality has always afforded. Then, 
normality supports the duty to respect human dignity which, by international human rights law, 
is conceived as respect-as-observance. According to what we have grasped some chapter ago, the 
legal duty of respect-as-observance human dignity presupposes the existence of human rights, 
and the respect comes formally and binding by the law in such manner that we respect a person 
 
438 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija [Trial Chamber], Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1998 I.C.T.Y. §153 (December 10); 
Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., §73 (2008); and Neira-Alegría et al. v. Peru, 
Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, §§74-75 (January 19, 1995). 
439 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WAR 221-229 (2006). 
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           HRL 
 
        IHL 
           IHL  =  HRL 
just as we respect the speed limit by driving below a certain speed. That is exactly the legal force 
generated by the post-war human rights bodies of law and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions440. Thus, the moral reasoning to judgement dislocates from duties, as fixed in 
Kantian deontology of categorical morality, to ends, consequences of actions, teleologically 
secured in consequentialist morality.  
So, graphically, it would be something like the representation below, meaning that in 
peacetime, where we face NTP conditions of normality and stability, the universe of 
international humanitarian law in contemporary international law is completely submerse and 
dependent on human rights law, while in armed conflict situations, where we face abnormality 
and instability provoked by public emergency and state of exception, international humanitarian 
law and human rights law universes are concentric.      
 
Peacetime – General Conditions                                            Armed Conflict – Exceptional Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
Apparent Conflicts between provisions                                      Apparent Conflicts between provisions 
Commensalism whose profits pertain to HRL         Mutualism whose profits pertain to both HRL and IHL 
 
 
440 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 57-60 (2012).  
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As we can see, any apparent conflict between provision from international humanitarian 
law and human rights law during peacetime, the human dignity morality must prevail, since it is 
the value and right highly appreciated in democratic societies and international community alike. 
It is the axial value; the supervalue of whole legal system. Therefore, commensalism on human 
rights behalf signifies the civilized commitment to respect, endorse and guarantee individual 
rights. Conversely, in wartime, both branches of law equalize, and human dignity morality no 
longer surpasses the apparent conflicts and moral quandaries, which requires a metamorality as 
values common to both branches and capable to provide both the benefits of mutual application. 
Peter Singer’s expanding circle of morality encompasses utilitarianism as common currency of 
all nation of a cosmopolitan environment such as international community441. Following the 
aristotelic teleological reasoning, only by living in a polis and partaking in politics do we fully 
realize our nature as human beings that are by nature meant to live in a political community 
which exists by nature and it is prior to the individual. Human beings are not self-sufficient 
without a political community442. What is being defended here is international community which 
international legal system is designed to protect, just as much as the lives and liberties of the 
members of this community. Thus, like a Latin catchphrase cited by Walzer, fiat justicia ruat 
coelom, do justice even if the heavens fall, and he adds, do justice unless the heavens are really 
about to fall, recalling the extreme necessity upon an intense crisis, a supreme emergency443. 
 
441 PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE 118-123 (2011); AND PETER SINGER ET RENATA SINGER, THE 
MORAL OF THE STORY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ETHICS THROUGH LITERATURE 401 (2005). 
442 PETER SINGER, ÉTICA PRÁTICA 21 (3RD EDITION. SÃO PAULO: MARTINS FONTES, 2002); ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 148 (3RD EDITION, 2007); AND MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTIÇA: O QUE É FAZER A 
COISA CERTA 54-55 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2012). 
443 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WAR 230-231 (2006). 
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The identification of supreme emergency, by the way, can be made international courts or 
international governmental organization, such as United Nations. As we have seen, international 
legal system allows the usage of legal general clauses which might be filled by interpretation and 
application of international law (Article 31 Vienna Convention). Moreover, this law-making 
process through decision-making rationale has to take into account the unity, coherence and 
wholeness of the entire legal system, forwarded by a systematic and teleological interpretation. 
The mandatory mutualism between international humanitarian law and human rights law, by this 
token, complies with international law standards when applying utilitarian metamorality to 
combat imminent danger of high impact where targeting civilians might appear necessary and 
proportional as a side effect to overcome the supreme emergency.  
We can boldly certify that Rawls reflective equilibrium defends that commitment of 
priority of rights shall prevail over the good. It is imperatively true in peacetime, where we can 
theorize an unveiled society building its values to uphold political stability, equality and social 
moral improvement444. All in all then, contemporary international law, principally the law of 
armed conflicts that ensues the mandatory mutualism between human rights law and 
humanitarian law, carries the burden of morality. International solutions in armed conflicts cases 
no longer admits the absence of moral considerations. Since last century, the law itself has been 
shaped in three dimensions indissociable to each other: fact, norm and value445. There is no 
modern body of law of humanity that is void in moral values, so the burden of morality and 
moral justification is a constant reality. Therefore, the rationale we are developing of using 
utilitarianism as metamorality to overcome moral quandaries on human rights law reach on 
 
444 JOHN RAWLS, UMA TEORIA DA JUSTIÇA 70-88 (3RD EDITION. SÃO PAULO: MARTINS FONTES, 2008). 
445 MIGUEL REALE, TEORIA TRIDIMENSIONAL DO DIREITO 124-126 (5TH EDITION, SÃO PAULO: SARAIVA, 1994). 
 193 
 
targeting civilians in armed conflict situations complies with the contemporary burden of 
morality and have too some social rules of applicability, value of community and social harmony 
ends446. 
Utilitarianism is a theory of both personal morality and social justice447. Applying 
utilitarianism as metamorality does not mean human dignity morality is forfeited. Utilitarianism 
comports personal morality within its walls, however social justice shall prevail on exceptional 
situations of armed conflict, particularly those moral dilemmas on targeting civilians. As 
abnormality and instability remove normal conditions of law interpretation and application, 
social justice trumps personal morality, such as it would in overruling Parrilo v. Italy hold on 
human dignity morality as an impediment of using human embryos for the sake of genetic 
developments on cures and saving human lives448. It is just a pragmatic morality where 
principles are put forward tentatively in the expectation that they will be shaped and modified by 
our responses to practical problems which adjustments, by the way, also comports Rawls 
reflective equilibrium rationale, since utilitarianism as metamorality underpins our judgement of 
community seeking for a greater good cooperatively449.  
As stated by Joshua Green, utilitarianism is a great idea with a bad name in politics and 
moral philosophy, albeit is always a great answer to promote community’s social values of 
liberty and security, since it delivers the best outcome to the greatest number of society 
 
446 Xiaorong Li, “Asian Values” and the Universality of Human Rights, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
397, 403-405 (2001). 
447 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 51-52 (1996). 
448 Parrilo v. Italy [GC], no. 46470/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015).  
449 JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY 06 (2nd ed., 2012); AND JOSHUA 
GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 328 (2013). 
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members. So, when we have a clash of values, or what we have called since the beginning of this 
work, an apparent conflict of law provisions, utilitarianism fulfil the duty of pointing a way out 
based in rationality and morality, which human values and interests are preserved. As we have an 
international community based on generalized and universal values, utilitarian metamorality 
serves too as common currency among nations, since everyone can easily attain the 
comprehension of promoting a greater good for the survival and continuity of society, weighing 
in the other hand some losses unintended as collateral damage before a significant victory or 
advantage450. Working as common currency, utilitarian metamorality must surpass two moral 
truths we have been working on, the morality in God and the morality in Reason. As we have 
seen extensively in Chapter 3, human rights conceptions rely immensely on both types, one 
through Christian values and the other through Kant’s breakthrough.    
Barack Obama once lectured that the biblical episode where Abraham takes his only son 
to the top of a mountain to sacrifice him in the name of the God to prove his faith is a good story 
to show the audience that the understanding of treating a person as a meaning to certain end is 
divinely wrong, since God had to personally interfere as a teachable moment for us to grasp the 
importance of human dignity. Nevertheless, if anyone of us saw Abraham nowadays taking his 
son out of the church to sacrifice him in the name of the God in the middle of the street, all of us 
would call the police or personally intervene, even whether Abraham had authentically listened 
the same orientations to sacrifice the kid as Bible says. It also serves us a good deal, since it is 
safer for us to act accordingly to what we see and hear, i. e., accordingly to our perceptions of the 
 
450 JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 106-107, 175 
(2013). 
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current facts, as a common inherited right of all of us or even as basic rational reasons451. The 
point is that morality in God has its reasons and rationality, all valid, but it does not serve as 
common currency for international community. Thus, if we are against abortion for reasons 
based in God and we believe we are right, we have to defend the idea based in different grounds 
toward others who do not believe in the same God we do or in no God at all. Morality out of 
Judeo-Christianity precepts are not able to work as common currency in a plural society.  
Morality on reason, in Western culture mostly, rests on Immanuel Kant’s shoulders. 
Recalling his moral groundwork and practical pure reason. Kant departs from an immanent sense 
of morality rooted in our humanity, which is a feature universal and self-evident. All of us share 
these traits regardless of our personal inclinations. From humanity, which inhabits in all human 
beings, emerges the element of morality which leads to two characteristics that only human 
reason provides, dignity and autonomy. Thus, the first human value is the dignity of the human 
person. Only on a second moment that other values definitions are made, and this process is 
developed by human autonomy. Under this point of view, the human being has dignity because 
the moral law lives within; it is embodied on him – reason why he praises for a universal and 
self-evident morality. Also, reason enjoin us to obey two imperatives, the universal law and 
humanity as an end. The former proposes we “act only on that maxim whereby you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law”. The latter insists all human “has in itself 
an absolute value… an end in itself…I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists 
as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will”452. As we have 
 
451 Barack Obama, Obama’s 2006 Speech on Faith and Politics (June 28, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech.html (last visited in Oct. 2, 2019) 
452 IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAÇÃO DA METAFÍSICA DOS COSTUMES 62-70 (SÃO PAULO: MARTIN CLARET, 
2006). 
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discussed in Chapter 3, a lot of practical and real-life problems come into action towards Kant’s 
morality of human dignity that transcends the human person becoming a universal imperative. It 
is more theoretical than pragmatic, while utilitarianism is just the opposite. Besides not being 
unanimously shared as the best conception to justice, as a true universal value, morality on 
reason is also unfit for universal common currency.  
To moral science, however, justice is goodness and the fulfilment of good deeds by men. 
Justice as value requires an endless reinterpretation so its meaning might realize new ideals and 
their unfulfilled potential pursuant new social achievements453. Neither human dignity nor 
utilitarianism are moral dogmas, there is no such thing is moral philosophy. Yet, when we talk 
about shared values obtained by a generalization process, utilitarian morality serves quite well as 
common currency. The pursuit of a greater good fits on restraining of freedom, life and property. 
Utility, in this vein, is the agglutination of good life experiences which is a notion accessible to 
all mankind regarding utilitarianism as common currency and metamorality. For that, 
utilitarianism serves as metamorality to achieve the greatest good as an end so we, as 
international community, always compromise to evolve and to be morally better. No need on 
being morally perfect454.  
Inasmuch, human dignity morality is prevailing and fully-fledged endorsed as first moral 
compass to lead human rights law and international law in peacetime, where social NTP is 
current as normal and politically stable. Once configured the state of exception, utilitarianism 
works as metamorality inward human rights law and, even though, human dignity plays a 
 
453 HANS JOAS, THE SACREDNESS OF THE PERSON: A NEW GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 135 (2013). 
454 JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 280-284 (2013). 
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secondary role when contrasting actions toward civilians with necessity, proportionality and the 
mandatory configuration of targeting as side effect, which makes those theoretical monstrous 
examples intangible in these lines of pragmatic approach. Complementarily, Michael Walzer 
says it is wrong to believe that the fight to enforce and endorse universal values and principles 
shall be fought always the same way. It is wrong because universal values have multiples 
concrete applications455.  
 
5.6. Doctrine of Double Effect and Utilitarianism 
 
The factual scenario of targeting civilians mentioned above, to be morally acceptable in 
this work, has to contain its epistemological limits within doctrine of double effect. It is morally 
permissible to perform an act having both a good effect and an evil effect, as long as the intended 
good effect outweighs the evil effect, which is simply foreseen rather than intended. In essence, 
double effect is a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking noncombatants 
with the legitimate conduct of military activity. Even before modern formulation of 
proportionality in Additional Protocol I, the laws of war incorporated these notions456, and its 
applicability looms to actions against nonstate actors as well457.  
It is paramount that the evil consequence is not intended as an end in itself, however it is 
permissible to pursue a greater good as a final end by neutral or good means even if a lesser evil 
 
455 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 117 (4TH EDITION, 2006). 
456 LAURIE R. BLANK AND GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS: FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 52 (2013) 
457 RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 122 (2011). 
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is certain, anticipated side effect when there is no other way to achieve the greatest good. So, it is 
important to highlight a subtle detail in this formula, which is intending and aiming. The doctrine 
of double effect morally acceptable is that one where the intending is good, and the aiming 
contains certain evil consequence. The one that covers an evil intending and aiming is not the 
focus of this work, since this one is incompatible with all moral advancement conquered in 
international law and would advocate the annulation of human dignity morality, the heart of 
human rights law. As galvanized above, utilitarianism works as metamorality and human dignity 
morality still there, in backstage though. Although the subjective content in intending, practice 
and pragmatism advises its identification by evidences collected case by case. The power of the 
State to act and target civilians is not unlimited, nor may the State resort to any means to attain 
its ends458. Then, it is important to analyze the intentional character of human action, the specific 
corporeal dimensions and the original social nature of the human capacity for action459. 
Doctrine of double effect is relevant because it morally distinguishes from terror bombing 
civilian in armed conflicts and bombing military targets predicting with certainty some civilian 
casualties as collateral damage, for example. The former is unacceptable, since its intention is 
evil, while the latter might be acceptable. So, this doctrine is deeply related to morality in 
wartime. Two things must be taken into consideration, the action is itself a means to the greatest 
good which has an evil effect and the greatest good must outbalance the evil effect. Principle of 
proportionality also adds one more aspect, that this evil foreseen ought to be the lesser evil 
possible. Thus, “it may be permissible to produce a lesser evil as a side effect only if we are 
 
458 Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., §§89, 
107 (2002); and Neira-Alegría et al. v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, §75 (January 19, 1995).  
459 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 191 (2003). 
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pursuing a greatest good as a final end”460. For instance, if we bomb a munition factory, civilians 
are going to die as a side effect, but it does not signify we aim at their deaths. Then, to be 
permissible, the greatest good aimed must outbalance this evil effect albeit we can infer that 
munition is necessary to kill people in war and the reduced ability to reach munition equals a 
greater number of people being alive, even though, the civilian deaths also should be the lesser 
evil shown. Furthermore, resorting to the lesser evil is not an immorality461.   
Likewise, Jonathan Glover stresses that armed conflicts allow some actions which have 
the foreseen but unintended consequence as a side effect. To tolerate innocent people being 
targeted, the good must be sufficient to outweigh the harm. So long as the numbers are not 
disproportionately large, some foreseen but unintended civilian targeted can be morally 
acceptable. Doctrine of double effect then causes acts which have both good and bad effects. The 
morality of the acts is tied to whether the bad effect is merely foreseen or actually intended. A 
merely foreseen bad effect may be permissible, so long as the badness is not out of proportion to 
the good being pursued. Afterall, intention is important in moral thinking, even teleological 
consequentialist moral reasoning. To many of us, there is an important moral difference between 
unintentionally killing civilians in a raid on the ball-bearing factory and deliberately bombing a 
housing state462. 
Justice in this scenario comes from fighting justly, which is twofold by the utilitarian 
outlook we can retrieve from international humanitarian law and human rights law. Basically, in 
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the conduct of armed conflicts is not permitted to do any mischief which does not tend materially 
to the end of the hostility or a significant gain is strategy towards its end, as maximization of 
utility. What is prohibited is the excessive harm and evil intentions. For that, we shall determine 
the utility out of military necessity and analyze proportionality upon the mischief done on 
targeting civilians, weighing it not only under the immediate harm to individuals but also any 
injury to the permanent interests of mankind against the contribution that mischief makes to the 
end of hostilities or great gain on this direction. The limits of utility and proportionality are very 
important. Utilitarianism applied to armed conflicts invites soldiers to calculate costs and 
benefits only up to a point and at that point it establishes a series of precise rules to moral 
barricades that can be captured only at great moral cost. The utilitarian arguments here are that 
victory or great advantage will end the conflict or reduce the probability of future combats or 
even eschew immediate and horrifying consequences. It all sets the interests of individuals and 
of mankind at a lesser value than the victory or advantage that is being sought, which follows 
utilitarian morality of the greatest good for the greatest number463.  
Afterall, the rationality of armed conflicts, and the nature of its necessity, is to compel the 
submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life and money. Military 
necessity can determine whether the civilians involved are attacked or not. Generally, they must 
not be attacked if their activities can be stopped or their products seized or destroyed, in some 
other way and without significant risk. They can never be the objects or the targets of military 
activity. Nevertheless, because of the civilians proximity to a conflict zone, doctrine of double 
effect requires not the battle to be stopped, rather that some degree of care be taken not to harm 
 
463 HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 75-79 (2012) 
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civilians, which commonly implies that we recognize their rights as best as we can within the 
context of armed conflicts. This doctrine is closely related to our ordinary ways of thinking about 
moral life; it is a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking non-combatants 
with the legitimate conduct of military activity464 and it is far way more complex than the simple 
statement of solving international issues “on the basis of arithmetical considerations”. This 
banalization would be contrary to the idea of human nature and the purpose of the international 
humanitarian law and human rights law mutualism465. 
Combatants, on the other hand, can be hit deliberately or as side effect. Targeting 
individual enemy combatants in war is accepted as both legal and moral466. International 
humanitarian law does not prohibit the targeting or killing of enemy combatants who have not 
laid down their arms or been placed hors de combat, and accordingly that the death of a 
combatant under these circumstances does not constitute a violation of the right to life467. 
Nevertheless, noncombatants can only be attacked as side effect, or collateral damage. The 
mandatory mutualism between international humanitarian law and human rights law, regarding 
military necessity on targeting, can be synthetized as below:  
Target Combatant Civilian 
Harm deliberate Side effect Side effect 
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Notwithstanding, international humanitarian law has been interpreted to permit deliberate 
harming of civilians in a supreme emergency, which is a necessity to overcome an imminent 
catastrophe and to win it, humanity principle ought to be put aside, at least partially. It is so 
because bombing in World War II, besides the elevated number of civilians’ deaths, was always 
under the greater good of defeating Hitler and Nazism, what would be worst worldwide than 
those casualties. In 1939, when atomic energy began to seem a serious possibility, United 
Kingdom and United States were concerned about the German atomic program and the danger of 
a Nazi bomb. In Germany, large quantities of heavy water from Norway was being used for 
experiments on the possibility of a chain reaction which pertained to the Norsk Hydro plant at 
Rjukan. Suddenly, the Nazi decided to dismantle the plant and to transport the heavy water to 
Germany. Glover tells us that it was vital to stop the heavy water reaching Germany, but there 
was no time for a full-scale raid on the plant in Rjukan, there were no troops nearby to undergo a 
successful attack to destroy the plant. The water would go by train, crossing a lake by rail-ferry. 
The train would be hard to blow up and would be crowded with civilians. The ferry carried fewer 
people but blowing it up would still kill civilians. However, the results were important enough to 
justify these losses, so the concerns aimed to make the effects of hitting civilians as minimum as 
possible. Then, the plant’s transport engineer supported the plan and he put the water to go on 
the relatively uncrowded Sunday ferry. Afterwards the ferry was blown up, killing 26 of the 53 
people on board, but also sending all the heavy water to the bottom of the lake. It was the 
elimination of German heavy water production in Norway and the Germans could not resume the 
heavy water project since that episode, which contributed hugely to the German failure on 
achieving a self-sustaining atomic reactor before the end of the war. Post facto studies and 
cientific analysis say that in 3 to 4 more years Germany would have completed its atomic bomb 
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project and this dreadful hindsight would have put Nazis ahead of Manhattan Project and 
excelled the atomic program468. 
The case of the ferry carrying the heavy water from Norway illustrates abstract calculus 
that is made for decision-makers, and these are the kind of indicators that legitimately lead the 
decision-making process in international law469. If the heavy water had reached Germany, a Nazi 
atomic bomb would not have been certain, but would have been more likely and letting Hitler 
have an atomic bomb would risk huge numbers of deaths and perhaps a Nazi victory, which is 
something we can picture nowadays, since there is a fictional TV show highly appreciated by the 
public that works towards this alternative scenario470. With so much at stake, the evaluation of 
fact there seemed worth paying a substantial price to keep the chance of atomic bomb by Nazi as 
low as possible. In this occasion, the doctrine of double effect has been welcome. If the deaths of 
the ferry passengers were not intended and the sinking permitted, the ultimate end fails. Civilian 
deaths, here, are side effect. It is not morally perfect, but it is morally acceptable.  
On this regard, Michael Walzer also agrees that rights of innocent people can be 
overridden for the sake of the political community. He stresses that “individuals cannot kill other 
individuals to save themselves, but to save a nation we can violate the rights of a determinate but 
smaller number of people”471, and so does Alasdair MacIntyre to whom loyalty bound and 
cosmopolitism should govern decision toward supreme emergency. The survival and freedom of 
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political communities are the highest values of international society472. Thus, the prohibition set 
in international humanitarian law and human rights law is not absolute but have threshold and so 
may be permissibly overridden even if it involves infringing the rights of civilians. For that, 
Kamm complements, the supreme emergency must entail a “dilemmatic situation” by which the 
deliberate killing of civilians is a wrong and not killing them is also wrong, and the lesser evil 
should prevail. Standard jus in bello, however, rules out (most) deliberate targeting of civilians 
albeit eventually some military operations may expect civilian casualties as collateral damage473. 
Fiction allows us to have a great account to what this theory represents in our real daily 
life. In Ender’s Game movie, the world is going through a war with an enemy alien race called 
Formics. Beyond fiction, great understanding can be captured from this movie. Ender Wiggin, 
the main character, is playing battles in a futuristic facility in something that looks like 
videogame on screen. All his military training is performed in this videogame battles and are 
informed that they are simulation trainings. In the end of the movie (spoiler alert here), Ender 
engage to the final battle of his simulated training, such battle that no military student was ever 
capable of winning. Somehow, Ender finds a solution that completely ends the war, annihilates 
the enemy and provide the victory to his army, and accordingly he performs. He wins, and 
everyone astonished upon the victory congratulates him emphatically, when he realizes the war 
was real. Mourning on the impact of his decision that wiped out the whole Formic race – besides 
being rational and teleologically aimed to an acceptable end, the victory – he listens from his 
General as consolation and justification “son, you are going to be remembered as a hero because 
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you put an end to the war”, and then he replies “no, I am going to be remembered as a 
murderer”. Finishing the discussion, the General answers “we won, that is all that matters”, 
Ender concludes “the way we win is what really matters”474. 
Of course, it is a fictional situation and to extreme to our purpose of endorsing utilitarian 
metamorality on targeting civilians. First, the example serves because Ender target a military 
object which was the entire enemy planet, so he intended the annihilation of the whole Formic 
soldiers and Formic civilians were side effects, however there was no prior cost-benefit calculus, 
nor an attempt to minimize civilian casualties. Second, there is a clear disproportionality in the 
maneuver, since he wiped out the whole race moved by a moral vacuum, which is an absurd for 
the development of utilitarian metamorality. Otherwise the solution for world war would be to 
blow up the whole Germany and Japan. This is not conceivable, but what worths noting is the 
rationality employed on his decision-making process. He was pure teleology, since his only goal 
was to end the war. Pure rationality is saved by its own open-endedness, but it is not acceptable 
here detached from moral boundaries. Therefore, this fiction helps me to defend utilitarianism as 
metamorality and the imposition of mutualism for both benefit of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law because it proves the presence of human rights morality on dignity 
underneath. It proves that utilitarian metamorality trumps human dignity morality in order to 
teleologically achieve an end, but it does not remove human dignity morality entirely of the 
equation because, as Ender said, the way we win also matters. It is not just doing, but how we do 
what we have to do also counts.  
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Ender’s concern was not directed to the victory he propitiated, rather to the respect of 
Formic’s dignity that he renounced and was not even a considered element of his equation of 
cost-benefit analysis. No proportionality was made on this regard, what he elucidates that would 
be done whether he knew it was a real fight. There is plausibility in his view because if an action 
is morally the best one available to us, then we are not morally worse for carrying it out. This is 
an appeal of symmetry. It is not just about winning; some moral grounds must remain to keep 
actions perpetrated morally admissible475. Some people challenge this opinion, but they would 
accept that it is still relevant that the alleged action was morally the best – or least bad – of all 
possibilities assessed. Therefore, utilitarian metamorality applied in international humanitarian 
law and human rights law mutualism is not just rationality and mere mathematic calculus of cost-
benefit. Deontology moral plays his supporting role through principles of proportionality and 
necessity. 
Returning to World War II bombing examples, the Allied atomic project had started in 
response to German development in the area. After fulminating German project to continue, 
Manhattan project gained a new aim, Japan. The target was Japan and the purpose was the need 
to end the war quickly, otherwise the endurance of the war would have had terrible human costs, 
afterall Japanese occupation in Asian countries was bloody and cruel and a military cost-benefit 
analysis of an invasion of Japan by Allied army would also mean enormous casualties on both 
sides and would make longer the period of armed conflicts, which also increases the cost of more 
American and Japanese lives. Hence, on August 6, 1945, the atomic bomb called ‘Little Boy’ 
was dropped from an American bomber called the Enola Gay on Hiroshima and caused 140,000 
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deaths and, five years later, the total amounted 200,000. On August 9, 1945, the atomic bomb 
called ‘Fat Man’ was dropped from an American bomber on Nagasaki, which killed 70,000 
people and, five years later, the total amounted 140,000.  
So, considering Ender’s conundrum, could the war against Japan have been stopped by 
other means? And, if there were no alternative ways of stopping the war, would the dropping of 
bombs remain justifiable? Maybe there was no certain way of ending the war without the use of 
the bomb. Nonetheless, in the light of what happened to the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
the thought is unavoidable that such an approach of an alternative should have been at least tried. 
Today we suppose using the bomb had been the only way of shortening the war. Glover narrates 
says a leading study performed at Oxford University, in 1956, has indicated that, under those 
circumstances of the war with Japan, dropping the bomb probably saved many lives, but pointed 
out that circumstances included the Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender and their 
disregard of Japan’s known desire for negotiated peace. The justification for the bombings was 
that they reduced the risk of a far greater evil476.   
Even though, the party launching an attack against a legitimate military objective must 
always seek to avoid or minimize foreseeable civilian casualties and damage to civilians. There 
must exist an attempt to minimize the damage inflicted on civilians. While the distinct nature of 
the principle of proportionality applicable under international humanitarian law must be 
recognized, it can be said as general rule that excessive foreseeable damage or injury to certain 
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people or objects is prohibited in peacetime as well as in armed conflict477. Likewise, European 
Court of Human Rights has already asserted that it is paramount to examine whether the 
operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so as “to minimize, to the greatest extent 
possible, recourse to lethal force. The authorities must take appropriate care to ensure that any 
risk to life is minimized” and, also “a balance must be achieved between the aim pursued and the 
means employed to achieve it”478.  
As cited above, Resolution 1373 of United Nations Security Council calls on States to 
work together to prevent and suppress terrorist acts and also requires states to take “the necessary 
steps” to prevent the commission of terrorist acts479. Subsequently, the war in Afghanistan 
engaged right after and in compliance with Resolution 1373, have shown aerial bombardment 
and a high number of civilians’ casualties. The aerial bombardment has been justified on 
“necessity” grounds as being “essential” to NATO’s efforts to clear out Taliban insurgents. 
According to an annual report issued by the United Nations, in Afghanistan in 2010, there was a 
significant human cost growth, “2,777 civilian deaths in 2010, an increase of 15 per cent 
compared to 2009”, but “2,080 deaths (75 per cent of total civilian deaths) were attributed to 
Anti-Government Elements, up 28 per cent from 2009. Suicide attacks and improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) caused the most civilian deaths, totaling 1,141 deaths (55 per cent of civilian 
deaths attributed to Anti-Government Elements)”480. As terrorism has grown in international 
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arena, becoming a real threat to the values our international community holds, a recent 
Resolution 2249 was enacted with the same purpose of prior ones, only updating the global 
tragedies and enemies481.  
As pragmatic as we shall be, let’s work on some variables to show how this foreseeable 
assessment on military necessity to achieve a good consequence at the cost of an evil 
consequence as side effect but, even though, the military action finds acceptance in moral 
justification in utilitarianism, since a greater good is an end teleologically reached and the harm 
on targeting civilians is deemed the lesser evil too. Decision-making elements can be predicted 
to afford proper planning and coordination of necessary actions and we are going to follow 
Richard Posner formula on cost-benefits analysis in this predictability of proportionality and 
lesser evil assurance482. Like cited in Chapter 4, the use of drones has been used constantly on 
military operations to fight enemies of the big global commonwealth.  
So, hypothetically, let’s imagine that a terrorist plot from an ISIS cell hidden in a farm in 
Brussels countryside is discovered planning an attack, not at military targets, but at a shopping 
mall in London that has the largest movie theater in town and the last movie of Harry Potter’s 
premier is going to be in screen at 5pm sharply. I chose Harry Potter movie because William 
Shawcross brings in his book a very curious fact he learned from Guantanamo Bay prisoners, 
that Harry Potter books are by far the most read book by the inmate population, overtaking any 
othe novel in the whole facility, being a huge success among them483. Curiosity apart, let’s say 
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that the expected audience to attend the mall in the premier is 1,000 people. A task force under 
Resolution 2249/UNSC then discovers the plot and plans a preventive attack to this threatening 
cell hidden in Brussels countryside farm, by drones, when the danger against Harry Potter’s 
audience is imminent (to eliminate the chance of an alternative plan of strike in our hypothetical 
case). The strike by drone therefore must be performed right away and they get the information 
that civilians, unrelated to the evil terrorist deed, are in the premises. So, among children, women 
and farm workers, we have an estimate number of 100 civilian in target that could be harmed as 
a side effect. In sum, the imminent danger posed to those 1,000 London citizens can be avoided 
by this military action that will eliminate the terrorists who are plotting the attack, primary 
targets duly intended, and harm 100 more possible civilians as collateral damage, secondary 
targets unintended but inevitable (since we removed alternative strive from the picture).    
Let’s do some math to analyze the cost benefit of the attack, which result will support the 
double effect argumentation and utilitarian morality validation. First, we need to ascertain to 
readers that this is a calculus performed anticipatedly, which means that it entails probabilities of 
occurrences, what is exactly the exercise of predictability that military do in rules of engagement. 
In sequence, let’s identify the formula elements. The evil consequence of the terrorist attack is 
the harm of 1,000 people that might happen with the probability TA (for terrorist attack). So, the 
cost of not acting against the terrorist is the Harry Potter’s fans human lives, that we call HL (for 
human lives). The possibility of eliminating such attack would impose a cost of our action, what 
we call perpetrator burden PB, what would be the 100 civilians targeted as side effect in a drone 
assault to the farm. The harm on these civilians targeted, in this equation of ours, is PB (for 
perpetrator burden). Therefore, the cost of avoiding the attack TA is PB and to be morally 
acceptable in utilitarian terms, as metamorality, it must be less than the expected cost of HL (or 
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benefit of avoiding the attack) multiplied by the probability of the attack happening TA. Finally, 
the formula is PB < TA*HL. 
Once we have the formula prepared, let’s run some number. Let’s say that the probability 
that the UNSC task force estimates of the attack happening is 100%, so the representation of TA 
in our formula will be 1,0. PB < TA*HL equals 100 < 1,0*1,000, giving us the outcome: 100 < 
1,000. If the mathematic statement portrayed is true, military necessity passed in cost-benefit 
analysis and lesser evil scrutiny; the former explains the teleological rationality to seek a good 
end regardless of means (which was solely applied in Ender’s Game), while the latter seeks to 
comply with moral argumentation of proportionality and all efforts converged to mitigate the 
loss, in order to let utilitarian morality trumping human dignity morality as minimum as possible 
(this is Ender’s conundrum grasped in “the way we win matters”). During this second analysis of 
lesser evil and mitigating the loss, it would be also considered any attempt to minimize the 
number of civilians targeted in the farm (like creating a deviation in road to the farm so 10 
workers would not be there at the moment of the strike, which is similar to the ferry explosion in 
Norway case, where the engineer selected a Sunday route to make the water transportation 
because it had less passengers). Nevertheless, whether the final outcome, which is the greatest 
good, outbalances the evil outcome of civilians harm as collateral damage, the doctrine of double 
effect is morally acceptable and mutualism benefits met, both to international humanitarian law 
and human rights law, the latter beneath utilitarian metamorality as primary moral compass 
during emergeny. 
Contrariwise, if the probability of occurrence of the terrorist attack is 10%, then the 
formula is 100 < 0,1*1,000, giving us the outcome: 100 < 100. This mathematic statement is 
 212 
 
false, thereafter, the drone strike is not morally acceptable or legally justified. In the light of all 
that have been said, the graphic exposition of our thesis is synthetized as follow: 
 
Utilitarianism rationale affords solution to social-political problems while fulfilling the 
greatest number of interests possible. Individual interests are considered in the equation, albeit 
they are considered pursuant the maximization of general welfare of international society. The 
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good promoted collectively in utilitarian rationality follows the best trail to quantity and quality 
in the welfare outcome. Obviously, not always utilitarian rationality satisfies individual interests. 
Notwithstanding, justice, as social value cherished in international community, is met as the 
favorable measurement to collective body484. The doctrine of double effect is invoked to permit 
some acts which will predictably target civilians, innocent people. Where these deaths are 
foreseen but not intended consequences and where they are not out of proportion to the good 
aimed at, the act is morally permissible. Doctrine of double effect is paramount to our work in 
armed conflicts international regulation because it provides moral identity instead of a moral 
emptiness.  
Notwithstanding, regarding the preconditions of necessity and proportionality, the 
analysis over cost-benefit must be done as well and, in practical life, procedural observances 
must be fulfilled alongside. Thus, all information on targeting civilians as side effects 
unintentionally, the attempts to minimize the harm on civilians, the lack of military alternative to 
achieve the end pursued and the configuration of the lesser evil, demonstrating that the greatest 
good reached outweighs the evil consequence, must be confirmed upon evidences – since 
international investigations not always can rely on proofs485 – and impartiality – which is closely 
linked to unintentionality of action, which indicates an action performed out of any motive 
discrimination or prejudice486.  
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At last, all moral background and rational reasoning requirement are accomplished in this 
piece of work. Pragmatically departing from a factual scenario of supreme emergency, which 
dissociates from normal regular conditions we face in peacetime and social NTP, we recognized 
a mutation in international law able to provide answers to overcome the crisis. Therefore, the 
mandatory mutualism between international humanitarian law and human rights law remains 
untouched in respect to their inner interplay and considerations. The important shift in their 
applicability occurs in utilitarian morality trumping human dignity morality and functioning as 
metamorality to solve pragmatic problems in armed conflicts. It is sensitive to highlight that 
human dignity morality is not remove, but instead of being primary moral compass, it becomes 
secondary moral compass, leaving the leading role to utilitarian metamorality.  
As consequence, the deontology rationality reasoning attached to human dignity morality 
that universally enjoins treating people always as an end, never as a mean, is surpassed by 
teleology rationality reasoning which is attached to utilitarian morality and, inversely, it accepts 
treating people as a mean to seek the greatest good to the greatest number. Regarding the civilian 
targeting, which is the scope of this work, in situations of armed conflicts, targeting civilians is 
permitted as a side effect, since the good outcome outbalances the evil consequences of the harm 
inflicted on civilians. More than that, proportionality and the justification of the lesser evil as a 
duty to minimize the losses or the harm impact on civilians are the moral considerations to 
comply with human rights rational whose mutual benefit derives from social values fulfillment 
towards the victory or the great advantaged behind the end pursued as a good effect. Yet, human 
dignity still plays a supporting role to utilitarianism metamorality when forbidding jus cogens 
violations, for example, like torture. Even in front of utilitarian metamorality, human dignity 
plays an important role which makes us conclude that, at first glance, there is no predictable 
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good consequence that outweighs the evil consequence of eroding a jus cogens value. We 
believe it is accurate in utilitarian terms in the manner that the erosion of jus cogens, in the long 
run, can provoke an irreparable harm to mankind flourishment and values enhancement.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
According to Ricardo Guibourg, the purposes of human knowledge towards the study of 
law are generally threefold: (i) identify the right in question, so it is possible to discuss its 
content and controversies; (ii) set the way society really behaves towards the conduct that is 
under law lens and the way law grabs this conduct and how it react before law; and (iii) establish 
the value over the law and the action under auspices in such manner that justice can be met487. 
By this very end, we can say we have gone through all these three steps.  
Building our idea from the very bottom, we have worked on how war shaped deeply our 
international society, politically and legally. We left an old conception of state-centric 
international society which had State as primary subjects and an international legal system 
mostly focused on political and commercial interests. Even in the beginning of last century, some 
improvement were made in international arena but after two world wars, the cost of humanity 
losses in loathsome atrocities, the despicable banalization of evil and the powerless response 
provided by international framework to deter the progression of such dreadful vices made the 
world congregate on cooperation and goodness spirits to build a system anew. 
Following sociological footsteps of society’s robust foundation, first, we generate values, 
second, we put them in practice, and third, we create institutions spot them, rules of international 
law and community were drafted commencing with values foundation, all placed in universal 
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language with generalization scope to reach every individual in the planet. The structuring rules 
made international society decentralized, open, egalitarian, universal and cosmopolitan. The 
number of international actors duly recognized increased significantly and the areas of their 
agency was enlarged to cover all areas of human interests, which caused a progressive movement 
of legal codification.  
As legal system grew it became more complex, because the sources of international law 
have exponentially increased and a rationality to organize the management of all these legal 
sources became imperative. Thus, a vertical hierarchy knowledge has been employed and legal 
norms, such as ICJ Statute and Vienna Convention, have set the rules of interpreting and 
applying the law keeping simultaneously the unity, coherence and wholeness of the system. In 
parallel, international courts have also been decentralized and regional courts have been foisted, 
especially human rights courts. In their current decision-making practices, through techniques of 
interpretation and application, jurisprudence overrules its secondary status as source of 
international law to turn it primary pursuant semantic densification of legal general clauses of 
multisemantic nature – such as human dignity – giving ductility and dynamism for legal concepts 
to settle case by case brought before the courts. Then, day by day international courts have 
shaped intimately international legal provisions through their precedents.   
In sequence, we have proceeded a profound grasp over human rights history in humanity, 
making some longstanding links with natural law and the rebirth of its notions in the rebuilding 
process of international community and law design. Following this trails, we went deep on 
human rights roots to reveal its inner basis in morality, rationality and human emotions, 
unfolding the sacredness of human life, ethos of love and universal respect that all amount to our 
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Christian values and Kantian reasoning. Thereafter, human dignity takes its place of center of all 
human rights law and international framework to whom the respect for human dignity irradiates 
as both value and right, compromising all international actors to obey, enforce and endorse. At 
international courts practices a lot of divergence on human dignity respectfulness applicability 
arises, some incommensurability diagnosis is identified, and plurality has been again advised, 
besides a crescent development of values generalization to meet plurality, community welfare 
and the promise of peace and ban on human cruelty. Moreover, a vast body of jurisprudence is 
produced, and judicial decision-making gradually transforms international society and law into a 
living body, permanently breathing and walking.    
In opposition to human rights law, comes international humanitarian law who represents 
the solution in armed conflict situations, while the former is initially conceive to peacetime 
regulation only. Nevertheless, international legal understanding started to move forward to add to 
the law of the war some contemporary values formally acquired during the international society 
reform which launched Geneva Conventions, and further Protocols, to implement into warlike 
regulation the principle of humanity to humanize the behavior in armed conflicts. After that, the 
identification of this branch of law became international humanitarian law, because of its new 
humanity values borrowed chiefly from human right rationale. Alongside humanity, principles of 
necessity, proportionality and distinction have been commonly applied to alleviate the horrors of 
war, taking a huge consideration over civilians, which are the ultimate recipients of this 
dissertation. 
Subsequently, a bunch of legal material was drafted to protect civilians and to strengthen 
civilians immunities. Nonetheless, armed conflicts necessarily place civilians in danger. 
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Although we have the moral duty to soften the aspect of the hellishness that is to be in the middle 
of hostilities, we can only assure the mitigation of dangers they are submitted. Meanwhile, a new 
specie of war has been formed in international community this century, which poses an immense 
danger and threatens the good life of all nations, risking of annulation all values so hardly 
conquered in human history. Furthermore, this new kind of coward and hollow engagement of 
terrorism becomes the contemporary hostis humani generis, enemy of mankind. In order to 
maintain the order and international welfare and society survival, new traits of law have been 
fabricated in treaties, international organizations resolutions and official documents and, most 
important, judicial decision-making. 
In the first wave, international decisions set the union of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law that from this moment forward are not separated as two independent 
branches of law whose scope of applicability differs from war to peacetime, respectively. From 
that moment in history onwards, an interplay between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law is conceived and their mutual interaction is placed within legal system methods of 
interpretation and application of the law over apparent colliding provisions of these two branches 
as the former being lex specialis, while the latter is lex generalis. Then, any apparent collision 
between provisions from these two branches, humanitarian provision shall prevail. As we have 
seen all over this work, new understandings held by international courts, particularly human 
rights courts, have significantly developed international law. The mutual influence between 
international humanitarian law and human rights law has been mandatory and it has foisted 
international law development in interpretation and application of legal concepts and values. It is 
well known that “there are many instances in which human rights law and humanitarian law do 
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not contradict each other, but rather regulate different aspects of a situation or regulate a situation 
in more or less detail and can therefore mutually reinforce each other”488.  
From this interplay comprehension between the two branches of law we fostered a 
sensitive apprehension over what it really means in practical life and day after day decision-
making process. From Biology we took that analogy of living organism that together works in 
symbiosis relationship which two situations might appear, the mutualism, where both organism 
benefits from the symbiotic relationship and equality functions and shares duties and gains of the 
union, and commensalism, where one organism takes a leading role, coordinate actions and 
benefits solely from the union. A mandatory mutualism is the regency we recognize from 
international humanitarian law and human rights law intertwined relation. The umbilical cord 
between them is the principle of humanity which, from human rights end, is enriched with 
human dignity morality evaluation. 
The second wave, then, is the formal observance of human dignity roots in armed 
conflicts situations, which provides guidance to caselaw solution brought before international 
courts of human rights. In this vein, both Inter-American Court and Commission and European 
Court and Council deliver a considerable number of precedents recognizing human dignity 
values as limitation to State agency toward the adversary, which has been, in many occasions, 
terrorist groups that deny all international rules of war and refuse to follow any moral rule to 
govern their deeds. Derogation clause in human rights conventions is often claimed by State to 
lift international obligation on human rights during the war on terror, but none is achieved to 
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overturn the safeguards and guarantees on human rights built in conventions and jurisprudence. 
In a piecemeal, especially in European Court, where the fight is constantly happening, they 
realize human dignity morality represents a setback in warzone and hostilities engagement, 
which brings us to the third and current wave, established openly in Hassan case.  
It is understandable that the rationale in Hassan is fruit of a process which amounts 
precedents piling – some cited above – that leave us to the final conclusion met: the interplay 
between international humanitarian law and human rights law is no longer mutualism, rather it is 
commensalism where the former takes the leading role, under lex specialis status, and says what 
is permissible or not. On this regard, not even derogation clause claim is needed in accordance to 
Article 4 of ICCPR, Article 15 of ECHR and Article 27 of ACHR, since it is a human rights 
disposition that, in armed conflicts situation, has no command over facts ongoing. Therefore, 
commensalism is formally recognized by this leading case and human rights law has no benefit 
from its interwoven relationship with humanitarian law. Resting only a supporting role to 
perform towards jus cogens human rights value – like prohibition of torture – at least for now.  
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society 
as a whole cannot override, says Michael Sandel489. It is not entirely true. Human dignity is 
founded on justice, but it does not constrain justice. As grasped in Hassan and other background 
cases, wartime legal framework is formally and substantially different from peacetime 
framework. Sandel’s statement is perfect for peacetime, just as much as the European Court has 
entailed on their new commensalism understanding of the interplay between IHL and HRL that 
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the latter is fully applicable only on peacetime490. Whilst we do not agree with the affirmative 
made by the court, we take advantage on its inner idea, which is the very notion of separating the 
use of law in peacetime – surrounded by normality and political stability – and in crisis, or 
emergency time, or state of exception, or wartime – surrounded by abnormality and political 
instability. The goal of the former is to keep the legal order functional with tendency to 
improvement to leave society better off, while the goal of the latter is to recover normality and 
stability as soon as possible, since the more we persist in crisis, the more damage in society we 
get.  
So, under normal conditions of political stability without threat posing to the very 
existence of society and international community as we value it, is accurate to affirm that each 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole 
cannot override. When we are under abnormal condition of political instability with threat to 
erode the very existence of society and international community as we praise it, in this occasion, 
the welfare of society must override individual rights until recovered normality. The main focus 
of legal order shifts, especially regarding the branches of law mingled by mandatory mutualism, 
but without giving space to anomie. The nature of mutualism mutates from deontology to 
teleology in order to restore the status quo. And for that, we do not need to step aside from 
justice, neither we need to let human rights law aloof. To meet justice, we ought to pin it down 
on other value than individuality, and to comprise human rights we ought to grapple on a 
morality that overlaps human dignity morality, which means, we have to bring a metamorality 
that fits the rule of law. Afterall, incommensurability of values on a pluralistic society requires 
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reason for justifying actions while accepting some conceptual room for explaining a wrongful act 
which teleology and end pursued might turn it into a rightful action.  
In order to be able to act according to necessity, the perpetrator must judge the nature of 
the situation. Besides of cost-benefits analysis, the evaluation of the type of situation in which is 
appropriate to proceed aiming on the end and accepting collateral damage. Pragmatism retrieved 
from real cases explains why situations of armed conflicts are not merely a neutral field of 
activity for intentions conceived outside of that situation. Rather, it calls for certain actions 
already in our perception which is suitable to replace the deontology of means-ends as primary 
basic category of international law. The relationship between action and the situation is not one-
sided, comporting teleological interpretation as well. Constitutive actions, which can be 
considered that kind of human agency that makes judgement on abnormality or exceptional 
situations, takes into account cost-benefit analysis and moral perceptions of values aimed to a 
certain end is the only way out of a moral dilemma whose nature of action shall be teleological. 
This dialogue between deontology and teleology is a reciprocal condition to regulate a complex 
legal order based on incommensurable pluralistic values.   
Teleology shows us that the end in pursuit justifies the means employed and the law, in 
general terms, national or international, points to social greater good. Human agency is set to 
accomplish purposes, it always has a goal to achieve. Human behavior is teleologically aimed to 
an end and governed by values. The ultimate components of meaningful human action are 
initially bound to the categories of “ends” and “means”491. Reasoning about the purpose and ends 
is an unavoidable feature of arguing about justice. The link between justice and the good is 
 
491 HANS JOAS, THE CREATIVITY OF ACTION 148-161 (2005). 
 224 
 
unavoidable and principles of justice depend for their justification on the moral worth or the 
intrinsic good of the ends. There is certain legitimacy on heavy attacks on military and industrial 
targets that makes the targeting of civilians inevitable. But there must be a fair balance between 
the means employed and the purpose achieved. 
For instance, it is crucial in Hassan that the denial of his liberty is justified in the name of 
an overriding good for others, since his liberty poses risk to welfare of other and society. 
Therefore, his right became instrumental to the advancement of some end held to be precedent, 
which is the common good and welfare of society and international community. Human rights 
law and philosophy does not work binarily, like either we fulfil individual right and dignity, or 
we face a human rights void. As remarked by Michael Sandel, it has been assumed that universal 
morality is based on binary terms: either you respect human dignity, or you treat human being as 
a mean instead of an end; you treat human being as a thing. However, this duality is passed. It 
has expired the position of take-or-leave-it regarding morality in human rights492. There is 
something in between using humanity as an end and as a mean. In this vein, the argument that 
human rights are entirely unfit for the context of armed conflicts is misleading. 
The justice pursued by human rights law and international humanitarian law, even crafted 
in humanity, is rightly measured in terms of the treatment and protection of persons, peoples, and 
a community of nations493. Many defenders of moral philosophy rights think individual rights 
morality and social welfare morality are incompatible concepts, but they are not, they actually 
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coexist harmoniously494. To understand utility, as social welfare, and to set boundaries by 
necessity and proportionality, a cost-benefit analysis must be employed. With a very persuasive 
pragmatic scope, cost-benefit analysis targets deep issues and designs “to assist people in making 
complex judgements where multiple goods are involved”. However, cost-benefit analysis cannot 
be the only rule used in decision-making process, some value must be attached to it495, reason 
why proportionality and necessity step in to attain principle of humanity rationale. Also, human 
dignity remains a human rights morality; remains present, albeit working as secondary 
enjoinment. Utilitarianism is a theory of both personal morality and social justice, and the 
absence human dignity morality within utilitarian metamorality would conceive all sort of 
asocial traits, such as cruelty and intentional evil deeds496. 
A creative dimension of human action shall be incorporated into this conceptual structure 
to enrich its content, since social order establishes a valid nexus between creativity and action 
and it makes clear that an emphasis on rationality is a normative orientation just as much as on 
dignity. So, utilitarian value applicable as metamorality in order to maintain human rights 
endorsable in mandatory mutualism of armed conflicts is, as Joas puts it, “the creative model 
superior to the normativist model, because it leads to the examination of two questions that 
would otherwise remain unsolved. The first is the question of how norms and values are to be 
applied to specific situations, and the second is the question of how values that guide our actions 
can arise in the first place”497.  
 
494 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 69-70 (1996). 
495 RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 123 (2001). 
496 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 83 (1996). 
497 HANS JOAS, WAR AND MODERNITY 190 (2003). 
 226 
 
Contemporary armed conflicts have shown us that it is not always possible to deduce how 
values should be applied in particular situations, instead, the opposite occurs, particular 
situations call for independent creative specifications of these values. In this equation, which is 
far away from our sense of social normality and political stability (NTP analogy), a commitment 
to specific values does not arise through intention, but through powerful experiences. On this 
regard, not all experiences come from enthusiasm, rather, experiences of powerlessness, like 
terrorist attacks, and violence, that causes trauma, open up a space in which there is scope for 
this third model of creative action and reshape of positive universalistic values498. Thus, the 
achievement of collective good, the greatest good for the greatest number, is a positive 
universalistic value that embeds utilitarian morality and underpins community values. By this 
token, teleology can be understood as a form of action that rationalizes ends, values and 
consequences, which remains ideal to armed conflicts situations499, because universal values 
mutate from case to case500. Only teleology can rationally galvanize the probabilities and social 
phenomena involved in military necessity and proportionality in action when civilians are 
targeted as side effect. 
Utilitarian morality comprehends a normativist theory of social order that implies 
decision-making and people often have to make decisions under conditions of profound 
uncertainty, pure contingencies. Even though, some decision-making elements can be predicted 
to afford proper planning and coordination of necessary actions. When we deal with social 
values into decision-making process, we shed into light social goals which are based on reason 
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towards individual and collective welfare. Morality and welfare merge to a common ground, 
becoming a common currency. The conventional philosophy of social science has asserted that 
the task of the social scientist is the production of law-like generalizations, that's the 
contemporary duty of social scientists who have to foresee the outcomes of alternative policies 
that derive from a knowledge of law-like generalizations501. On this regard, utilitarianism, by the 
equation of the greatest good for the greatest number, trumps human dignity morality, serving 
armed conflicts dilemmas, such as targeting civilians for military necessity, as metamorality 
content.   
Teitel enlists six clusters of threats which international community must be concerned 
now and in the decades ahead, which would fit the abnormality conditions that shifts morality 
density and application, recalling NTP chemistry analogy: “(1) economic and social threats, 
including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; (2) Inter-State conflict; (3) 
Internal Conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; (4) nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons; (5) terrorism; and (6) transnational organized 
crime”502. Some critics on utilitarianism comes from the fact that its ethics treats people as cell in 
the overall social organism rather than individuals and has no boundary principles, except 
possibly sentience. Nevertheless, some objections to utilitarianism ethics can be suppressed by 
replacing wealth for utility as the maximand, taking for wealth a context not in strictly monetary 
terms but rather as the summation of all the valued tangible and intangible objects in society503.  
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It is just a matter or argumentative allocation. Placing utilitarian morality into judgement 
call on military actions covered by mandatory mutualism scope shall not put human rights law 
aside, as did Hassan. Respecting the idea of mutual reinforcement, utilitarian morality fits human 
rights law goals as metamorality over human dignity. Not to say that utilitarianism displaces the 
central role of human dignity deontology, but it prevails as metamorality under armed conflict 
exceptionalism in order to perform a good outcome towards international community and general 
values. Therefore, the conflict of interests and aim between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law is merely apparent. The alleged incompatibility between them is hence misled. 
In essence, there is no conflict between them; there is no need to establish the commensalism 
between them, giving to international humanitarian law the preference over human rights law in 
order to its benefit only. Conversely, utilitarian metamorality fits both branches and mutually 
provides them benefit of application without erasing the broad knowledge of humanitarian law as 
lex specialis and human rights law as lex generalis.   
What is being defended here is international community which international legal system 
is designed to protect, just as much as the lives and liberties of the members of this community. 
Thus, like a Latin catchphrase, fiat justicia ruat coelom, do justice even if the heavens fall, calls 
for extreme necessity upon an intense crisis, a supreme emergency which authorizes the 
exceptional action to recover normality and stability. The identification of supreme emergency, 
by the way, can be made international courts or international governmental organization, such as 
United Nations. As we have seen, international legal system allows the usage of legal general 
clauses which might be filled by interpretation and application of international law (Article 31 
Vienna Convention). Moreover, this law-making process through decision-making rationale has 
to take into account the unity, coherence and wholeness of the entire legal system, forwarded by 
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a systematic and teleological interpretation. The mandatory mutualism between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, by this token, complies with international law standards 
when applying utilitarian metamorality to combat imminent danger of high impact where 
targeting civilians might appear necessary and proportional as a side effect to overcome the 
supreme emergency.  
In such cases, international humanitarian law and human rights law intermingle by 
mandatory mutualism. Human dignity morality remains primary moral compass into this mutual 
relationship, at least while preserved social NTP, social normality and political stability of 
international community. Once eroded such traits, an exceptional state takes over and NTP 
morality becomes secondary, for the sake of mutualism integrity. Furthermore, in the middle of 
human agency to recover status quo of international community and defend our cherished values 
and cooperative fellowship, some acts deemed necessary shall be performed. Among them, we 
can eventually have a civilian target situation which can be accommodated into legal-moral wall 
whether some conditions are met. The harm that shall fall upon them must be unintended but 
assumed by predictions as a side effect. For that, a primary target of military necessity shall be 
the one truly intended whose outcome will contribute to the overall goal of overcoming supreme 
emergency, definitely or partially, or giving to the battle a great advantage.  
To make this operation possible, doctrine of double effect must be argumentatively 
placed with the additional considerations of cost-benefit analysis, where all costs (including the 
evil consequence of harming targeted civilians as collateral damage) shall face the benefits to 
reach a certain end. The path to reach this intended end with good consequence, the greatest 
good, is rationally constructed by teleology reasoning, to whom the ends justifies the means, 
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what is basically a mathematical assessment. To morally evaluate this cost-benefit analysis 
teleologically connected to the greatest good of the end pursued, utilitarianism shall provide 
moral grounds to challenge the action as primary moral compass during emergency time. As the 
value that will contrast all action is the welfare of international community and collective great 
achievements, moral consideration on proportionality and duty to mitigate the harm to amount a 
lesser evil effect are pushed forward in front of the evil consequence of targeting civilians.   
Considering the formula we provided above, PB < TA*HL, military necessity must go 
through cost-benefit analysis and lesser evil scrutiny. The former explains the teleological 
rationality to seek a good end regardless of means, while the latter seeks to comply with moral 
argumentation of proportionality and all efforts converged to mitigate the loss, in order to let 
utilitarian morality trumping human dignity morality as minimum as possible. During this 
second analysis of lesser evil and mitigating the loss, it would be also considered any attempt to 
minimize the harm on targeted civilians. Nevertheless, whether the final outcome, which is the 
foreseeable greatest good, outbalances the evil outcome of civilians harm as collateral damage, 
the doctrine of double effect is morally acceptable and mutualism benefits equally met, both to 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, the latter beneath utilitarian metamorality 
as primary moral compass during supreme emergency. 
For this account, departing from a factual scenario of supreme emergency, which 
dissociates from normal regular conditions we face in peacetime and social NTP, we recognized 
a mutation in international law able to provide answers to overcome the crisis. Therefore, the 
mandatory mutualism between international humanitarian law and human rights law remains 
untouched in respect to their inner interplay and considerations. The important shift in their 
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applicability occurs in utilitarian morality trumping human dignity morality and functioning as 
metamorality to solve pragmatic problems in armed conflicts. It is sensitive to highlight that 
human dignity morality is not remove, but instead of being primary moral compass, it becomes 
secondary moral compass, leaving the leading role to utilitarian metamorality.  
As consequence, the deontology rationality reasoning attached to human dignity morality 
that universally enjoins treating people always as an end, never as a mean, is surpassed by 
teleology rationality reasoning which is attached to utilitarian morality and, inversely, it accepts 
treating people as a mean to seek the greatest good to the greatest number. Regarding the civilian 
targeting, which is the scope of this work, in situations of armed conflicts, targeting civilians is 
permitted as a side effect, since the good outcome outbalances the evil consequences of the harm 
inflicted on civilians. More than that, proportionality and the justification of the lesser evil as a 
duty to minimize the losses or the harm impact on civilians are the moral considerations to 
comply with human rights rational whose mutual benefit derives from social values fulfillment 
towards the victory or the great advantaged behind the end pursued as a good effect. Yet, human 
dignity still plays a supporting role to utilitarianism metamorality when forbidding jus cogens 
violations, for example. Even in front of utilitarian metamorality, human dignity plays an 
important role which makes us conclude that, at first glance, there is no predictable good 
consequence that outweighs the evil consequence of eroding a jus cogens value. We believe it is 
accurate in utilitarian terms in the manner that the erosion of jus cogens, in the long run, can 
provoke an irreparable harm to mankind flourishment and values enhancement.  
That is why we agree with Hassan conclusion, however we disagree with its terms. For 
the sake of this work’s idea, human rights law should not be removed from equation in order to 
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give international humanitarian law all benefits of international law fulfillment, which we called 
commensalism. Rather, reaching the same conclusion, the rational we would apply regards 
utilitarian metamorality to fight against hosti humani generis of our time, which causes 
significant risks to the foundational values of our international community and the welfare of its 
members. The danger they pose is imminent and of high impact, what complies with supreme 
emergency, endorses the mandatory mutualism between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law whose benefits of law applications ought to be left for both branches. 
However, in violating human rights in order to fight this abnormality, particularly overlapping 
human dignity morality, a metamorality underpinned in social values is measured pursuant its 
symmetry towards necessity and proportionality, even whether targeting civilians as side effect, 
whose harm is not intended but it is foreseen in order to achieve a greatest good. The survival 
and freedom of the community are the utmost values – also embedded in human right morality 
frame – of international society in situations of armed conflicts characterized such peril that NTP 
social conditions are no longer assessed. The teleology and systematic interpretation which 
allows us to get to the end and restore social normality and political stability is morally 
acceptable and preserve legal order unity, coherence and wholeness.  
Notwithstanding, regarding the preconditions of necessity and proportionality, the 
analysis over cost-benefit must be done as well and, in practical life, procedural observances 
must be fulfilled alongside. Thus, all information on targeting civilians as side effects 
unintentionally, the attempts to minimize the harm on civilians, the lack of military alternative to 
achieve the end pursued and the configuration of the lesser evil, demonstrating that the greatest 
good reached outweighs the evil consequence, must be confirmed upon evidences – since 
international investigations not always can rely on proofs – and impartiality – which is closely 
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linked to unintentionality of action, which indicates an action performed out of any motive 
discrimination or prejudice. Under such auspices, both substantial and procedural comprehension 
of international law are met. More, the mandatory mutualism between international humanitarian 
law and human rights law is entirely preserved, opening space for their mutual relationship to 
thrive and develop granting benefits for both sides. Even this consideration attains to utilitarian 
morality since it is international community who will be better off from the continuity of 
interwoven interpretation and application of these two humanely branches of law.  
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